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Summary
Using case studies from twenty East German and Hungarian companies this thesis 
examines the process of enterprise restructuring in transition economies. The data was 
specifically collected for such a comparative study and benefits from a relatively large 
number of cases, an unusual amount of internal consistency and depth. The broad 
theme is one of disintegration and integration. I examine how in response to 
increasing market pressures companies change their vertical integration, including the 
in-house provision of social services, how they functionally integrate with their 
investors and restructure their forward and backward linkages. The aim is to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the restructuring process as it affects the crucial aspects of a 
company’s operations. By explicitly relating my findings to the empirical and 
theoretical literature on enterprise restructuring, vertical integration and economic 
geography I hope to contribute to existing controversies and open up new avenues of 
research.
A noticeable pattern in my data is that the academic literature and investors frequently 
endorsed restructuring measures which turned out to be ‘right’ for the East German 
companies and ‘wrong’ for the Hungarian ones. The second startling feature of my 
case studies is the evidence of total industrial devastation in East Germany. I argue 
that these observations are related to three recurring themes: local idiosyncrasies 
matter, the past matters and the future should not be rushed.
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Introduction
This Ph.D. examines the restructuring challenges posed by transition using 
comparative case study evidence from twenty East German and Hungarian 
enterprises. The broad theme is one of disintegration and integration. I examine how 
in response to increasing market pressures companies change their vertical 
integration, including the in-house provision of social services, how they functionally 
integrate with their investors and restructure their forward and backward linkages. 
Enterprise restructuring in transition economies is an extraordinary economic and 
historical occurrence. This process is not only interesting in its own right, but also 
poses a multitude of academic, policy and practical challenges.
The aim of this Ph.D. is to provide a comprehensive picture of the restructuring 
process as it affects the crucial aspects of a company’s operations. Transition 
economics still suffers from data scarcity, particularly when questions at the 
company-level are concerned. Especially in the early transition phase this scarcity has 
arguably contributed to the dogmatism based on pre-conceptions, which is 
occasionally evident in the academic literature. This Ph.D. aims to make a 
contribution by providing detailed empirical evidence which will help in 
distinguishing the relevant theories and interpretations from the less relevant ones. In 
doing so this study benefits from a relatively large number of in-depth comparative 
case studies enjoying an unusual amount of consistency. Only one researcher was 
involved who spoke each interviewee’s native language and used the same extensive 
questionnaire throughout.
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Chapter 1 examines the way in which previously highly integrated enterprises have 
restructured their vertical boundaries. In particular I ask whether, as suggested by the 
literature on enterprise restructuring, vertical disintegration leads to transaction cost 
savings and efficiency gains. Chapter 2 maintains a focus on the firms’ boundaries by 
examining the way in which enterprises have restructured the extensive social 
services they used to provide. Empirical hypotheses are examined which suggest that 
the extent to which a company stops the internal provision of social services is a good 
indicator of its overall restructuring effort. Chapter 3 deals with the role of foreign 
direct investors in the strategic restructuring of their subsidiaries. The notion that 
companies with FDI will outperform their rivals because of knowledge transfer from 
their investor and his role in introducing new products and production methods is 
examined both qualitatively and statistically. Using the literature on economic 
geography as an interpretative framework Chapter 4 deals with the changes which 
have occurred in the companies’ forward and backward linkages. Chapter 5 concludes 
by arguing that in enterprise restructuring local idiosyncrasies matter, the past matters 
and the future should not be rushed.
Despite the fact that surveys rather than case studies are typically used in economics, 
case studies play a significant role in other areas of social science. Case studies allow 
us to focus on naturally occurring units, such as an individual company. By 
relinquishing typicality, they make possible the ‘thick’ description of a phenomenon. 
Case studies allow for an in-depth understanding of context and situation, which is 
especially important when examining the complex and multifaceted process of
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adaptation and change companies in transition economies are subject to. Case studies 
complement surveys because are able to indicate the qualitative reasons behind 
statistical regularities, which on their own can be consistent with several explanations 
or interpretations. In addition the big transition induced changes in the boundaries of 
firms make the traditional use of large firm databases (even if these were readily 
available with reliable data) largely irrelevant in the key initial restructuring phase.1
A comparison between East Germany and Hungary can yield insights which are 
relevant to other transition economies as well. Both Hungary and East Germany 
benefit from a relatively stable political and social environment. For this reason these 
countries allow us to focus on the ‘economic’ side of transition, rather than on 
questions as to how economic agents behave under political, legal and social 
uncertainty. Consequently both Hungary and East Germany provide an example of 
what one might expect to happen at the enterprise level in other countries once there 
is some stability and legality in the overall framework they operate in. At the same 
time Hungary and East Germany represent important differences within this relatively 
advanced and ‘smooth’ transition group, in particular along the shock therapy and 
gradualism dimension; their comparison can provide a more general indication of the 
relative merits of these two approaches to transition.
1 These advantages of case studies have to be weighed against the fact that they are only able to provide 
us with snapshots of what is happening and that they do not allow us to generalise to entire populations, 
only to empirical and theoretical hypotheses. An ideal procedure is, of course, to combine case study 
evidence with survey evidence. In this study this is partly done by explicitly taking account of the 
findings made in and puzzles raised by surveys conducted by other researchers.
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The reader will find that in many instances the changes examined have also occurred 
over time in companies in more advanced market economies. For example, I find that 
in restructuring their boundaries firms closed some product lines and replaced them 
with new ones. They stopped in-house input production and started using some 
subcontractors for physical and non-physical inputs. The reader might well be left 
with a feeling of “so what?”. The answer to that question lies not so much in the 
individual changes themselves, but rather in the magnitude and diversity of the 
pressures which the companies examined simultaneously faced and the resulting 
speed and complexity of change.
To gain an impression of the pressures which companies in transition economies face, 
one has to consider that they are not just -as is common for companies operating in 
more stable and advanced market economies- faced with rapidly changing market 
conditions but that also the entire legal, political and economic framework within 
which they operate is simultaneously changing as well. To put it differently, 
companies in a transition environment are not just faced with a situation where the 
parameters of the game are changing but one where also the rules of the game have 
suffered a structural break.
It is the all-encompassing nature of the changes which all companies are 
simultaneously exposed to which makes a sit-and-wait response almost infeasible. 
Companies have to try and adapt by introducing targeted changes to all aspects of 
their operations if they do not want to be entirely left behind by their fast-moving
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environment.2 It is not activism which is called for, but genuine change: The 
company has to find new markets, new products, new supply networks, new ways of 
organising production and learn the new rules of the game (that is, for example, learn 
about marketing, consumer wants, quality control, legal requirements, new political 
lobbies etc.). Furthermore, a company has to find and learn all these things more or 
less at the same time and as soon as possible.
Information about the companies visited and the empirical evidence collected
Although one cannot speak of strictly matched, randomly selected or representative 
samples, the companies in my data set were selected to allow for meaningful 
comparisons between Hungary and East Germany. The listing of companies provided 
in the Appendix summarises the information about each company.3 In both the 
Hungarian and East German data I have focused on manufacturing companies. A few 
construction companies were included in order to be able to examine, for example, 
issues arising from the extent to which a company’s operations are localised due to 
factors such as high transportation costs for its final products and inputs. In both 
countries I have focused on companies which used to be very large, that is have at 
least 2000 employees, before 1990. These are companies which by their very size, 
prominence and high degree of vertical integration were likely to face big 
restructuring challenges. In both countries I included some medium-sized companies
2 This assumes that the force for change in the country and industrial sector at hand has already 
developed so much momentum that it is not a feasible policy for managers of the company to try and 
obliterate it or at least try and control it through forming alliances with political and bureaucratic 
forces.
3 The Appendices to the Conclusion contain the questionnaire used and discuss the statistical questions 
involved.
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in order to be able to examine under what circumstances a company’s initial size 
effects its restructuring outcomes. Overall the Hungarian and East German companies 
included had a very similar mean size in 1990. Similarly, although companies with 
FDI dominate my data set, in both data sets I included companies without a direct 
investor for comparative purposes.
It has to be noted, however, that the ultimate composition of my data set was not 
determined by my selection criteria but by the companies’ willingness to participate. 
This is likely to lead to a bias in favour of companies which are generally co­
operative, open, have nothing to hide and are hence more likely to be dynamic and 
successful. However open a company is, the promise of anonymity generally was a 
precondition for their participation.
I collected data pertaining to a company’s situation in 1990 and data on subsequent 
changes. With the aim of allowing for all aspects of a company’s restructuring 
challenge I focused on changes in each company’s
• vertical integration,
• its integration with and relationship to its investor,
• changes in its human resource policies and the general handling of labour 
shedding,
• changes in its product range, production methods, product markets, competitive 
situation as well as
• the regional effects of FDI and on changes in the company’s procurement policies.
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The companies have been numbered though from 1 to 9 in Germany, with the prefix 
D indicating that this is a German company and from HI to HI 1 in Hungary. In each 
company I used the same 38 page questionnaire (see Appendix 1 to the Conclusion) 
and every interview was conducted in the interviewee’s native language. Although I 
made sure that the basic questionnaire was answered in all companies, I regularly 
encouraged interview partners to elaborate and digress, since this is usually the 
context in which the most interesting information was revealed. I revisited a company 
until I felt that all my questions had been answered satisfactorily and truthfully, 
frequently asking several different people to give their version of events. As a matter 
of principle the trade union representative and the personnel manager were asked the 
same set of questions. Overall I conducted in-depth interviews with (at least) the 
managing director, personnel manager, trade union representative, procurement 
manager and production manager in each company. Each individual interview was 
semi-structured and lasted at least one hour. The information obtained in the 
interviews was supplemented with company reports, archival material and newspaper 
articles.
Company D1 belongs to the building sector and currently has 600 employees. In 
1995 the value of its sales was about 150 million DM. In 1990 it had 2000 employees 
and was one of the most important employers in the small town just outside Berlin in
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which it is located. In March 1991 the company was acquired by a Swedish investor 
operating in the same industrial sector. I visited company D1 on 13.08.96 and 
conducted interviews with the procurement manager, the Vice-trade union 
representative, the personnel manger and the manager in charge of logistics and 
organisation. Each interview lasted for about two hours and all of these managers had 
been with the company for many years. I obtained back issues of the magazine for 
employees of company Dl, company reports, brochures of building projects in which 
the company has been involved in over the years, a brochure on quality management 
and copies of algorithms used by the manager in charge of procurement when 
evaluating suppliers and subcontractors and quality control documents. I also obtained 
a case study report published in the book “ Privatisierte und was aus ihnen geworden 
ist”, Verlag Die Wirtschaft, 1994.
Company D2 belongs to the building sector as well and has currently 248 employees. 
In 1995 the value of its sales was about 33 million DM. In 1990 the company had 330 
employees and was only active in the quarter of East Berlin in which it is located. In 
July 1992 it was acquired by a local investor with a lot of experience in the West- 
Berlin building sector. To complement my interviews with the managing director, 
trade union representative and procurement manager I obtained a company report and 
a list of references for the company. Furthermore there exists a case study report 
published in the book “ Privatisierte und was aus ihnen geworden ist”, Verlag Die 
Wirtschaft, 1994.
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Company D3 is a steel processing plant with 270 employees and sales of 69,3 million 
DM in 1995. The company is a very interesting case study since in 1993 it was 
acquired by the East Slovak Steel Works, a company with 15000 employees. Not only 
is it most unusual to find FDI into Eastern Germany coming from another transition 
economy but also the vertical integration is the other way around as is usually 
expected, with the investor supplying its acquisition with inputs. Company D3 had 
2021 employees in 1990 and is located in town which used to be one of the industrial 
centres of the Brandenburg region but has experienced a significant decline in its 
industrial base since reunification. I visited the company on 11.09 and 20.09.1996. I 
conducted interviews with the manager in charge of procurements, the manager in 
charge of logistics, who had been until recently in charge of sales for the last twenty 
years, the personnel manager and the worker’s representative. I was also given an 
extended tour of the factory with an explanation of the machines and production 
processes. Further supporting material was obtained in the form of the company 
brochure and report as well as in numerous newspapers from the local as well as 
national and international press, including an article in Business Central Europe, 
October 1996, on the East Slovak Steel Works.
Company D4 is a tyre manufacturer located in the same town as Company Dl. The 
company has 722 employees currently and used to have 9500 employees, which made 
it the single most important employer in its home town. Current sales amount to 135 
million DM (1995), with 170 million DM being planned for 1996. In January 1995 
company D4 is acquired by a West German tyre maker, who in turn belongs to a
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Japanese conglomerate. I visited company D4 20.08.96 and conducted two-hour 
interviews with the manager in charge of production, the personnel manager, the 
worker’s representative and the manager in charge of procurements. Further 
supporting material was obtained in the form of a copy of the contract between the 
employees and the managers of the company concerning working hours, wages and 
employee numbers which is in force while the company transfers from one trade 
union (Chemie-Papier-Keramik) to another (Bergbau-Chemie-Energie), cuttings from 
local newspapers, back issues of all press releases made by the company as well as a 
copy of the quality management booklet compiled for the managers of the company 
which includes, among others, documents dealing with the internal organisation of 
quality control, internal and external audits, project management and customer 
relations.
Company D5 is a pharmaceuticals company in (East) Berlin with 1033 employees, 
down from 2700 employees in 1990. In 1992 company D5 was acquired by an Italian 
pharmaceuticals company. In 1995 its sales amounted to 256 million DM. I visited 
company D5 on 05.09 and 06.09.96 and conducted interviews with the manager in 
charge of Gesundheitspolitik und Untemehmensfiihrung (health policies), the 
manager in charge of sales and the manager in charge of procurements, the personnel 
manager and the worker’s representative. Supporting material was obtained in the 
form of a complete set (starting in 1991) of back issues of the magazine published for 
the employees of company D5, company reports of 1995 and 1991 product price lists 
and brochures as well as several confidential audit reports of suppliers. Furthermore
10
there is a case study report of this company in “ Privatisierte und was aus ihnen 
geworden ist”, Verlag Die Wirtschafit, 1994.
Company D6 is of interest because it is an example of a failed privatisation. This 
company used to belong to the VEB Kombinat Kraftwerksanlagenbau in which 
40.000 employees were organised in 20 companies. The company out of which D6 
developed had 6500 employees. Before 1990 company D6 designed and built 
components for both nuclear and fossil fuel power stations, but had an exclusive 
responsibility within the conglomerate for designing and building nuclear power 
stations. In 1995 the company had 320 employees and sales amounting to 58 million 
DM. Since 1990 company D6 has been specialising in designing and co-ordinating 
the building of small and medium sized fossil fuel power stations. In 1992 the 
company had been sold to a consortium consisting of an American pipeline operator 
and a West German power station builder, with the latter however pulling out of the 
deal at the last moment. The privatisation to the pipeline operator did not prove a 
success and to save company D6, the Treuhand intervened by instituting a 
treuhandlerischer Verwalter, that is an administrator who is the formal owner of 
100% of the company’s shares and is supposed to restructure the company with the 
aim of reprivatisation. Thus the Treuhand in effect bought back company D6. When I 
visited the company in 1996, it was conducting negotiations with several potential 
investors and was hoping to be privatised before the end of the year. It was facing 
serious economic problems as was reflected both by the lack of hope its employees
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had for the future of the company and in comments made by managers in company 
D8 which used to belong to the same Conglomerate as company D6.
In a follow-up call in May 1998 I was told that the company D6 went bankrupt on 
30.11.97. It was then taken over with a third of its employees by a consortium 
consisting to 51% of a German and to 49% of an English power station builder.
I visited the company on 21.08. and 24.09.96 and interviewed the manager in charge 
of public relations, the worker’s representative, the manager in charge of 
procurements and the personnel manager. Supporting material was obtained in the 
form of the 1994 and 1995 company reports as well as a list of references for the 
company.
Company D7, a civil engineering company, is an unusual case because its investor, 
an internationally operative Austrian holding company with 10000 employees world­
wide, went bankrupt in the beginning of 1995. Interestingly the investor had also 
bought what managers in company D7 refer to as their “sister company”, an industrial 
site builder who was of a similar size as D7 before reunification and belonged to the 
same Conglomerate. The sister company, together with the investor’s numerous 
acquisition in all of Eastern Europe followed the investor into bankruptcy. Company 
D7 is the only member of the conglomerate who survived and is currently up for sale 
by the Treuhand again. Company D7 had 6800 employees in 1990 of which 800 are 
left by the end of 1996. Its sales amounted to 220 million DM in 1996 with 210 being
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expected for 1997. I visited the company on 17.12.96 and conducted interviews with 
the personnel manager, the trade union representative, the Technischer Leiter (the 
manger in charge of technical questions) and the procurement manager. I further 
obtained a case study published in “Privatisierte und was aus ihnen geworden ist”, 
Verlag Die Wirtschafit, 1994 as well as company reports for 1995 and 1994, an 
internal exposé concerning developments since 1990, copies from the internally 
developed training programme, evaluation sheets for suppliers, the investor’s 
company report for 1992 and excerpts from training documents provided by the 
investor.
Company D8 is a power station components supplier specialising in gas turbines. In 
1991 D8 was bought by a large Swedish-Swiss conglomerate. In 1990 the company 
had 4500 employees, down to 500 by the end of 1996. Its sales volume in 1996 
amounted to 120 million DM. Company D8 used to belong to the same conglomerate 
as company D6 and still occasionally supplies turbines or services for projects co­
ordinated by company D6. I visited company D8 on 19.12.96 and conducted 
interviews with the manager in charge of PR and the management of change. He 
seemed to be the only manager left who had a good historical experience of the 
company and overview of the parameters of change. He also answered questions 
concerning industrial relations, because the position of the personnel manger was just 
being filled with a new candidate. I also talked to the trade union representative and 
obtained a case study published in “Privatisierte und was aus ihnen geworden ist”,
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Verlag Die Wirtschaft, 1994, as well as a company report for 1995 and an expose of 
the history of the company.
Company D9 is a gear factory acquired by a West German company operating in 
the same industrial sector. Company D9’s investor has shares in 34 companies in 15 
countries, including South and North America and Eastern Europe, a sales volume of
7,2 billion DM and 33 892 employees. Company D9 itself has 750 employees, down 
from 3000 in 1990 and a sales volume of 213 million DM (1996). I visited the 
company on 18.12.96, conducted interviews with the manager in charge of 
controlling, the trade union representative and was allowed to join an end of year 
inspection of the entire factory. I also obtained a company report of the investor for 
1996, a brochure on quality management, an exposé of the products, a case study 
published in “Privatisierte und was aus ihnen geworden ist”, Verlag Die Wirtschaft, 
1994, as well as back issues of the magazine for employees.
Company HI belongs to the food industry. The company is active in crushing and 
refining oilseeds and has a virtual monopoly in the Hungarian market for sunflower 
oil. In 1996 the net value of sales generated by company HI was 292 million DM. At 
the time of its privatisation in 1992 to a French investor from the same sector the 
company had 2100 employees in six factories. By 1997 the overall number of 
employees in the three remaining factories had been reduced to 640.1 visited the head 
offices of the company on 15.04.97 and 29.07.97. I conducted a two and a half hour 
interview with the general manager and a one hour interview with a trade union
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representative. The general manager thought it unnecessary for me to talk to the 
personnel and procurements managers separately since in his opinion I would receive 
the very same answers from them as from him, after all “we have all been here for 
very long.” From the head of marketing I obtained leaflets which the company 
publishes as part of a heart awareness campaign along the lines of “eat less animal fat 
and more vegetable fats”, the investor’s annual reports of 1995 and 1996 and a 
collection of newspaper articles published in the national media about the company.
Company H2 is also active in the food industry. Its main product groups are instant 
drinks, convenience foods and sweets, generating net sales of 133 million DM in 
1996. Overall, the company has currently 1396 employees, down from 2400 in 1992, 
the year of its privatisation to a Swiss multinational from the same industrial sector. 
The factory I visited produces chocolate drinks and wafers. Since 1992 the number of 
its employees has fallen from 600 to just 50 people. I visited the head office of the 
company as well as its factory on 20., 21, 22.05.97. I conducted interviews with the 
general manager of the factory, the manager in charge of product development who 
also acts as a trade union representative, the personnel manager and the head of 
procurement. Each interview lasted for about one and a half hours. In addition I also 
obtained the investor’s company report for 1995.
Company H3 belongs to the food industry as well. Originally it was part of the same 
industrial structure as most of what was become company H2. H3 specialises in 
chocolates and cookies. Its net sales amounted to 101 million DM in 1996. In 1992
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H3 was privatised with 3400 employees to the German subsidiary of an American 
multinational company. In the same year two of the four factories acquired by the 
investor were sold on to the investor of company H2, thus transferring 900 employees 
between the two companies. Today H3 employs 800 employees in two factories. I 
visited company H3 on 17.04.97 and conducted interviews with the general manager, 
the personnel manager, a trade union representative and the head of procurement. I 
also obtained press releases by the company, back issues of the employee’s magazine 
and newspaper articles from the national press.
Company H4 is a pharmaceuticals company with 2550 employees (1997) and net 
sales totalling 265 million DM in 1996. When the French investor acquired a 40% 
stake in H4 in 1991, company H4 had 4500 employees. The stake of the investor, who 
is also a pharmaceuticals company, was gradually increased to 51% in 1993, 76% in 
1995 and 100% in June 1996. I visited the company on 15.05.97 and conducted 
interviews with the operation director of industrial resources, the trade union 
representative, the personnel manager and the head of purchasing. I also obtained 
relevant newspaper articles and a company profile.
Company H5 is a large chemicals company specialising in polyolefin feedstock and 
products. The company is based on a vertical structure and produces ethylene, 
propylene and polymers from naphtha. H5 has 20% of Central Europe’s
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petrochemical capacity4. It is one of the two remaining Hungarian chemicals 
companies of this size and importance and generated net sales worth 569 million DM 
in 1996. Company H ll is a major input supplier of H5, who purchases refined 
petroleum products, in particular naphtha and gasoil, from Hll .  There were several 
potential foreign investors who wanted to acquire a controlling stake in the company, 
but H5 resisted being privatised to any of them on the grounds that the prospective 
investors did not have long-run plans with H5 which were in the interest of H5 as 
perceived by its management and workforce. The company made a conscious decision 
to resort to institutional investors instead and floated in 1996, becoming one of the 
most liquid stocks on the Budapest stock exchange. The company is also listed on the 
London stock exchange. In 1997, 51% of shares were held by foreign institutions, 
23.4% by domestic institutional investors and 8.2% of shares were held by the 
company’s employees.5 In 1990 the company had 5000 employees. Today H5 itself 
has 3500 employees. About 1600 employees were transferred to 32 affiliated 
companies which have been separated out from H5 as part of its restructuring plan or 
which are joint venture greenfield developments with a foreign investor.
I also visited companies H5b & c. Since in these companies it was not possible to 
obtain complete data sets, they have been omitted from the statistical parts of this 
study. H5b is a joint venture on-site greenfield development between H5 and an 
American investor (the shareholdings are 40% and 60% respectively). Using inputs 
from H5, H5b produces carbon, which is needed, for example, for the production of
4 source: H5’s company report for 1996
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tyres. Since its foundation in 1992, H5b has been profitable throughout and has 
increased its employee numbers from 60 in 1992 to 88 in 1997. In 1996 its net sales 
totalled 53 million DM. H5c used to be fully integrated with company H5. Using 
plastic fibres produced by H5, H5c specialises in the production of polypropylene and 
polyethylene sacks. In 1991 H5c was separated out from H5 and a 50% stake was sold 
to an Austrian investor. H5c’s employee numbers have risen from 150 in 1994 to 
about 500 in 1997.6 Net sales in 1996 amounted to 16 million DM.
I visited H5, b and c on 05 and 06.06. 97. All three companies are located on one site 
in northern Hungary. I interviewed the managing directors of companies H5b and H5c 
respectively, the deputy CEO of H5, the personnel manager of company H5, a 
representative of the trade union to which employees in all three companies belong 
and the personnel manager of company H5. Furthermore I obtained back issues of the 
employee’s magazine of H5, a company brochure for H5c, relevant newspaper articles 
from the national press, stock exchange reports of H5 for 1996 and 1997, the annual 
report of H5 for 1996 and the script for a PR presentation introducing H5 to 
prospective business partners. I was also given a guided tour of the main production 
facilities and of the extensive on-site recreational facilities for employees.
Company H6 used to be one of the best-known manufacturing companies in 
Hungary. The company is still state owned although there are ongoing negotiations 
with potential investors. The only investor so far is a Russian consortium which has a 5
5 source: H5’s stock market report for 1996. The remainder is held by H5’s local government.
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30% stake in the company. It has been claimed towards me by the TUR that this is 
however a sleeping investor, who is represented through the Hungarian state property 
agency, APV Rt. Articles in the Hungarian equivalent of The Economist, HVG, 
document, however, in great detail the rather stormy past this “sleeping” investor has 
had with the state property agency.7 H6’s main products are buses of all categories, 
vehicle parts and vehicle manufacturing equipment. At the height of its output 
throughout the 1980s, the company produced in excess of 12000 buses a year. In 1989 
an accelerated decline set in and production in H6 fell to about 500 buses in 1996. 
The net value of sales in 1997 was about 203 million DM, generated by the sale of 
about 1750 buses. Employee numbers reflect this overall decline: they fell from 
10.500 to 3.200 overall and in the factory visited from 3500 to 850. Considering that 
in its main markets demand for the product of this company has not collapsed as 
much as would be the case for some other manufacturing products, this rapid decline 
is as much intriguing to the researcher as it seems to be baffling and de-motivating to 
highly trained workforce. In 1996 the company got a new managing director and 
there are hopes to stabilise the output of the company in the medium term at 3500 
buses and increase output in 1998 to 2500 buses, hopefully generating targeted net 
sales worth 354 million DM that year.
I visited company H6 on 13., 14. and 20.05.97 and conducted interviews with the 
head of logistics, a trade union representative, the head of corporate strategy and the 
personnel manager. I also had a discussion with some junior engineers and met an 6
6 source: script of a presentation held in May 1997 by the manager in charge of investor relations
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intern from America, Todd Calamita, who gave me a working paper written by him 
on the situation and strategic options of the company. I also obtained a company 
profile and the script for a PR presentation introducing H6 to prospective business 
partners.
Company H7 is another well-known Hungarian manufacturing company. Its 
products are lamps, lamp equipment and components. In 1989/90 H7 was acquired by 
an American investor. At the time H7 had 14.297 employees. The number of 
employees has been reduced to 9.952 by 1997. Production increased between 1989 
and 1995 by over 50% with net sales totalling 442 million DM in 1995 and 600 
million US $ in 1996. The privatisation of H7 is now widely viewed as very 
successful, also because the investor has not only maintained the R&D activities of 
H7 but even transferred large R&D capacities to H7 from Europe and the USA. I 
visited H7 on 03.06.97 and 07.08.97. I conducted interviews with the Director of 
Manufacturing of the European division of H7’s investor, the manager in charge of 
compensation and benefits, the trade union representative, the manager heading 
services sourcing, the head of R&D and the communication manager. I also obtained 
a company profile, a publication on the history of the company, back issues of the 
employees’ magazine, ongoing leaflets to the employees outlining and arguing for the 
company’s most recent advancements in quality management, the 1996 annual report 
of the investor and articles from the national press. 7
7 see, for example, HVG 1995 June 10, HVG 1995, November 25, HVG 1996 October 12
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Company H8 is active in the printed matter and packaging industry. Its main 
products are folding cartons, flexible-wall packaging materials, labels as well as 
books and news-papers. H8 is an input supplier to H7. In 1996 the company had net 
sales worth 97 million DM. It was acquired in 1990 with 1000 employees by a 
French institutional investor. By 1997 employee numbers have been reduced to 580.1 
visited H8 on 06.08.97 and conducted an interview with the technical director of the 
company, the personnel manager and a trade union representative. I was also given 
several promotional publications on both H8 and its investor and was shown some of 
the products made by H8.
Company H9 is also in the packaging industry, specialising in the production of 
paper boards and folding cartons. In 1996, the company had net sales worth 10 
million DM. The company was acquired in 1993 by an American investor. Between 
1990 and 1997 employee numbers fell from 450 to 100. I visited the company on 13. 
and 29.08.97. The managing director of the company preferred to take the 
questionnaires home hand fill them in his own time. Consequently I could only have 
an unstructured discussion with him at our first meeting and I have to rely on the 
answers he gave me on the questionnaire. I was unable to see the trade union 
representative, who could not make any proposed meeting times. I also obtained a fact 
sheet about the company.
Company H10 belongs to the construction industry. Its activities include road and 
railway building, the production of asphalt and the building of water and gas
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pipelines. In 1996 it generated net sales of 23 million DM employing 250 people. In 
1991 H10 was privatised to an Austrian investor with 650 employees. I visited H10 
on 14. and 15.08.97. I interviewed the managing director of the company and the 
chief accountant. Since the employees showed no interest in their trade union, the 
local trade union structure has withered away and there was no trade union 
representative to be interviewed. I obtained two different PR booklets introducing the 
company to potential business partners and the investor’s annual report for 1995/6.
Company H ll  is one of the largest Hungarian companies. Its field of activity is the 
exploration and production as well as the refining and marketing of gas and oil. HI 1 
also has a telecommunications division, whose main asset is a switched network of 
over 6.000 km laid alongside the company’s pipelines. H ll produces petrol, runs a 
network of petrol stations, produces heating oils, lubricants, kerosene, propane, 
butane and is involved in gas and oil production and transportation but not in 
distribution. Company H5 is one of the three most important wholesale customers of 
HI 1. In some areas of its activities the company still has an effective state monopoly. 
The company was floated in 1991 on the Budapest stock exchange, where, due to the 
profitability of HI 1, it has proven to be one of the most popular shares. In 1996 the 
net value of sales reached 4.159 million DM and had 14.500 employees. In 1990 the 
company had 40.000 employees. As part of a pre-flotation restructuring 33 companies 
with overall 17.000 employees were separated out of Hl l .  Hl l  was floated with 
22.000 employees in 1991, so that the overall direct reduction of employee numbers 
between 1990 and 1997 is no more than 8500.
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I visited H ll on 25.05.97. I conducted interviews with the deputy finance manager, 
the deputy marketing manager, a trade union representative and the personnel 
manager. I also obtained the report for the shareholders’ meeting of 28.05.97, back 
issues from the employees’ magazine from several years, the company report for 
1996/7, an investors’ news leaflet from February 1997 and a document outlining the 
company’s business development since 1993 and its business plans up to 1999.
In addition to the research done in companies Dl-9 and HI-11 I also conducted 
interviews with the following people, whom I thank for their participation and help:
1. On 22.09.96 I conducted a two-hour interview with Mr Harald Braun, 
Bezirkssekretar at the IG Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt, Landesverband Berlin-Brandenburg. 
Mr Braun has been active in the trade union movement in Brandenburg for many 
years before reunification even though he was not a member of the SED. From 1981 
to 1987 he was Betriebsgewerkschaftsleiter (the head of the trade union in that 
company) in a medium sized company. He is one of the very few remaining trade 
union officials who have stayed in their positions after 1990. Mr Braun has been 
known to be very critical of the political regime of the GDR, a stance which caused 
personal problems for him in the past, such as being denied a university education.
2. On 11.04.96 I conducted a three-hour interview with Professor Hilmar Schmidt 
from the Bundesanstalt fur Vereinigungsbedingte Sonderaufgaben (BVS). Professor
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Schmidt has been previously working for the Treuhandanstalt in a high-ranking 
position.
3. In Hungary I interviewed the President and Managing Director of Douwe Egberts 
Hungary, a subsidiary of the American company Sara Lee. He declined an interview 
based on my questionnaire, but kindly gave me a two hour unstructured interview on 
03.06.97. Sara Lee took over the former state monopolist in food packaging, Compac, 
and also developed some greenfield sites. The company belongs to the food industry 
and specialises in coffee (40% market share), tea (65%), spices (50%), groceries, 
sweeteners and salt. The turnover of Douwe Egberts Hungary was about 22 billion 
HUF in 1996. The interview provided an insight into a Western manager’s point of 
view concerning the attitudes and qualification of the Hungarian workforce, the 
professionalism of Hungarian trade unions, the conditions with the APV Rt., the role 
of local government, the reliability and attitude of Hungarian business partners and 
the image of Western investors with the general public. Since my interview partner 
gets interviewed by the Hungarian media, including television, quite frequently, his 
opinions seem to be regarded by the Hungarian media as fairly representative.
4. I also conducted a two hour interview with a senior Hungarian diplomat who was 
involved, among other things, in post-1990 trade negotiations with Russia.
5 .1 am grateful for the discussions conducted with Hungarian academics working in 
related fields, especially Prof. Csaba Mako from the Hungarian Academy of Science,
24
Dr. Annamaria Inzelt from the Budapest University of Economics and Dr. Gabor 
Papanek from the GKI Economic Research Unit.
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Appendix: 
List of companies
Sector Main Products FDI Sales8 Employees 1996/7 
(1990)’
D1 construction Housing YES 150 600, (2000)
D2 construction Housing YES 33 248, (330)
D3 manufacturing steel products YES 69,3 270, (2021)
D4 manufacturing Tyres YES 135 722, (9500)
D5 manufacturing Pharmaceuticals YES 256 1033, (2700)
D6 construction power stations NO 58 320, (6500)
D7 construction civil engineering NO 220 800, (6800)
D8 manufacturing gas turbines YES 120 500, (4500)
D9 manufacturing Gears YES 213 700, (3000)
HI manufacturing food: refined oils YES 292 640, (2100)
H2 manufacturing food: instant drinks, sweets YES 133 1396, (2400)
H3 manufacturing food: cookies, chocolate YES 101 800, (2500)
H4 manufacturing Pharmaceuticals YES 265 2550 + 200 
(4500)
H5 manufacturing chemicals: polyolefin feedstocks and 
products
NO 569 3500+ 1600 
(5000)
H6 manufacturing buses, vehicle parts NO 354 3200 + 4300 
(10.500)
H7 manufacturing lamps, lamp equipment YES 442 9.952 + 2000 
(14.297)
H8 manufacturing packaging materials NO 9.7 580 + 400 
(1000)
H9 manufacturing packaging materials YES 10 100, (450)
H10 construction civil engineering YES 23 250, (650)
H ll manufacturing petroleum and gas products NO 4159 14.500+ 17.000 
(40.000)
* 1995 figures for the German companies and 1996 figures for the Hungarian ones, all in million DM 
2550 + 200 means, for example, that in 1997 the company in question employs 2550 people, while 
200 of its former workers are now employed by fully operative separated out units (, that is newly 
founded companies under independent management, but not necessarily without ownership ties to the 
parent company).
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Chapter 1
Restructuring the boundaries of the firm: 
Changes in vertical integration
Abstract
This chapter examines the way in which previously highly integrated enterprises have restructured 
their vertical boundaries, both with respect to the internal production o f inputs and their functional 
integration. Empirical hypotheses derived from the literature on enterprise restructuring and on 
transaction costs are examined both qualitatively and statistically. In particular I  ask whether, as 
suggested by the literature on enterprise restructuring, vertical disintegration leads to transaction cost 
savings and efficiency gains. I  find a startling difference: in East Germany restructuring measures 
resulting in less vertical integration are associated with higher profitability while in the Hungarian 
data the opposite holds. It is argued that in the Hungarian context the lack o f a well established 
background industry and the relatively high degree o f economic, political and legal uncertainty 
strongly favour vertical integration. These environmental factors even dominate hypotheses based on 
opportunism and asset specificity, which are generally supported by my data. Foreign direct investors 
tend to fail to appreciate country specific factors and as a consequence tend to endorse restructuring 
measures which are performance enhancing in the East German context but not in the Hungarian one.
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Introduction
Most formerly state owned companies in the transition economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe have inherited a highly integrated vertical structure. Using a 
transaction cost framework this chapter examines two questions which can be derived 
from the literature on enterprise restructuring, namely
• whether a reduction in vertical integration unambiguously leads to transaction cost 
savings and efficiency improvements1
• and whether companies with foreign direct investors are ‘better’ able to 
implement the required vertical disintegration2 and to restructure the their supply 
arrangements3.
This chapter examines the validity of these contentions. Explicit reference is made to 
the restructuring of both physical and functional vertical inputs. When a company 
reduces its vertical integration by stopping the production of physical inputs, then I 
will refer to this as the company experiencing the closure of vertical product lines and 
hence reducing the physical vertical integration of its product range. I interpret 
“functions” as ancillary services or activities which are an input into the productive 
process and can be potentially separated out in the process of reducing the company’s 
functional vertical integration.
1 See, for example, Carlin (1994, p.285), Aghion, P, Blanchard, 0  & Carlin, W (1994, p.2), Dobrinsky, 
R ( 1996, p.402), Meyer & Moller ( 1998, p.412), Ericson ( 1998, p. 108).
2 See, for example, the implications of Aghion, Blanchard & Burgess (1994).
See, for example, the implications of the literature on ‘deep restructuring’: Carlin, Van Reenen & 
Wolfe (1995).
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The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 provides a survey of the literature. 
Section 2 derives empirical hypotheses. Section 3 presents the empirical evidence 
found in my case studies and derives statistical variables. Section 4 confronts the 
hypotheses. Section 5 concludes by interpreting the statistical evidence found.
1. Literature survey: Advocating a reduction in vertical integration4
The situation before 1990
Before 1990 East German and Hungarian companies operated in an economy 
characterised by bottlenecks. Consequently companies developed a desire for 
‘reproductive self-containment’ (Grabher 1996) which led them to produce as many 
inputs internally as possible. In addition planners in both countries tended to have a 
preference for monopolising industrial sectors as it was deemed that larger but fewer 
enterprises would be easier to control than many small ones (Komai 1992). The 
creation of autarchic mass producers was also hoped to achieve greater efficiency by 
making wide-spread use of the principles of concentration and specialisation (Grabher 
1996).
These two forces frequently resulted in the creation of highly vertically integrated 
local monopolies whose boundaries had been determined by non-market based 
considerations. One result was that in any given sector individual firm size tended to 
be a lot larger in Central and Eastern Europe. To illustrate this point Komai (1992,
4 This literature survey will serve as the basis for the derivation of the empirical hypotheses in Section 2 
and in Section 5 it will constitute the framework for interpreting the evidence found. Consequently this 
survey is more detailed than would be required if the sole objective was to give a simple overview.
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Table 17.4) suggests that in 1988 in the chemical industry, for example, the mean 
number employees was 1419 in an East German company and 296 in a West German 
one. In addition Amsden et al (1994, Table 4.3) point out that not only were 
individual companies larger and more integrated, but that the size distribution of 
companies on an economy-wide level was skewed in favour of very large ones. For 
example in the late 1980s 90.8% and 75.3% of the East German and Hungarian 
workforce respectively were employed in companies counting more than 1000 
employees. In contrast only 31.2% of the Austrian and 49.8% of West German 
employees worked in such companies.
Advocating a reduction in integration on efficiency grounds
The unbundling of these ‘excessively’ integrated enterprises [Estrin (1994, p.15)] and 
the demonopolisation of the industrial sectors they operate in are generally regarded 
as central to improving efficiency in the enterprise sector of transition economies. 
Privatisation is frequently seen as a prime way of achieving the former objective and 
trade liberalisation as a crucial contributor to the latter [see, for example: Gros & 
Steinherr (1995, p.285)]. The contention that on the enterprise level a reduction in 
vertical integration is needed to increase productive efficiency and a reduction in 
horizontal integration is a pre-requisite for greater allocative efficiency is so 
widespread that it is rarely discussed in depth in the enterprise restructuring literature. 
Authors also do not tend to differentiate between functional and physical vertical 
integration. Carlin (1994, p. 40), for example, states with reference to East Germany 
that “The motivation for breaking up the Kombinates and for splitting up enterprises
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was to increase efficiency. Allocative efficiency requirements to reduce horizontal 
integration have played a relatively limited role in East Germany in the light of the 
strength of competition in the product market coming from West German 
suppliers...The need to improve private productive efficiency has dominated the 
splitting up process.” The general tendency is to simply include a call for a reduction 
in vertical integration in a general list of urgent restructuring measures required as 
part of the process of ‘the closure of non-viable units’ and the ‘separation of core 
from non-core activities’ [See, for example: Aghion, P, Blanchard, O & Carlin, W 
(1994, p.2), Dobrinsky, R (1996, p.402), Meyer & Moller (1998, p.412), Ericson 
(1998, p.108)].
It is sometimes implied that companies with FDI will be able to better restructure 
their vertical structure because investors can break the power of insiders who might 
form coalitions to oppose such restructuring measures [see, for example, the 
implications of the Aghion, Blanchard & Burgess (1994) model]. An alternative 
possible reason for companies with FDI being better able to restructure their supply 
arrangements is that investors might facilitate a reduction in vertical integration by 
giving their subsidiaries access to international supplier networks as well as to 
marketing, R&D and other facilities at the head offices.
A strand of literature which cautions against endorsing reduced vertical integration 
simply because firms are more integrated than their Western counterparts can be 
found with authors of a more evolutionary and network based focus. Grabher & Stark
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(1996), for example, provide evolutionary arguments in favour of organisation 
diversity and against adopting winning models from the west. On this account some 
redundancy and slack and hence a reduction point optimality might be required to 
preserve adaptability and dynamic efficiency. They view the persistence of 
organisational forms and social relationships from the old system not so much as a 
signal for incomplete change as an option for the future.
The question of holding companies and imperfect vertical disintegration 
It is generally not discussed whether companies should preferably reduce their vertical 
integration by selling off their input producing facilities or by closing them. The 
creation of structures in which the parent company maintains an ownership stake in its 
(separated out) supplier tends to be classified as ‘ambiguous restructuring’ [Carlin, 
Van Reenen & Wolfe (1995, p.442 ff), Grosfeld & Roland (1995, p.9)]. Ambiguous 
restructuring is generally defined as restructuring measures which are not clearly 
motivated by market based and efficiency considerations. The alternative is that they 
aimed at ‘building up different protections from pressures to change’[Grosfeld & 
Roland (1995, p.9)]. Grosfeld & Roland (1995, p.9) state that in their judgement 
“another form of rent-seeking behaviour is the creation of cross-ownership or of 
holding companies retaining stakes in their subsidiaries in order to shelter insiders 
from outsider control and securing monopoly power for the firm.” Carlin, Van 
Reenen & Wolfe (1995, p.442 ff.) are more differentiated in their assessment of the 
motivation for creating holding companies which retain ownership stakes in separated 
out suppliers and suggest (p.444) that, although it is unclear whether this practice will
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actually hinder or help the subsequent sale of these suppliers to outsiders, “stakes for 
suppliers... may enable the enterprise to guarantee secure suppliers in an uncertain 
market.”
The network literature elaborates on the risk hedging implications of the creation of 
holding companies with ownership stakes in separated-out suppliers. Stark (1996) 
argues that such practices create networks which can reduce risk and offer hedging 
strategies under conditions of extreme market volatility and in some instances might 
even lead to supply arrangements which are conducive towards innovation. This 
statement leads us directly to an argument why the separating out (whether by sale or 
by the creation of a holding company) rather than liquidation of non-core activities 
might be preferable in a transition context: In a situation where the principle of 
‘reproductive self-containment’ lead to underdeveloped networks of external 
suppliers companies which separate out units are actually creating their own 
background industry. This is such a central observation that it is worth elaborating 
with a quote from Auerbach (1993, p.145) made when discussing the general 
relationship between planning and the market: “Firms have been at the same time 
devices for the avoidance of the market mechanism as well as for its extension. The 
option of avoiding internal organisation by the use of the market is only possible if 
other entities, such as firms, have been organised in sufficient depth for a ‘market’ to
appear for the service at hand a presupposition of the existence of markets and the
failure to see the role of firms in the making of markets informs Coase’s analysis...” I 
would like to add that this presupposition seems to also inform some of the literature
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on enterprise restructuring and, as we will see from my Hungarian case studies, the 
policies of many investors.
Can one assume that all the determinants of ‘optimal’ vertical integration are moving 
in the same direction in all transition economies?
Another presupposition which needs to be made explicit underlies the general claim 
that a reduction in vertical integration should increase productive efficiency in all 
transition economies.5 Underlying such a notion is the implicit assumption that all the 
theoretical and empirical determinants of vertical integration are moving in the same 
direction in all transition economies. This is not trivial. Should I find contrary to 
what the literature leads us to expect that the efficiency implications of differing 
degrees of vertical integration do indeed differ across countries, then these basic 
determinants of the ‘optimal’ degree of vertical integration will have to be referred 
back to.
On the basis of the transactions cost literature one should only expect companies in 
different economies to exhibit the same degree of vertical integration if in each case 
this particular degree of vertical integration happens to be the transaction cost 
minimising corporate configuration. This is a direct result of what Williamson (1998) 
calls the discriminating-alignment hypothesis underlying the predictions of 
transaction cost economics, namely that (p.76) “transactions, which differ in their
5 Since none of the authors surveyed distinguish between different countries in this respect it is 
reasonable to infer that they intend their conclusions to hold for transition economies in general.
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attributes, are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their cost 
competence, so as to effect a (mainly) transaction cost economising result.”6
The major premise of transaction cost theory is that the properties of transactions 
determine the contracting hazards involved and the response of agents to these 
hazards in turn determines the governance structure for that transaction. The 
magnitude of contracting hazards depends on the attributes of the assets and on the 
characteristics of the contracting relation [Williamson (1985, p.84)]. Factors 
producing contractual hazards and hence transaction costs are considered to be the 
crucial behavioural assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism as well as 
situations characterised by small number bargaining and asymmetric information. 
Transaction costs are traditionally assumed to increase with the asset specificity and 
uncertainty involved in a transaction as well as its infrequency [(Reve (1990), Masten 
(1996), Williamson (1996, p.59)].
Bounded rationality relates to the impossibility of writing complete contracts which 
cover all possible future contingencies. Such incompleteness gives rise to residual 
rights of control, that is a situation where it is no longer the case that any rights 
conferred by ownership can be contracted away [Hart (1993)].7 Kreps (1986) extends
6 In Williamson (1996, p.95) the same idea is referred to as ‘discriminating match’.
Bemheim & Whinston (1998) argue that bounded rationality and transaction costs are not sufficient to 
explain why contracts sometimes make actions less sensitive the verifiable events than would appear 
optimal or even fail to specify verifiable obligations of the parties. They suggest that once some aspects 
are unverifiable, then it is often optimal to leave other verifiable aspects of performance unspecified. 
Such purposeful incompleteness can help contracting parties sustain co-operation by allowing them to 
create more severe history-dependent punishments and they argue that many best-response functions
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the notion of residual rights of control by stating that party A to a transaction will only 
be willing to give to party B such residual rights if party B has a reputation for 
sticking to an implicit contract concerning the adjudication processes that meet 
unforeseen contingencies. Such a ‘culture’ characterising the implicit rules of the 
game and the private norms and sanctions applicable becomes all the more important 
the more complex and uncertain a transaction is, that is the more incomplete explicit 
contracting is.
Informational asymmetries can be expected to confound the problems caused by 
bounded rationality and to increase the costs associated with writing, monitoring and 
enforcing contracts [Joskow (1993, p. 125)]. Similar costs are associated with 
opportunism. Opportunism is generally aimed at obtaining a higher share of the 
benefits of trade for oneself than the other party has agreed to a priori. Masten (1996, 
p.7) distinguishes between two types of opportunism: Firstly actions aimed at a 
redistribution of the gains from trade within the terms of an existing agreement (a 
moral hazard problem) and secondly actions aimed at forcing renegotiation (the hold 
up problem). He claims that opportunism is costly not only because efforts to 
constrain opportunism directly consume resources and place additional demands on 
bounded rationality, but also because it can cause a failure to reach agreement and to 
realise potential gains from trade.
may be achievable only through the use of an incomplete contract that leaves the alter-moving player 
with discretion.
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A lot of attention has focused on how asset specificity increases transaction costs. 
Asset specificity or a lock-in effect is generally assumed to be caused by relationship- 
specific investment undertaken by one party to a transaction. For this party a 
‘fundamental transformation’ [Williamson (1993, p.97)] occurs as a consequence of 
which a situation of ex ante competition turns to one of small number bargaining ex 
post, thus greatly increasing the scope for opportunism by the other party. Williamson 
(1985, p.95) distinguishes between four types of asset specificity: physical, site or 
location and human asset specificity as well as the presence of dedicated assets. He 
argues for a common ownership of core activities for which asset specificity is high 
(1985, p.98).8 Both uncertainty and infrequency increase transaction costs by 
increasing the informational requirements on and the demands on the bounded 
rationality of contracting parties. A particular problem with infrequent transactions is 
that agents cannot acquire reputations, which would have tempered their propensity to 
behave opportunistically [Masten (1996, p.150)].
Contracting hazards do not, however, only occur due to the characteristics of a given 
transaction and of the contracting agents, but also due to the characteristics of the 
wider economic, political and social system within which a transaction is located. In 
his later writings Williamson (1998) increasingly takes account of this
8 Similarly Hart (1989, p.209) argues that with extreme complementarity between assets- that is if no 
transacting party can benefits from any increase in his marginal productivity unless he has access to 
both sets of assets- assets should be owned in common, which may provide a minimum size of the firm. 
From a rather different starting point and without making clear how codification costs relate to 
transaction costs Casson & Wadeson (1998) suggest that the boundaries of the firm should lie where 
information is most easily codified and where communication can therefore take a relatively impersonal 
form.
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‘embeddedness’ of transactions, claiming that additional contracting hazards might 
arise from systemic features such as weak property rights and a general weakness in 
the institutional environment. Similarly Coase (1998, p.73) states that “the costs of 
exchange depend on the institutions of a country: its legal system, its political 
system,...., its culture and so on.” If two economies systematically differ along these 
dimensions, then one would expect their organisational structures to reflect these 
differences, even if in both instances a given transaction is characterised by the same 
degree of, for example, asset specificity and infrequency.
When contracting hazards are severe then vertical integration provides an alternative 
way of organising a given transaction. Grossman & Hart (1986) interpret vertical 
integration as the unified ownership of the physical assets involved in successive 
stages of production. They interpret ownership over an asset to entail the purchase of 
all the residual rights of control over that asset. On this account in an externality-free 
world the person whose actions determine the profitability of an asset would also own 
it [Hart (1993, p. 114)].9 Grossman & Hart’s (1986) approach to vertical integration 
differs from that of Williamson and Coase. Instead of emphasising changes in the 
ownership of physical assets Williamson and Coase tend to mainly associate vertical 
integration with changes in incentives and control mechanisms caused by the 
substitution of an ordinary contractual relationship with a relationship of 
hierarchically organised authority. Such an interpretation of the main features of
Dow (1993) claims that it is sufficient for essential input suppliers, who have large sunk costs before 
production and are indispensable in the production process, to be able to appropriate large ex-post
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integration leads to definitions which defined integration in terms of the organisation 
(rather than ownership) of two successive processes by a single firm [Riordan 
(1990)].10
The potential benefits of integration can be directly derived from a consideration of 
the contractual hazards it tries to mitigate.11 Asset specificity and the increased danger 
of opportunism it entails are frequently seen as and found to be the single most 
important motivating factor favouring vertical integration [Williamson (1985, p.86), 
Lieberman (1991)]. Integration can avoid hold-up problems by eliminating the second 
transactor [Grossman & Hart (1986), Masten (1996)]. Alternatively it could be argued 
[Williamson (1985)] that a reduced probability of opportunism in an integrated 
supplier is due to feelings of loyalty which might result from integration. The aim of 
avoiding opportunism becomes all the more important the higher the fraction of total 
costs accounted for by a given input [Lieberman (1991)]. Klein (1988) argues that the 
reduced likelihood of opportunistic hold-up is the principal transaction cost saved by 
vertical integration.
Whyte (1994) suggest that an alternative reason why high asset specificity is 
associated with integration is the ‘sunk cost effect’ according to which people take
quasi-rent streams. Rajan & Zingales (1998) suggest that giving them access to critical resources is an 
alternative to giving ownership to motivate agents to make relationship specific investments.
0 These two types of definitions are not mutually exclusive. For the purposes of this chapter I will 
define vertical integration in organisational terms, including the degree of control exercised over the 
subsidiary’s operations. In the context of examining the organisational and efficiency issues arising in 
the subsidiaries of foreign direct investors and in Hungarian holding companies this is far more fruitful 
than sticking to ownership relations as such.
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into account the sunk costs they have incurred when deciding how much use to make 
of, e.g. a facility. A consequence of this effect is a tendency to escalate commitment 
(by, for example, integrating) to a previously chosen course of action to a greater 
degree than is justified by the objective facts of the situation. On this account there is 
no reason why one should expect greater vertical integration motivated by such sunk 
cost consideration to be positively associated with profitability.
An improved information flow to the integrating customer can help mitigate the 
informational problems inherent to bounded rationality, asymmetric information and 
the infrequency of transactions. It is argued that employees have a greater duty to 
disclose information to employers than suppliers have to customers [Masten (1996), 
Riordan (1990)]. Williamson (1985, p.154) also argues that by integrating companies 
gain better information through an increased ability to control their subsidiary’s 
accounting procedures.
The decision to vertically integrate not only affects the information available to a 
company but also the risks it faces: Hanson (1995) argues that the choice of 
ownership involves a trade-off between minimising hold-up risk and spreading 
natural risk. Ownership under one party increases exposure to environmental 
uncertainty while reducing hold-up risk. He arrives at the empirical prediction that a 
manufacturer will subcontract a high share of production where demand is highly 
variable and a low share where they make large relationship-specific investments. The 1
11 It should be noted that the decision to remain vertically integrated, which is what I am are dealing
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possible risk hedging properties of vertical integration are supported by Lieberman 
(1991) who found in a study of 34 companies that firms appear to have integrated 
backward to avoid variability in the input market that was independent of fluctuations 
in their downstream market.
Although this is disputed by Alchian & Demsetz (1972) it is also argued that vertical 
integration gives a customer greater flexibility and adaptability to changing 
circumstances, since he can now resolve disputes in the supply relationship by 
administrative fiat rather than having to appeal to courts [Masten (1996), Williamson 
(1996), Dow (1993)]. It is important to distinguish two types of flexibility, however. 
To the extent that private ordering does away with the need to determine a wide range 
of possible future contingencies in advance (since they can be dealt with internally 
when they arise) it is likely to be associated with transaction cost savings as well as 
greater flexibility in responding to unforeseen eventualities. Vertical integration, 
however, causes a company also have the reduced flexibility in choosing a new 
supplier. The greater the competitiveness of a company’s background industry the 
more likely it is that a company’s adaptability is better preserved by maintaining 
choice rather than integrating with any individual supplier.
Considering the competition in a company’s background industry leads us to two 
further factors favouring integration which are not directly related to transaction costs. 
Firstly one can expect companies whose competitors have monopoly power to
with in this chapter, is intellectually analogous to the decision to become more vertically integrated.
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consider integrating with the aim of avoiding the negative externality effect which a 
double marginalisation has on their final demand [Waterson (1993)]. Secondly 
because they will be better able to realise economies of scale one can expect larger 
firms to be more integrated into components than will be smaller ones, ceteris paribus 
[Williamson, 1985, p.94)].
Vertical integration is not without costs, however, otherwise there would be no limit 
on firm size. The costs associated with integration are mainly incentive type costs, 
usually implying a reduced incentive for costs savings and productivity improvements 
in the subsidiary [Waterson (1993)] as well as increased monitoring and bureaucratic 
costs for the parent [Dow (1993), Williamson (1985, chapter 6)]. The main factor 
driving the result that managers in a subsidiary will have lower effort incentives ex 
ante is the fact that upon integration the principal obtains better information upon the 
upstream manager’s ex post rent [Olsen (1996)]. Since a commitment to selective 
intervention by the principal is not credible, the agent, who is no longer the holder of 
the residual rights of control, becomes vulnerable to the pincipal’s opportunism. The 
agent’s reaction is to reduce his effort. Grossman & Hart (1986) analyse the resulting 
countervailing incentive effect: integration is only beneficial if firml’s (the 
purchaser’s) control increase the productivity of its management more than the loss of 
control decreases the productivity of firm 2’s management. They conclude that non­
integration is desirable if both firms’ relationship specific investments are important 12
12 In contrast to Grossman & Hart Chiu (1998) suggests that the loss of ownership of an asset may 
actually increase the assets loser’s investment incentive. This result is based on a different 
interpretation of the role of the threat point and outside options in bargaining.
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to the final outcome. Williamson (1985, p.279 ff.) and Kay (1993) suggest that in­
form companies, where inter-function co-ordination is carried out by divisions, can at 
least partially mitigate the incentive and control-loss problems associated with 
vertical integration.
To conclude this discussion I can state that the wide-spread notion that a reduction in 
vertical integration is going to unambiguously have positive efficiency effects in the 
form of improved incentives and transaction cost savings in all transition economies 
presupposes that in all these countries
• contracting hazards and uncertainty arising from the characteristics of the wider 
economic, political and legal system are moving in the same direction
• pre-existing background industries are developed and competitive to a similar 
extent
• agents are characterised by similar levels of opportunism
• pre-existing internal supply arrangements are characterised by a similar degree of 
asset specificity and the effort exerted by suppliers of valuable inputs is equally 
important in both contexts.
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2. The empirical hypotheses
The foremost question this chapter examines is whether a reduction in both physical 
and functional vertical integration unambiguously leads to transaction cost savings 
and increased cost efficiency in both East Germany and Hungary. Accordingly 
Hypothesis 1 formulates this question by suggesting that less integrated companies 
should have a higher likelihood of being profitable in both countries. Hypothesis 2 
suggests that in this context reducing vertical integration by the creation of holding 
companies is likely to have ambiguous profitability implications. According to 
Hypothesis 3 foreign direct investors were better able to accomplish reductions in 
vertical integration. Hypothesis 4 combines Hypotheses 1 & 3 by concluding that 
companies with FDI should perform better than those without. The remaining 
hypotheses relate directly to the implications of the transaction costs literature. To the 
extent that I find on the basis of these secondary hypotheses that Hungarian and 
German companies systematically differ along the dimensions favouring vertical 
(dis)integration I will be better able to interpret the findings for Hypothesis 1.
2.1 Hypotheses relating to the profitability implications of vertical disintegration and 
to the role of foreign direct investors
HYPOTHESIS 1:
• a negative association between profitability (as a proxy for cost efficiency and 
transaction cost savings) and vertical integration for both Hungarian and East 
German companies [Carlin (1994, p.285), Aghion, P, Blanchard, O & Carlin, W (1994, p.2), 
Dobrinsky, R (1996, p.402), Meyer & Moller (1998, p.412), Ericson (1998, p.108)].
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HYPOTHESIS 2:
• an ambiguous association between profitability and the creation o f holding 
companies by separating out ancillary units [To the extent that such measures are aimed 
at insulating insiders against outside pressures, they will be negatively associated with profitability 
- Grosfeld & Roland (1995, p.9). On the other hand they might guarantee secure supply channels- 
Carlin, Van Reenen & Wolfe (1995, p.442 if.).]
HYPOTHESIS 3:
• a positive association between FDI and reductions in vertical integration [ The
Aghion, Blanchard & Burgess (1994) model can be interpreted in this way if an insufficient 
reduction in vertical integration is due to insider power. Alternatively investors might reduce their 
subsidiaries’ integration because they can use alternative suppliers from pre-existing world-wide 
supply networks. This is implied by Grabher’s (1996, p.181) discussion of “cathedrals in the 
desert” being created by investors with globally focused supply strategies.]
HYPOTHESIS 4:
• a positive association between FDI and profitability [This is a logical conclusion from 
Hypotheses 1&3. No causation is implied.]
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2.2 Secondary hypotheses relating to the implications of the transaction costs 
literature
HYPOTHESIS 5:
• positive association between opportunistic suppliers and vertical integration
[Masten (1996, p.7), implication of Grossman & Hart (1986), Klein (1988, p.166)]
HYPOTHESIS 6:
• positive association between reductions in vertical integration and companies 
procuring mainly standardised products (that is products involving a low asset 
specificity)[Wmger (1994, p.10), implication of Williamson (1985, p.86, p.94), Lieberman 
(1991)]
HYPOTHESIS 7:
• positive association between company size (proxied by the number o f employees) 
and vertical integration: [Larger companies are more likely to remain vertically integrated 
into components because they will be able to make better use of scale economies than smaller 
companies- Williamson (1985, p.94).13]
13 A counterargument is that smaller companies might still be able to realise sufficient scale economies 
by selling internally produced components to external agents.
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2.3 Explanatory hypotheses which are not going to be confronted statistically
HYPOTHESIS 8:
• companies operating in an environment characterised by greater economic, legal 
and political uncertainty are likely to remain more integrated [Coase (1998, p.73), 
Williamson (1998)]
HYPOTHESIS 9:
• companies with a less developed background industry are more likely to remain 
integrated [The motivation for this is that they are more likely to face a double marginalisation 
problem if they turn to external suppliers.]
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3. Variables and case study evidence14
The aim of this section is to present the case study evidence on which the statistical 
variables capturing changes in the companies’ physical and functional vertical 
integration are based. Case study evidence is presented concerning the relative 
advantages of different degrees of integration.
3.1 Variables capturing and examining changes in the companies’ physical and 
functional vertical integration15
• Variables capturing changes in the companies' physical integration
In each company I obtained information in the number of vertical product lines which 
were closed and newly introduced, making it possible to capture the overall net 
change in the companies’ physical integration. The means reported in Tables 4a & b 
suggest that in my data set 33% of the East German companies closed an important 
input producing facility and none introduced new vertical products. In Hungary on 
the other hand only one company closed down a vertical product line and 25% of 
companies actually started producing new inputs internally. The net effect is a mean 
decline of 0.33 vertical product lines in East Germany and a small mean increase in 
the Hungarian companies’ physical vertical integration. These differences are 
statistically significant. The notion that in both countries companies are adjusting
14 The case study evidence not only serves as a basis for the statistical variables used in Section 4, but 
will also help to interpret the statistical results obtained.
15 Tables 1&2 summarise the changes in the companies’ functional integration. Table 3 describes the 
variables which were used to examine the changes in the companies’ integration. Tables 4a &b
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their (physical) vertical integration in the same direction can be clearly rejected at this 
stage already: The claims that the mean East German company is closing down more 
input producing facilities and introducing fewer new ones are both significant at the 
10% level, while the observation that Hungarian companies have been experiencing 
much smaller declines in their integration is significant at the 1% level.16
• Variables capturing changes in the companies ’functional integration
I asked each company which functional inputs were catered for internally, by other 
companies in the Kombinat and by entirely external suppliers in 1990 and, similarly, 
internally, by the investor and by external suppliers in 1996(7). For 1990 the functions 
considered were: 1. Bilanzierung, that is checking whether production in the company 
is running according to the plan given from the central authorities, 2. Investment 
planning, 3. Personnel, 4. Product development, 5. Process development, 6. Input 
procurement, 7. Maintenance, 8. Distribution and 9. Transportation. In reflection of 
the fact that the functional inputs required for production and administration have 
changed eleven categories were considered for 1996(7): 1. Personnel, 2. Design, 3.
summarise the data. Tables 5a &b show the correlation matrices obtained. All tables can be found in 
the Appendix.
16 At this point I am testing for homogeneity between Hungary and East Germany. Unless it is 
otherwise stated the null cannot be rejected for the variables used in my case studies. Testing the 
hypothesis of homogeneity for two country-specific dummies involves using the chi-square test of 
independence. In the case of continuos variables a t-test on their means was used. If the null hypothesis 
of homogeneity cannot be rejected, then the two country specific variables can be pooled. Correlation 
matrices were obtained for the pooled data but did generally not contradict previous findings or add 
something new.
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Quality control, 4. R&D, 5. Procurement, 6. Maintenance, 7. Sales, 8. Transportation, 
9. Marketing, 10. Customer services and 11. Computer facilities.17
I find that in 1990 the Hungarian companies in my data set made more use of 
suppliers which were entirely external to the company and the conglomerate it 
belonged to. One in six Hungarian companies used such external suppliers, while no 
German company reports such arrangements. This difference is an indicator of the 
overall greater (micro)economic decentralisation and liberalisation which existed in 
Hungary by the late 1980s as a result of the reform period in the 1980s. By 1997, 
however, the Hungarian companies tend to be more functionally integrated than their 
East German counterparts, with the Hungarian companies tending to cater internally 
for 8.18 functions out of a maximum of 11 and the average German company catering 
for only 718. A major reason for why the Hungarian companies are more functionally 
integrated is that there are far more R&D (significant at the 10% level) and customer 
service departments (significant at the 1% level) in the Hungarian data set than in the 
German one. The overall trend has been, however, for functional vertical integration 
to decline in both countries, by a mean value of 17.2 percentage points in the 
Hungarian data set and of 22.5 in the East German one. The Hungarian companies 
tend to rely to a relatively greater extent on suppliers which have been separated out 
of the parent company, while East German companies make greater use of entirely 
external suppliers.19
17 See Tables la,b & 2a,b for details.
18 All these mean values can be found in Tables 4a & b.
19 These differences are noticeable but not statistically significant.
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I asked several interview partners in each company to explain the main advantages 
and disadvantages of having a more integrated structure. The arguments given by 
Hungarian and East German managers for and against integration are largely the same 
and reflect many of the theoretical considerations raised by the transaction cost 
literature. Hungarian and East German managers seem to have arrived at different 
conclusions concerning the ‘optimal’ degree of vertical integration from similar 
starting points. Companies name as the major advantages of having an overall less 
integrated structure:
• Cost savings due to the use of external subcontractors (D7, Dl) who, for example, 
can pass on gains due to scale economies. On a similar note the production 
manager in H6 claimed that by separating out ancillary units capacity utilisation 
has increased, because outsiders are also using these facilities.
• Flexibility: an ability to react faster to changes in the competitive environment by 
having direct information about local demand conditions, having direct access to 
local networks and being able to reorganise the company’s operations faster (H5, 
H10, Dl).
• A reduction in the internal bureaucracy of the company (D9, H3)20 1.
20 For example an interview partner in H10 claimed that less integrated structures increase flexibility 
and ease information flow problems: “We have a very small centre and most day-to-day decisions are 
made on the building site or in the factory where they arise. These local units are only accountable for 
their profitability but are not asked to justify each and every decision made. This increases our 
flexibility and makes us responsive to local demands. Furthermore, like this we are better able to tap 
into local networks, which is important in gaining jobs.”
“When we have to ask for permission from the head offices to do something, then this costs time and 
increases the administrative burden on us.” (H3’s managing director)
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Perceived disadvantages of having a less integrated structure and advantages of
greater integration are:
• Autonomy has the advantage o f the company not having to rely on a non-existent 
or highly unstable background industry (HI, H6, H8, D5: Input procurement from 
the investor can serve to smooth production runs and capacity utilisation.)22.
• Control loss by less integration is mitigated resulting in greater flexibility and 
faster decision making in more integrated structures (D8, D9, H3)23. Furthermore 
quality control problems with external suppliers can be mitigated by internal 
production.
• The use o f synergies between different vertical stages enables the company to, for 
example, secure optimal delivery conditions and smoother operations (HI l)24
• The company is better able keep high quality workers (HI 1, H6).
The case studies showed25 that a major way of reducing the internal provision of 
functions in companies was to obtain them from their investor instead, effectively 
causing functional integration of the subsidiary with the investor. Entirely external or 
separated out suppliers tend to be predominantly used for transportation and 
maintenance, with the remaining reduction in functional integration being accounted
22 “Vertical integration reduces our dependency on others. The infrastructure is not sufficiently 
developed to subcontract more functions out. The aim is to maintain this level of integration in the 
medium-run as well.” (H i’s managing director).
23 The managing director of H3 cites of the main advantages of generally having internal departments, 
rather than using the investor that it gives the local company flexibility, local information and cost 
advantages. He adds that: “When we have to ask for permission from the head offices to do something, 
then this costs time and increases the administrative burden on us.”
In H11 both upstream (due to temperature changes) and downstream activities (due to tourism) are 
highly seasonal, but their seasonal fluctuations cancel each other.
25 See Tables 2a &b.
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for by investors. Companies cite as the main advantages of being functionally more
integrated with the investor:
• Integration o f the local company with the investor’s world-wide procurement 
activities leads to cost savings (H4, H7, H9).26
• If the investor provides computing facilities, this can lead to knowledge transfer 
(H4).
• Integration o f the marketing functions can open up new trade channels to the 
Hungarian subsidiary (H4).27
• Functional integration with the investors enables the subsidiary to make use of 
synergies (D4, D5, D8, D9).28
Companies cite as the main disadvantages of being functionally more integrated 
with the investor:
• Some investors try to import practices and policies which are ill-adjusted to the 
subsidiaries’ environment (H2, H3, H7, D7).29
26 H3’s managing director: “The advantages of the investor conducting part of our procurement is that 
we can save costs due to bargaining with larger orders. We can also save time by using the expertise of 
procurement managers in the Head Offices. However we expect this division of labour to stay constant 
in the medium-run, since it makes no sense for the head offices, which are far away in Cologne, to take 
on more functions (also H9).”
H4 benefits from the investor’s trade channels and experience in the West and the investor from H4’s 
in the East. Similar synergies can be achieved in R&D, where both the investor and the subsidiary 
provide R&D services (H4, H7).
8 This is especially the case with R&D activities.
For example H2 is highly integrated with its investor and the production manager interviewed made 
the following comments: “(Our parent company) tries to have a coherent organisational methods on a 
world-wide level. This results in very hierarchical structures and in methods which in their uniformity 
do not always adjust well to local conditions. In particular, the Hungarian subsidiary suffers from 
information flow problems. This is particularly true for the investor’s marketing department, which 
seems to be unable to get to grips with Hungarian idiosyncrasies because they are unable to take in 
information from the Hungarian subsidiary. The overall consequence is that H2 is very slow in reacting 
to market developments.”
53
• A reduction in the subsidiaries ’flexibility (H3, D8)30
3.3 ‘Explanatory’ variables
• Dummies to capture whether the company is profitable in 1995, 1996 or 1997 
[Hypotheses 1, 2,4]: Interview partners were simply asked whether their company 
was profitable or not. In 1995 44% of the companies in my East German data 
were profitable rising to 77% in 1997. In 1996 54% of the Hungarian companies 
were profitable and all expected to at least break even by 1999.
• A variable to capture whether the company has separated out ancillary units or 
not [Hypothesis 2]: Although 66% of the East German companies and 75% of 
Hungarian ones created new companies by splitting off previously integrated 
units, there are very important qualitative differences between the two countries. 
In Hungary this was a very common practice affecting a large number of 
employees in service as well as production units. In East Germany separated out 
units only tended to be small and with hindsight not viable companies with 
typically under 50 employees who provide maintenance, transportation, cleaning 
and guarding services. In contrast to Hungary it was entirely uncommon for East 
German companies to maintain an ownership stake in these small new companies.
30 For example the change manager in D8 complains that if D8 wants to introduce changes, the interests 
and position of other companies within the investor’s conglomerate (some of its suppliers belong to the 
same investor) have to be taken into consideration.
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• A dummy to capture whether the company has a foreign direct investor or not31 
and one relating to the influence on the restructuring o f the product range that the 
foreign direct investor has had [Hypotheses 3 & 4]:
In the East German data 77% of companies had foreign, including West German, 
investors in 1996. The two companies which at this time did not fall into this 
category were both up for re-sale after failed privatisations. The privatisation of D6 
failed because the investor ended up asset stripping until the company’s board 
intervened and initiated a re-purchase by the Treuhand. When I called in 1998, D6 
had been re-privatised to a UK company. The case of D7 is very unusual in that this is 
a company which is very successful in spite of its investor who went bankrupt. D7 
was the only company in a large conglomerate which did not go down with its 
Austrian investor.
In Hungary the picture is more varied. 63% of the companies visited have a foreign 
direct investor, H5 and H ll have floated on the Budapest stock exchange after 
prolonged government involvement (some would say interference), H6 has been 
going from one crisis and government intervention to the next and H8 has an 
institutional investor who does not interfere in the day-to-day running of the company. 
Only in four of the East German and five Hungarian companies did the investor have 
a determining influence on the restructuring of the product range.
31 By 1997 all the companies with FDI are fully owned subsidiaries, that is we are dealing with
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• A variable to capture the extent to which a company is facing opportunistic 
suppliers [Hypothesis 5]:* 32 Hungarian interview partners tended to view their 
suppliers as slightly more opportunistic, but this was not a statistically significant 
difference.
• A variable capturing the extent to which a company’s inputs are standardised and 
hence characterised by a low asset specificity [Hypothesis 6]: The case studies 
suggest that for East German companies 65% of their inputs tend to be 
standardised, while the mean value for Hungary is 85%. This difference is 
significant at the at the 10% level. Consequently on the basis of Hypothesis 6 one 
should expect the Hungarian companies to have a tendency to be less integrated 
into input production than their East German counterparts.
• Variables capturing the size, that is number o f employees, o f a company in 1990 
and 1996/7 [Hypothesis 7]: In the East German companies the mean number of 
employees fell from 4150 to 577, while in Hungary there was a much smaller 
decline from 4430 to 2270.
acquisitions rather than joint ventures.
32 This variable was obtained from interviews with the procurement manager in each company.
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4. Confronting the hypotheses
This section presents the statistical evidence obtained with respect to Hypotheses 1-7. 
Tables 5a and 5b in the Appendix summarise the associations found for the variables 
introduced.
4,1 Hypotheses relating to the profitability implications of vertical disintegration and 
to the role of foreign direct investors
HYPOTHESIS 1:
• a negative association between profitability (as a proxy for cost efficiency and 
transaction cost savings) and vertical integration
Summary: This hypothesis is supported by the East German data both with respect to 
functional and physical vertical integration. In the Hungarian data, however, higher 
functional and physical integration are both associated with a higher probability o f 
being profitable, not a lower one as Hypothesis 1 suggests.
The East German data there is clear evidence that companies which procure a larger 
share of their functional inputs from outside agents in 1996 have a higher than 
average probability of being profitable [0.64, 5%]33. In addition I observe positive but 
overall insignificant associations between net reductions in physical and functional 
vertical integration and profitability.
33 The numbers in parentheses indicate the association found and its statistical significance. Statements 
along the lines of ‘companies with a higher than average functional integration have a higher than 
average probability of being profitable’ are meant to indicate that in the case studies there is, for 
example, a significant positive association between functional integration and the profit dummy.
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I find that companies which have been particularly effective in reducing their physical 
integration also tend to have reduced their functional integration [0.76, 1%].34 East 
German companies which have greatly reduced their functional integration tend to 
heavily rely on entirely external suppliers [0.62, 5%].35
In the Hungarian data the opposite profitability trends prevail. Companies which have 
experienced below average reductions (or even an increase) in their vertical 
integration are more likely to be profitable than average [0.43,10%]. In addition there 
is consistent evidence that reductions in and a smaller degree of functional integration 
affect a company’s performance negatively: Companies which have an above average 
degree of functional integration in 1997 are likely to be profitable [0.49, 10%]36. 
Similarly using agents external to the companies as suppliers of functional inputs is 
negatively associated with profitability in both 1997 and 1990 [-0.49, 10% in both 
cases]. In particular entirely external suppliers, that is those without historic or 
ownership ties with the company, are associated with reduced profitability in 1996 [-
0.42, 10%]. The negative association between procuring inputs from the investor and 
profitability is noticeable but insignificant.
34 From a historical perspective I find that companies which were more functionally integrated in 1990 
tend to have experienced above average subsequent reductions in their integration [0.62, 5%].
35 Companies which relied on other companies in the same Kombinat in 1990 (that is they were less 
than average functionally integrated) tend to have a strong propensity to use separated out suppliers 
with whom they have historic ties [0.70, 5%] rather than entirely external ones. This might suggest the 
persistence of a ‘relying on local networks’ attitude.
36 In addition companies which were highly functionally integrated in 1990 already have above average 
profit prospects in 1996 [0.55, 5%].
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In the Hungarian data there is no evidence that the companies reducing their physical 
integration have also reduced their functional integration. I do find, however, that 
companies which close down input production tend to end up relying on entirely 
external suppliers [0.77, 1%]. Similarly reductions in functional integration are 
associated with a reliance on the investor [0.53, 5%] and on entirely external suppliers 
[0.64, 5%] rather than on suppliers with whom the company has historic ties. There is 
strong evidence that functional integration with the investor is the predominant way in 
which companies achieve a low on-site integration in 1997 [0.89, 1%].
HYPOTHESIS 2:
• an ambiguous association between profitability and the creation o f holding 
companies by separating out ancillary units
Summary: Separating out ancillary units is clearly associated with other37 
restructuring measures which in turn have been shown to be associated with better 
performance (see Hypothesis I). Consequently separating out ancillary units is 
unambiguously associated with higher profitability in both countries.
By 1997/6 a policy of separating out ancillary units is strongly associated with a 
higher probability of being profitable in both the East German [0.76, 5%] and 
Hungarian [0.67, 5%] data sets. Interestingly in Germany separating out ancillary 
units seems to have been a concomitant of high reductions in physical integration
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[0.50, 10%] and of obtaining a low level of functional vertical integration by 1996 
[0.73, 5%]. In Hungary on the other hand a policy of separating out ancillary units 
seems to be a partial substitute for closures: Companies which have separated out 
ancillary services have overall closed a below average number of input producing 
facilities [-0.52, 5%], remain more functionally integrated [0.43, 10%] and use fewer 
than average subcontractors with whom they have no historical or ownership ties [-
0.59, 5%]. I can conclude that in both countries separating out ancillary units is 
associated with other -and on the country level diametrically opposed- restructuring 
measures which in turn have been shown to be associated with better performance 
(see Hypothesis 1).
In addition there is evidence in both data sets that companies separating out ancillary 
units are actually creating their own background industry because they continue using 
these newly founded companies as subcontractors [0.49, 10% for Germany; 0.59, 5% 
for Hungary]. This clearly indicates that one should interpret the policy of separating 
out units with reference to a country’s background industry, that is the availability of 
alternative, entirely external suppliers [Hypothesis 9]. 37
37 -and on the country level diametrically opposed-
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HYPOTHESIS 3:
• a positive association between FDI and reductions in vertical integration 
HYPOTHESIS 4:
• a positive association between FDI and profitability
Summary: In neither country data set is there evidence that companies with FDI have 
experienced above average reductions in their physical and functional integration. 
There is evidence, however, that they arrange their new supply arrangements in 
contrast to other companies. There is a tendency to rely on functional inputs from the 
investor and in Hungary an above average propensity to use entirely external 
suppliers. There is very weak evidence that in the German context such new supply 
arrangements are profit enhancing but not in the Hungarian one.
In the East German data there is no evidence that companies with FDI have reduced 
their integration more than average. There is clear support, however, for the 
contention that investors give their subsidiaries access to functional inputs from the 
headoffices. Companies with an investor who was the main force in the restructuring 
of the product range are very likely to be functionally integrated with their investor 
[0.78, 1%] and FDI in general is associated with a smaller than average propensity to 
use entirely external suppliers [-0.49, 10%]. These observations can either be 
interpreted as evidence for extensive knowledge transfer to the subsidiary or as the 
creation of ‘cathedrals in the desert’. Only qualitative case study evidence can help to
61
distinguish between these two interpretations. The associations between the investor 
related dummies and profitability in 1997 are positive but insignificant.
In Hungary investors seem to have had a propensity to endorse restructuring measures 
which in the Hungarian context tend to be associated with lower profitability (see 
Hypothesis l).38 Investors, especially those who took an active interest in the 
restructuring of the product range, tend to be less likely to separate out ancillary units 
[-0.77, 5%], tending to prefer liquidating non-core activities. Consequently they are 
also unlikely to be using subcontractors with whom the company has historic ties [-
0.78,1%] and they have an above average propensity to use entirely external suppliers 
[0.42, 10%]. FDI in general is also associated with functional integration with the 
investor [0.54, 5%] and a below average degree of on-site functional integration in 
1997 [-0.45, 10%]. There is no evidence, however, that companies with FDI have 
actually experienced greater overall reductions in physical and functional integration 
rather than investors being attracted to companies which were less integrated a priori.
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4.2 Secondary hypotheses relating to the implications of the transaction costs 
literature
HYPOTHESIS 5:
• positive association between opportunistic suppliers and vertical integration
Summary: Support in the East German data, none in the Hungarian one
In accordance with Hypothesis 5 I find that East German companies with 
opportunistic suppliers tend to not only remain functionally more integrated in 1996 
[0.49, 10%] but have also experienced smaller reductions in this respect [-0.60, 5%]. 
As would be expected on the basis of the transaction cost literature opportunistic 
suppliers are associated with a lower probability of being profitable, especially in 
1995 (-0.60, 5%). The associations found in the Hungarian data set are generally 
insignificant with respect to opportunism.
HYPOTHESIS 6:
• positive association between reductions in vertical integration and companies 
procuring mainly standardised products (that is products involving a low asset 
specificity)
Summary: Support in both the East German data and Hungarian 38
38 The associations between the investor dummies and profitability are negative but insignificant.
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The East German data suggests that companies with more standardised inputs have 
less opportunistic suppliers [0.84, 1%]. This strongly supports the suggestion that 
more standardised products involve a lower asset specificity and hence a lower risk of 
lock-in and opportunism. In accordance with Hypothesis 6 companies procuring more 
standardised products are also found to have more strongly reduced their physical and 
functional integration [0.48, 10% in both instances]. In the Hungarian data as well I 
find that companies procuring standardised inputs have experienced above average 
net decreases in their physical integration [-0.54, 5%].
HYPOTHESIS 7:
• positive association between company size (proxied by the number o f employees) 
and vertical integration
Summary: No support in the Hungarian data and the opposite trend holds in the east 
German context
In the East German data the general impression is that larger companies have reduced 
their vertical integration more than average. I find that both companies which were 
large in 1990 and are so in 1996 have closed an above average number of input 
producing facilities [0.56, 10% and 0.77, 1% respectively] and have also experienced 
above average reductions in their functional vertical integration [0.48, 10%]. In 
addition they have had an above average propensity to reduce their integration by
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separating out ancillary units [0.84, 1%]. The data suggests that companies which 
were large in 1990 have mainly reduced their functional integration by obtaining 
inputs from their investor instead in 1996 [0.54, 10%].39 In the Hungarian data both 
size variables are entirely insignificant and there is no support whatsoever for 
Hypothesis 7.
5. Conclusions and interpretations40
I have found evidence of a startling difference with respect to the restructuring of 
enterprise boundaries. In East Germany restructuring measures resulting in lower 
vertical integration are associated with higher profitability. In the Hungarian context, 
however, the opposite trend holds. Since managers in both Hungary and East 
Germany refer to similar considerations when discussing their company’s vertical 
integration, one has to examine how differences between the two countries affect the 
importance of the theoretical and empirical arguments for and against vertical 
integration.
The very first point to emerge from the case studies in this context is that no East 
German company endorsed a high degree of vertical integration because of a non­
39 Both in the East German and Hungarian data there is some indication that investors have been 
deterred from investing into large companies which presumably offered a bigger restructuring 
challenge. A company’s size in 1990 is negatively associated with FDI at the 10% level in both 
countries.
40 This section is best started by a caveat: All my conclusions relate only to the twenty companies 
studied. Although I am hence unable to make statements about trends pertaining to Hungarian and East 
German companies in general, my case studies nevertheless are well suited to show the degree of 
support found for the hypotheses studied and to indicate avenues for future research.
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existent or unstable background industry, while this was a commonly cited reason in 
Hungary. Through reunification East German companies were able to access pre­
existing and stable West German suppliers, effectively giving them a ready-made 
background industry in relatively close proximity. In addition these well-established 
and large suppliers made scale economy arguments in favour of internal input 
production in large East German companies irrelevant. These considerations explain 
why East German companies only separated out, if at all, service providers whom it 
was advantageous to have in immediate proximity, while Hungarian companies 
engaged in measures aimed at creating their own background industry on a much 
larger scale.
My data clearly suggests that far from being an instance of ‘ambiguous restructuring’ 
creating your own background industry by separating out units is a profitable strategy. 
This is especially the case in an economy such as Hungary which characterised by a 
limited choice of suppliers and a high degree of supply uncertainty which is not 
necessarily related to variability in output markets. In this context the creation of 
holding companies with ownership stakes in these separated out units can reinforce 
and formalise the overall risk-hedging effect: The holding company benefits from an 
m-form organisation giving its subsidiaries a high degree of flexibility but at the same 
time the flow of information from below and the shared company culture and identity 
are preserved. The desire to obtain cost savings, increased flexibility in choosing 
suppliers and a reduction in the internal bureaucracy in the company was shared by
66
both East German and Hungarian companies, but only the East German companies 
had immediate access to suitable pre-existing supplier networks.
Hungarian companies not only faced greater uncertainty in their dealings with 
potential external suppliers because these were likely to face strong economic and 
quality problems themselves but also because of a higher level of uncertainty in the 
wider framework within which the transactions are located.41 The optimal degree of 
vertical integration can be assumed to also depend on environmental factors such as 
the overall economic, legal and political uncertainty.
• When a country is characterised by relatively low levels of economic uncertainty, 
it is easier to negotiate longer-term contracts as one can assume that price and 
demand fluctuations as well as bankruptcy rates will be low enough not to entail 
prohibitively frequent renegotiations.
• Low legal uncertainty in the form of a well-established legal framework and a 
sufficient number of precedents entails that, should problems in the interpretation 
of contracts arise in the future, it is predictable how these will be resolved by a 
recourse to the law.
• Low levels of political uncertainty mean that, firstly, independently of which 
political party or social grouping gains power, parties to a contract can reasonably 
expect that the overall economic, legal and political framework within which they 
operate is not going to be substantially changed (by, for example, the introduction
41 Lyons (1996) gives a review of the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence relating to how 
environmental and behavioural risk are likely to affect inter-firm contracting.
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of nationalisation programmes) and, secondly, that changes in government are not 
going to entail changes in the two companies’ management due to political 
appointments.
The transaction costs involved in the negotiation and implementation of contracts 
increase with all three forms of uncertainty [see also Williamson (1998) and Coase 
(1998)]. In this situation vertical integration has distinct advantages:
• The parent does not face the uncertainty of the supplier’s unexpected bankruptcy,
• it can resolve problems arising from demand and price fluctuations without 
having to renegotiate any supply contracts (resulting in greater flexibility and 
faster decision making in more integrated structures),
• these resolutions are unlikely to lead to court cases with an uncertain outcome 
and,
• to the extent that political uncertainty is likely to affect the integrated supplier, the 
parent is going to have more information on the nature of this political uncertainty 
than if it did not have ownership ties with the supplier.
If, however, a company operates in an environment such as East Germany where the 
overall level of political and economic uncertainty is low, then the uncertainty and 
transaction costs involved in contractual relationships is likely to be outweighed by 
the benefits of using contractual rather than hierarchical control mechanisms. Since 
Hungary is arguably characterised by higher levels of economic, legal and political 
uncertainty than is East Germany, one would, on the basis of the above arguments,
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expect a higher degree of vertical integration to be profitable in Hungary and a lower 
one in East Germany. Indeed this reasoning, together with the absence of a well- 
developed background industry in Hungary, seems to be driving our results. The 
questions whether a) there are suitable external suppliers and b) whether the degree of 
environmental uncertainty can be satisfactorily resolved by contractual means are 
logically prior to considerations based on opportunism and asset specificity.
It is these two considerations which best explain my results. The implications of 
transaction cost theory concerning opportunistic suppliers and standardised products 
are generally borne out but are arguably not determining the difference in the relative 
degree of ‘optimal’ vertical integration in the two countries. There is strong evidence 
that East German companies with more opportunistic suppliers do indeed exhibit a 
higher degree of vertical integration, but opportunism does not even enter into the 
consideration of Hungarian companies because their supply arrangements are 
dominated by a need to deal with a lacking background industry and a large amount of 
environmental uncertainty. This is so even though the mean value for opportunism is 
even higher in Hungary (but not significantly so) than it is in East Germany.
Considerations based on the degree of asset specificity in a company’s inputs are even 
more clearly dominated by environmental factors in the Hungarian context. In both 
Hungary and especially East Germany I find that companies with more standardised 
products will reduce both their functional and physical integration. Since the 
companies in the Hungarian data set procured standardised products to a higher extent
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this effect should lead to less vertical integration in Hungary than East Germany. I 
observe the opposite and environmental consideration are clearly dominating the 
Hungarian companies’ vertical integration decision.
Many investors do not seem to understand these important differences between the 
country-specific factors determining the profitability of vertical integration in the East 
German and Hungarian contexts. There has been a general tendency to try to impose a 
lower degree of vertical integration as found in their Western subsidiaries, but there is 
no evidence that the overall degree of vertical disintegration is greater in companies 
with FDI.42 What differentiates companies with FDI, however, is their reliance on 
entirely external suppliers and a usually high degree of functional integration with the 
investor. Especially in Hungary investors seem to have been unwilling to actively 
contribute to the development of a local background industry by separating out 
ancillary units. The preferred method of dealing with non-core units has been their 
liquidation, with the intention of buying these inputs from external suppliers. In the 
East German context these policies tended to work well especially since the pre­
existing supply network tend to be the investor’s. In the Hungarian data set, however, 
after closing down non-core vertical units many investors ended up having to choose 
between incurring high transportation costs by importing inputs from non-local 
suppliers (other companies in their conglomerate, for example,) or having to rely on 
embryonic and unstable local companies. In this context they frequently found that the
42 This might be partly due to the fact that investors tended to be attracted to companies which were 
smaller and less integrated to start off with.
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most effective local suppliers were those which had been separated out from their 
Hungarian rivals.
Functional integration with the investor is a two-edged sword. On the one hand it can 
lead to genuine knowledge transfer and an opening of marketing and supply channels 
for the subsidiary. On the other hand, however, it can amount to a situation where the 
investor tries to transfer knowledge and impose practices which do not work well in 
the context of local idiosyncrasies. Furthermore functional integration can lead to 
increased bureaucracy, reducing the subsidiary’s flexibility in responding to local 
conditions. Since East and West Germany share the same laws, regulations, 
competitors and many cultural factors, one can expect most of the functional 
knowledge and practices which are transferred by West German investors to be 
appropriate. The possible negative effects of functional integration with the investor 
are more likely to be of importance in the Hungarian context.
Overall foreign investors seem to have a tendency to try to achieve vertical 
disintegration by liquidating non-core activities and as a consequence tend to endorse 
new supply arrangements which are performance enhancing in the East German 
context but not in the Hungarian one. This can be traced back to a failure to fully 
appreciate the importance of the absence of a well-developed background industry 
and the impact of the relatively high degree of economic, legal and political 
uncertainty in Hungary.
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Table 3;
integration
D ti95 1 if the company is profitable in 1995,0 otherwise
D Jt97 1 if the company is profitable in 1995 (97), 0 otherwise
H n96 1 if the company is profitable in 1995, 0 otherwise
D(H) size 90 number o f  employees in 1990
D(H) size 96(7) number of employees in 1996/7, employees working for partially owned subsidiaries 
which have been separated out are not included
D (H) ancill 1 if the company has separated out ancillary services into new companies, 0 otherwise
D(H) standard percentage of total inputs which are standardised and obtainable, for example, from 
catalogues. This variable captures the extent to which the company in question procures a 
homogenous products with a low asset specificity
D (H )opport Do you think that your suppliers would use an unforeseen eventuality to their advantage, 
that is are your suppliers opportunistic? (1 , the supplier is not at all opportunistic— > 6, 
the supplier is highly opportunistic)
H Pnew(vert) number of major vertical products which have been newly introduced'
D (H)
Pclosed (vert)
number of major product groups which have been closed down and where the closure 
constitutes a reduction in vertical integration
H A pvertin t H Pnew (vert) minus H Pclosed (vert): This variable captures the net effect on physical 
vertical integration of the closure of (vertical) product lines and the introduction of new 
ones"
D
90 internal
The number of functions (out of a maximum of 9) which were catered for internally in 
1990.
D
90 kom binat
The number of functions (out of a maximum of 9) which were catered for by other 
companies belonging to the same conglomerate (Kombinat) in 1990.
H 90 external The number of functions (out of a maximum of 9) which are sub-contracted out to 
suppliers external to the conglomerate in 1990.'“
D (H)
96(7) in ternal
The number of functions (out of a maximum of 11) which are catered for internally in 
1996.
D (H)
96(7) investor
The number of functions (out of a maximum of 11) which are catered for by the investor 
(that is other companies in the acquiring conglomerate) in 1996.
D (H)
96(7) subcontr
The number of functions (out of a maximum of 11) which are sub-contracted out to 
suppliers which originally belonged to the company being interviewed and maintain close 
ties with it in 1996.
D (H)
96(7) external
The number of functions (out of a maximum of 11) which are sub-contracted out to 
external suppliers in 1996 (7).
D (H) 
% 90out
Percentage of functions (9=100%) which were catered for by outside units (that is other 
companies in the Kombinat).
D(H)
%96(7) out
Percentage of functions (11=100%) which were catered for by outside units (that is by the 
investor, separated-out companies or external suppliers).
D(H)
%A fvertint
D(H) %96(7)out minus D(H) %90out: This variable captures the net change in functional 
vertical integration (as a percentage of total functions which are catered for by external 
units) between 1990 and 1996 (7).
D (H) 
FDI
1 if the company has a foreign direct investor, 0 otherwise
D (H) 
IM PPR
1 if the investor was the most important force in determining changes in the product 
range;
0.5 if the investor and the company’s “old” management had roughly the same influence; 
0 if the “old” management was the main force in determining changes in the product 
range;
80
1 In the German data set no new products have been introduced which constituted an increase in the 
vertical integration of the company. Consequently this variable is zero for all companies in the German 
data set and has not been included there.
" Since no East German company has introduced any new vertical products the net change of physical 
vertical integration in East Germany is captured by D Pclosed (vert).
1,1 In East Germany in 1990 no functions were supplied by companies which did not at least belong to 
the same conglomerate (see Table la). Consequently this variable is zero for all companies in the 
German data set and has not been included there.
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Table 4a:
Summary of the East German data on changes in physical and functional
vertical integration
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 mean
Dtt95 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0.44
Dti97 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.77
Dsize90 2000 330 2021 9500 2700 6500 6800 4500 3000 4150
Dsize96 600 248 270 722 1033 320 800 500 700 577
D ancill 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.66
D standard 75 99 100 100 80 0 90 10 30 65
D oppor 2 1 3 2 3 6 2 6 3 3.11
D pclosed (vert) 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0.33
D90 internal 6.5 8 8 9 9 9 9 5 9 8.5
D90 kombinat 1.5 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 0 0.72
D96 internal 6.5 5 7 6.5 9.5 8 5.5 7 8 7
D96 investor 1 0 0 3.5 1 0 0 1.5 1 0.88
D96 subcontr 2 0 0 0 0 0 1.5 2 0 0.38
D96 external 0 1.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 3 0.5 1 1.2
D% 90out 16 0 11 0 0 0 0 44 0 7.8
D% 96out 27.2 13.6 9 40.9 13.6 4.5 40.9 36 18.1 22.5
D% A fvertint 10.6 13.6 -3 40.9 13.6 4.5 40.9 -8 18.1 14.5
DFDI 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.77
DIMPPR 0 0 0 1 0.5 0 0 0.5 1 0.33
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Table 4b:
Summary of the Hungarian data on changes in vertical integration and in the 
companies’ horizontal product range
HI H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10 H ll mean
Hn96 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.58
H size 90 2100 2400 2500 4500 5000 10500 14297 1000 450 650 40000 4430
e x c l . H l l
7663
i n c l . H l  1
H size 97 640 1396 800 2550 3500 3200 9952 580 100 250 14500 2270
e x c l . H l  1
3406
i n c l . H l  1
Hancill 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0.75
H
standard
100 90 100 90 100 65 10 100 80 100 100 85
H oppor 6 5 2 5 2 5 3 2 4 3 3 3.6
HPcIosed
(vert)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.08
Hpnew
(vert)
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0.25
HA
pvertint
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.16
H90intern
al
9 7.5 3.5 9 9 9 9 9 7 9 9 8.08
H90
kombinat
0 0.5 5.5 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0.75
H90
external
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.16
H97
internal
9.5 2.5 6.5 7 9 8.5 9 10 10.5 6.66 10.5 8.18
H97
investor
0 6.5 3 2.5 0 0 2 0 0.5 0.66 0 1.26
H97
subcontr
0.5 0 1.5 1.5 2 1.5 0 1 0 0 0 0.79
H97
external
1 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3.16 0.5 0.8
H%90out 0 5.5 61 0 0 0 0 0 22 0 0 8.35
H%97out 13.6 77.2 40.9 36.3 18.1 22.7 18.1 9.09 4.54 39.3 4.54 25.5
H%
Avertint
13.6 71.7 -20.5 36.3 18.1 22.7 18.1 9.09 -17.6 39.3 4.54 17.2
HIMPPR 0.5 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0.45
HFDI 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0.62
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Table 6: Summary of the main statistical findings
Hypo­
thesis
East Germany Hungary
1 YES NO- on the contrary 
- Hungarian data higher functional and 
physical integration are both associated with 
a higher probability of being profitable, not 
a lower one as Hypothesis 1 suggests.
2 YES
- Separating out ancillary units is associated 
with other restructuring measures, which in 
turn are profitable
- in the East German data these other 
restructuring measures include reductions in 
physical and functional integration
YES
- Separating out ancillary units is associated 
with other restructuring measures, which in 
turn are profitable
- in the Hungarian data companies which 
separate out ancillary units tend to maintain 
a high degree of vertical integration
3 & 4 WEAKLY YES for Hypothesis 4 only NO
- all relevant associations are insignificant
5 YES
- companies with opportunistic suppliers 
remain more integrated
NO
- all relevant associations are insignificant
6 YES
- companies with standardised inputs have 
less opportunistic suppliers and reduce their 
integration more
YES
7 NO- on the contrary 
- larger companies have reduced their 
integration more
NO
- all relevant associations are insignificant
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Chapter 2
Social Disintegration?
Changes in the internal provision of social services in East 
German and Hungarian companies 1990-1997
Abstract
This chapter examines the way in which enterprises have restructured the extensive social services 
they used to provide internally, changing the company's degree o f vertical integration. Empirical 
hypotheses derived from the literature on enterprise restructuring are examined both qualitatively and 
statistically. I  find that although the economic literature captures important aspects o f social service 
restructuring in East Germany, developments in Hungary tend to be in stark contrast. There is strong 
evidence that companies which maintain their internal social service provision and shed less 
employees actually outperform other companies. This outperformance can be measured in terms o f  
profits, domestic market share and exports. Surprisingly Hungarian companies with FDl show just as 
strong a persistence in social service provision as those run by local managers. Nor has it been, as 
generally suggested, a question o f time until Hungarian companies follow East German trends and 
shed their social services. It is not that Hungarian companies are laggards in restructuring social 
service provision, it is that they have chosen a different restructuring path. Instead o f admonishing 
Hungarian companies for their lack o f restructuring we should turn our attention to examining the 
efficiency rationale behind the choices they have made. Companies which maintain social service 
provision and maintain historically accepted social responsibility norms tend to benefit from a highly 
co-operative trade union and workforce. This is an important and overlooked factor enhancing their 
ability to meet the challenges posed by transition.
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Introduction
In the early literature1 the issue as to how enterprises should deal with non-productive 
social facilities and activities aroused little controversy. Their divestment was 
recommended to reduce vertical integration and improve efficiency. This chapter 
examines:
• the extent of social service shedding2 by different sized companies
• the impact of social service shedding on a company’s performance
• whether management style affects the degree of shedding and
• differences in the experiences of East German and Hungarian companies.
These issues are examined from a comparative perspective using extensive qualitative 
and quantitative case study evidence from twenty newly privatised and state owned 
East German and Hungarian enterprises3. The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 
provides a survey of the literature. Section 2 derives empirical hypotheses. Section 3 
presents the empirical evidence found in my case studies and derives statistical 
variables. Section 4 confronts the hypotheses. Section 5 concludes.
 ^See, for example, Fisher & Gelb (1991), Dhanji (1991), Aghion, Blanchard & Burgess (1994).
Before 1990 East German and Hungarian companies used to internally provide a wide array of social 
services such as canteens, childcare facilities, medical surgeries, holiday camps etc. Section 3.1 deals 
with individual services in greater detail.
A listing of the companies can be found in the Appendix. Section 3.1 discusses the data in greater 
detail.
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1. Literature survey
Before 1990 East German and Hungarian companies operated in an economy 
characterised by bottlenecks. Consequently companies developed a desire for 
‘reproductive self-containment’ (Grabher 1996) which led them to produce as many 
inputs internally as possible. In addition planners in both countries tended to have a 
preference for monopolising industrial sectors as it was deemed that larger but fewer 
enterprises would be easier to control than many small ones. These two forces 
frequently resulted in the creation of highly vertically integrated local monopolies 
whose boundaries had been determined by non-market based considerations. 
Consequently the unbundling of these ‘excessively’ integrated enterprises [Estrin 
(1994, p. 15)] and the demonopolisation of the industrial sectors they operate in are 
generally regarded as central to improving efficiency in the enterprise sector of 
transition economies. Privatisation is frequently seen as a prime way of achieving the 
former objective and trade liberalisation as a crucial contributor to the latter [see, for 
example: Gros & Steinherr (1995, p.285)].
This chapter focuses on the social aspects of the unbundling of former state-owned 
enterprises. This social question derives from the fact that as part of their high vertical 
integration enterprises were not only engaged in the internal production of physical 
inputs, but also provided their employees with a wide range of social services, such as 
crèches, doctors’ surgeries, canteens, holiday camps, sports’ facilities and the like. 
Consequently enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe provided a large range of 
social services to their employees which in Western economies are more commonly
90
provided by local governments or non-profit organisations. At the same time social 
protection benefits4, a common feature of non-wage benefits in many Western 
economies, tended to be the task of the government [Friedman & Worgotter (1997)].
In the early literature the issue as to how enterprises should deal with these non­
productive social facilities aroused little controversy. They were either not mentioned 
explicitly and implicitly included in the general recommendation for the need to 
reduce vertical integration [see, for example: Fisher & Gelb (1991), Dhanji (1991)] or 
it was, for example, briefly stated that: “ State-owned enterprises are typically 
collections of both production and on-production activities. The reasons which led to 
such an organisation are gone. Non-production activities, schools, housing, hospitals 
and the like should be operated independently” [Aghion, Blanchard & Burgess (1994, 
p. 4)]. Similarly Carlin, Van Reenen and Wolfe (1995, p.428) state that: “ 
...undertaking restructuring generally entails cuts in employment and the shedding of 
social assets by the enterprise.” The almost unanimous recommendation was 
divestiture to the local government or, should no alternative operator be found, their 
ultimate closure.
The reasoning behind this recommendation focused on the efficiency implications of 
a continued internal provision. Since these social services are non-productive 
activities they reduce per-capita productivity in the company. Estrin, Schaffer & 
Singh (1997) have also suggested that overextensive social provision might not only
4 Benefits which protect employees from falls in income associated with eventualities such as 
unemployment, sickness and retirement would are generally termed social protection benefits.
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raise the costs of enterprise restructuring but also deter potential foreign direct 
investors. One reason for this is suggested by the Aghion, Blanchard & Burgess 
(1994) model of restructuring: At any point in time the closure of social services 
creates groups of ‘losers’ who will have an incentive to form a coalition against the 
proposed restructuring measures, thus complicating restructuring. If a company has 
not shed its social service provision prior to its acquisition by a foreign investor, then 
an investor will anticipate the future complications which would arise as a 
consequence of an attempt to implement restructuring measures and might be 
therefore deterred from investing in the first place. A further concern is the possibility 
that a persistence of social service provision in former state-owned enterprises would 
raise the effective wage paid by the state sector and lead to increased set-up costs for 
new companies, thus distorting their relative efficiency and stifling the growth of a 
dynamic private sector [Commander & Schankerman (1997)]. Commander & 
Schankerman as well as Estrin, Schaffer & Singh (1997) are also concerned about the 
possibility that social services might create attachment in workers and retard their 
mobility, thus preventing them from moving to more productive sectors.5
Based on these cost and efficiency considerations an expectation of rapid 
restructuring in the provision of social services developed. Since internal provision 
was primarily associated with negative consequences for the enterprise and economy 
overall, it was reasonable to expect that not only would enterprises seek to rid
5 In my case studies a lack of labour mobility was mentioned by several Hungarian interview partners 
as creating a problem for companies facing labour shortages in certain skill categories (mostly 
managerial and highly trained blue collar employees). However, nobody mentioned social service 
provision as being the cause of lack of mobility. It was the rigidities in the housing market which 
attracted universal blame.
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themselves of these non-productive units as quickly as possible, but that they would 
also be encouraged to do so by the government. Indeed in my interviews I found that 
most managers in state-owned or privatised enterprises were relatively quick to learn 
the language of free-market entrepreneurs, stressing the need to focus on core 
activities and improving efficiency by shedding all non-productive social activities 
and eliminating the slack induced by overstaffing [see Clark & Soulsby (1998) for a 
similar finding in Czech enterprises].
Nevertheless over time increasing case study evidence emerged that this expectation 
of speed has not generally materialised [see, for example, Carlin, Van Reenen & 
Wolfe (1995) and Friedman & Worgotter (1997)]. Not only do most companies in 
Central and Eastern Europe continue to provide social services, but furthermore there 
is evidence that governments continue to subsidise their provision. There is a 
discernible tendency in the literature to equate a continuing internal provision of 
social services with a failure to restructure sufficiently the enterprise’s operations. 
Dobrinsky (1996, p. 402), for example, states that: “The enterprises’ responsiveness 
to the new environment and the changes in their behaviour and performance are the 
most important indicators of adjustment at the micro level. Enterprise adjustment
shows up in changes such as....restructuring of costs aimed at their reduction by
eliminating non-essential and non-productive expenses (for example, the maintenance
of social assets)....” Since most of the studies finding a continuity of social service
provision tend to only cover data up to 1993 and many of the pressures to restructure 
can be expected to intensify over time with the progress of, for example, privatisation,
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FDI and trade liberalisation, Rein & Friedman (1997, p.147) express a general 
sentiment when they state that: “The finding of stability in overall benefits is probably 
a result of the [shortness of the] time period [studied].”
Explanations for the persistence of internal social service provision tend to focus on 
the power of insiders and the lack of alternative sources of supply, heightening the 
resistance against their divestiture6. When trying to explain the fact that in a survey of 
overall 117 case studies of Polish, Hungarian and Czech companies they find no 
examples of companies which have got rid of all or nearly all their social assets 
Carlin, Van Reenen & Wolfe (1995) put forward the hypothesis that this was due to 
the continuing power of the companies’ insiders, that is the employees and local 
managers. They summarise their findings by stating that the majority of restructuring 
efforts undertaken in the initial years of transition were not threatening to insiders and 
did not require much cash, thus resulting in a general lack of ‘deep’ restructuring.
Commander & Schankerman (1997, p.3) also blame the “continuing dominance of 
insiders in decision-making and control in privatised as well as state firms” and add 
that managers consider social services to be a necessary ‘social burden’ which is not 
primarily kept in order to ensure worker attachment but out of a sense of ‘social 
responsibility’. Overall they conclude (p.l 1) that “from the perspective of firms, these 
choices [to maintain the internal provision of social services] seem difficult to 
explain.” Based on three case studies in the Czech Republic Clark & Soulsby (1998)
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give an explanation for the persistence of social services which ties in with the notion 
of ‘social responsibility’: on their account the nature of the inherited enterprise- 
community relationship, that is of the social embeddedness of the company, impacts 
on restructuring decisions to reduce overstaffing and to unburden the enterprise of its 
social and welfare assets. A logical conclusion from all this is that companies will 
only be able to improve their efficiency by fully shedding their social service 
provision once the power of insiders and of historically inherited norms is broken by, 
for example, sale to a foreign direct investor.
2. The empirical hypotheses
From the literature surveyed four main empirical questions arise:
• Do large companies continue to provide an above average number of benefits?
• Do companies which provide many benefits underperform those which have shed 
them more effectively?
• Does management style affect the number of benefits a company provides?
• Have East German and Hungarian companies chosen the same approach to 
restructuring their social services?
This section explores answers to these questions suggested by the literature surveyed 
and formulates them in the form of testable empirical hypotheses. 6
6 The fact that a different provider is supplying the same level of services at an affordable price should 
not in itself lead to any resistance. Problems are likely to arise, however, when divestiture is a
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2.1 Hypothesis relating the number of benefits provided to company size 
HYPOTHESIS 1:
• positive association between firm size (proxied by the number o f employees) and 
number o f benefits provided [See, for example, Commander & Schankerman (1997, p.5) for 
empirical findings to this effect with respect to Russian and Ukrainian firms and Estrin, Schaffer & 
Singhh (1997, p.26) for Polish ones.]
Companies which were larger than average in 1990 can be expected to have exhibited 
higher than average vertical integration. As part of this greater integration I would 
expect larger companies to have provided a greater number of social services in 1990. 
To the extent that there is a persistence of historical trends both with respect to firm 
size and benefit provision, I would expect the same to hold in 1996.
HYPOTHESIS 2:
• positive association between monopoly power (proxied by market share) and
number o f benefits provided [Carlin, Van Reenen & Wolfe (1995, p. 440/442), for example,
give the favourable financial position associated with a monopoly as a reason for a general lack of 
restructuring. Others, such as Grosfeld & Roland (1995, p.21), formulate the same idea by 
stressing the positive incentive effect of demonopolisation.]
Companies with greater than average monopoly power in 1996 can be expected to 
have experienced fewer pressures to restructure in general and hence to have 
maintained a larger number of internally provided social services.
2.2 Hypotheses relating the number of benefits provided to performance
euphemism for closure or radically reduced access. 96
The hypotheses in this section are all deduced from the suggestion that a continued
i
social service provision will have negative efficiency implications on the enterprise 
level: see, for example, Commander & Schankerman (1997, p .2 /11), Estrin, Schaffer 
& Singhh (1997, p.25), Dobrinsky (1996, p.402). A company’s “future decline” is 
also an implied consequence of delaying restructuring in the Aghion, Blanchard & 
Burgess (1994) model. I examine whether these negative efficiency implications can 
be seen in terms of a company’s profitability, market share and export performance.
HYPOTHESIS 3:
• negative association between profits and number o f benefits provided7
Due to the negative efficiency implications of a continued internal social service 
provision I would expect firms which maintain an above average number of internal 
social services to be less profitable than average.
HYPOTHESIS 4:
• negative association between market share (as an indication o f a company’s 
competitiveness) and number o f benefits provided
HYPOTHESIS 5:
• negative association between export performance and number o f benefits 
provided
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To the extent that a continued social service provision is an indication of a general 
failure to restructure sufficiently the firm’s operations [see, for example, Dobrinsky 
(1996, p.402), Aghion, Blanchard & Burgess (1994, p.4), Carlin, Van Reenen & 
Wolfe (1995, p.439)] I would expect companies with numerous social services to 
have a below average market share in 19967 8 and, because they are less internationally 
competitive, to achieve few exports to the EU and world-wide markets.
2.3 Hypotheses relating to management style, that is to the role of insiders and foreign
direct investors
HYPOTHESIS 6:
• a negative association between FDI and the number o f social services provided 
[This is an implication of the suggestion that a general lack of “deep restructuring” and the 
concomitant persistence of social service provision is largely due to a prevalence of privatisation 
measures which leave insiders in charge: See, for example, Carlin, Van Reenen & Wolfe (1995, p 
441), Carlin & Aghion (1996, p.374). See also comments on the general role of foreign direct 
investors: Estrin, Brada, Gelb & Singh (1995, p.23), Grosfeld & Roland (1995, p.10), for 
example.]
HYPOTHESIS 7:
• a positive association between insider power and the number o f benefits provided
[ This is merely another way of expressing the ideas underlying Hypothesis 6.]
7 In contrast to their underlying expectations Commander & Schankerman (1997, p.5) find that in their 
Russian data there was actually a positive association between profitability and benefit provision. They
do not, however, explore the possible causalities involved.
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HYPOTHESIS 8:
• local managers who, deriving from the previous economic order, have a moral
conviction that they have a ‘social responsibility’ are less likely to shed both
superfluous employees and the internal provision ofsocial services [Clark & Soulsby
(1998) find support for a variant of this hypothesis in three Czech companies. Commander & 
Schankerman (1997, p.4 and p. 13) mention social responsibility and consider the case of company 
towns. Estrin, Schaffer & Singhh (1997, p.37) mention the role of ‘historically accepted norms’. 
Usually such factors are merely reported or mentioned but not discussed in detail.]
To the extent that companies do not engage in an efficiency enhancing restructuring 
of their social services as a result of insider power or due to the historically 
determined ethical values of local managers, I would expect to find a) a persistence of 
social service provision in companies in which local managers are in charge and b) 
that the companies with FDI provide almost no social services internally.
2. 4 Hypotheses relating to a comparison between developments in East Germany and 
Hungary
Both East German and Hungarian companies tended to provide social services 
internally which in Western market based economies are typically provided by agents 
external to the company. In both countries companies are in a process of transition to 
a market based economy. Consequently one can expect that:
8 It should be stated explicitly that in contrast to Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 4 assumes that a high market
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HYPOTHESIS 9:
• Both East German and Hungarian companies should show an unambiguous trend 
towards shedding the internal provision o f social services. [The expectation that this 
trend should hold in all transition economies is evident in the entire literature surveyed.]
The finding of relative stability in internal social service provision tended to be made 
in studies including only data up to 19939 and there was a general expectation that 
this stability would not last [Rein & Friedman (1997, p.147)]. Even if Hungarian 
companies had weaker incentives to restructure in an environment characterised by a 
much more gradualist approach to transition, by 1997 one can expect that Hungarian 
companies should be starting to catch up with their East German counterparts.
3. Variables and case study evidence
The aim of this section is to present the empirical evidence which can then be used to 
confront Hypotheses 1 -9. The case study evidence not only serves as a basis for the 
statistical variables used in Section 4, but will also help to interpret the statistical 
results obtained. It is for this reason that this section goes into some detail. Section
3.1 presents the case study evidence on which the statistical variables capturing 
changes in the provision of social services are based. The reasons given by managers 
for their continued provision are explored and changes in the provision of individual 
benefit types are discussed. Section 3.2 presents the ‘explanatory’ variables which 
relate to the companies’ size and performance. In Section 3.3 I explore the case study
share is an indication of a company’s superior efficiency and competitiveness, rather than of its 
monopoly power.
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evidence pertaining to the role of foreign direct investors, insider power and different 
management styles in the restructuring process. Tables 1, 2, 3a and 3b in the Data 
Appendix explain and list all the variables.
3,1 Social service variables
• Variables capturing changes in the number o f social services provided internally
These include variables capturing the number of benefits provided in 1990 and 1996/7 
as well as the change in the number of benefits over this time period. I had seven 
categories into which benefits could fall and counted the number of categories 
covered by a given company. These categories were:
1. Food related benefits: canteens or food-tokens,
2. Childcare: kindergartens and crèches,
3. Medical services: on-site doctor’s surgeries,
4. Holiday services: hotels, children’s camps, financial contributions to holidays,
5. Non-food commodity benefits and presents: subsidies for school books, 
transportation, Easter and Christmas presents, subsidised on-site shops
6. Housing: housebuyers and -builders loans, provision of dormitories, provision of 
apartments 9
9 See, for example, Carlin, Van Reenen & Wolfe (1995) and the contributions in Rein, Friedman & 
Wörgötter (1997).
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7. Cultural, sports and community activities as well as recreational facilities: libraries, 
cultural centres, swimming pools, sponsorship of sports’ clubs.
This list also provides an indication of the wide range of social services which these 
companies have historical provided to their employees10 1. My average German 
company provided 4.2 social services in 1990 out of which at most a canteen was left 
in 1996. Foreign direct investors usually made it a condition of their acquisition that 
the company sheds all its social services and a certain number of employees first. In 
this process canteens were kept or upgraded by ‘socially minded’ investors as 
‘sweeteners’1 *. Only the two enterprises without FDI (D6, D7) have kept any benefits 
at all. D7, for example, the holiday camp for children, presents for anniversaries and 
activities centred at over 1200 former employees who are now retired, such as 
company fetes with special emphasis on the elderly and young. The personnel 
manager points out that D7 is the only company in the entire building sector which 
has kept such services. He attributes this fact to D7 still having a different 
management culture in this respect than other companies where investors are in the 
driving seat. D6 as well has kept similar benefits which are all relatively cheap and 
have a motivational and community-building role.
10 See Table 2 for more details.
11 Expressions used by the personnel manager of D4. The impression that even in 1990 the East 
German companies tended to provide fewer benefits is probably less a reflection of reality than of what 
interview partners could remember. In East Germany the provision of social services is not an ongoing 
issue as it is in Hungary, consequently interview partners are less likely to remember precisely all the 
benefits which the companies used to historically provide.
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In Hungary the decline in social service provision was much smaller, from an average 
of 5.7 services in 1990 to 5 in 1997.12 *I asked both managers and trade union 
representatives why their company had maintained the internal provision of social 
services. The answers obtained can be grouped into to following categories:
• they increase productivity by improving loyalty, morale and work motivation14
• tradition and company culture15
• 'humane ’ company philosophy of the investor/ local management16
• maintaining social peace, management’s fear o f the trade union/ the trade union 
fought hard to keep the benefits17
• they constitute a compensation for being paid lower monetary wages18
• tax savings when compared with providing monetary wage increases19
Interestingly only one personnel manager (in Hl l ,  incidentally the company which 
was in state ownership the longest) claims that providing social services is not the 
task of the company in the first place. Furthermore it is stated in only one company
12 All the data in this section are taken from Tables 3a and 3b.
PM= personnel manager, MD= managing director, TUR= trade union representative
14 TUR and PM in H3, PM in D6, H5, H7, H8, MD in HI
15 MD in HI, PM in H2, H6, H7, D7
16 TUR in H2, H4, TUR and PM in H8
17 TUR in H3, H4, H5, H7, PM in H6. The TUR of H4 states that in companies where the trade union
is less organised and strong, “employees loose all these benefits without being compensated for this 
loss by higher wages.”
“They are a small compensation and sign of appreciation for the employees in a situation where the 
company cannot give them many of the financial fringe benefits which employees of West German 
companies receive.” (TUR in D6) “Making sure that employees are looked after socially is also in the 
management’s interest in a country where wages are extremely low when compared to Western levels.” 
(TUR in H5). “The workers would be very annoyed if these things ceased to exist. The attitude is that 
only if you pay us market rate wages (that is Western level wages), can we be expected to pay a market 
rate for all these benefits.” (TUR in H6) “These benefits could only be taken away from them if people 
earn so much that they can afford to buy these services outside.” (TUR in H7)
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(H5) that many of the extensive social activities this particular company engages in 
detract from its profitability, but the company would not even consider abolishing 
them because they are so essential for maintaining morale. No company has the 
medium-run aim of winding its internal provision of social services down, the general 
aim seems to be to fine-tune existing arrangements.
This overall stability in the number of social services provided by Hungarian 
companies, does not mean that there have been no changes within individual benefit 
types. In accordance with other authors Table 2 suggests that there has been a shift 
away from in-kind benefits towards monetary benefits (vouchers) especially in the 
area of food  provision. [See Rein & Friedman (1997, p.145), Fajth & Lakatos (1997, 
p.183). Both chapters also discuss the other types of benefits.] Only the two smallest 
enterprises have dropped food provision altogether and two companies, H8 and H2, 
have even built a new canteen. 81% of the Hungarian enterprises provide food 
benefits in one form or the other. The popularity of food vouchers was explained by 
several interview partners in terms of the tax advantages they incur.
Childcare has been generally separated out and given to the local government, but in 
only one case, H3, was the facility closed down altogether. Separating-out childcare 
facilities seems to have caused little overall controversy, possibly because already 
historically there were numerous alternative suppliers in this area and employees have 
generally retained access to their old facilities even after restructuring.
19 PM in HI 1
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No company with pre-existing medical services has scrapped them. Overall 81% of 
the Hungarian companies in my data provide on-site medical facilities. Employees 
value the ready access they have to medical care if they can use facilities at work 
rather than having to go through the GP (rationing) system introduced in 1995. In 
favour of keeping medical facilities employers give paternalistic reasons, as well as 
efficiency reasons, such as reduced sick leave.
Astonishingly, all of the companies in my Hungarian data set continue to provide 
holiday facilities to their employees. Rein & Friedman (1997, p.154) suggested that 
enterprises might be prevented from selling these assets by there being an oversupply 
of such properties on the market, but I encountered no enterprise which had even tried 
to sell its holiday facilities all together. As Fajth & Lakatos (1997, p. 181) concluded: 
“It is the general experience that enterprises sell their holiday homes only when they 
are in extreme difficulties.” I gained the impression from interview partners that 
selling holiday facilities would be a certain way to create demotivation and industrial 
unrest unless the situation was so bad that “employees had to accept that we have to 
sell our silver in order to survive”20. In addition, although holidays are usually 
accessible to all, they tend to be disproportionately used by better-off employees 
(managers), since companies only tend to provide a contribution rather than providing 
their holiday facilities free of charge. It should be noted that this is the only benefit 
requiring a physical infrastructure which has been kept by the two East German 
companies still providing some old-style benefits.
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The category of commodity benefits includes, for example, presents, money towards 
school books and transportation but also on-site shops selling items at a reduced 
rate21. Presents are small bonuses in kind while the other benefits in this category are 
effective wage subsidies which, as in the case of food vouchers, incur tax advantages 
both for the employer and the employees because they are not subject to generally 
high social insurance and income taxes. The importance of the benefits seems to be 
declining with only 63% of companies using them in 1997. Since economic theory 
suggests that outright wage increases would be preferred by employees I would expect 
a decline in commodity benefits as inflationary pressures subside and as the tax rules 
which made their provision advantageous change.
Community benefits such as sporting facilities, libraries and cultural clubs are again 
an area where no company has scrapped its pre-existing facilities, although only 63% 
of companies provided such facilities in the first place. The finding of stability in this 
area is in contradiction with suggestions made by other authors that enterprises are 
showing a tendency to divest themselves of these facilities [Rein, Friedman & 
Worgotter (1997, p.7)]. This is possibly the area where it is hardest to give an 
economic rationale for a continued provision of such facilities by enterprises and 
where a wider analytical approach is warranted which takes into account a given 
enterprises’ role and ‘embeddedness’ in the local community and economy.
Expression used by the TUR in H6.
For example, employees of H2 can purchase H2’s products at a reduced rate in an on-site shop.
20
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Housing benefits have generally been restructured, with companies selling their 
apartments and closing the dormitories which used to house (now sacked) migrant 
rural workers. Low interest loans for housebuyers and -builders, aimed mainly at 
better-off employees in managerial and administrative ranks, still enjoy great 
popularity and are provided by 72% of companies. This overall trend has also been 
found by Rein & Friedman (1997, p.154), Fajth & Lakatos (1997, p. 183). This is the 
clearest example where social services are restructured in such a way that they prime 
objective is no longer redistributional, but rather they are aimed at attracting and 
keeping the ‘right’ type of workers.
• Variables capturing qualitative changes in social service provision:
Simply counting of the number of benefits provided does not give us important 
information concerning changes in their extent and in the organisation of their 
provision. For this reason I introduced three state variables to capture a) whether the 
real value of the overall social services provided by the company has at least stayed 
constant, b) whether it has increased and c) whether the provision of the remaining 
social services has been re-organised, by, for example, shifting from and an internal 
canteen to giving employees food-tokens of equivalent value. Table 3b shows that 
72% of companies in the Hungarian data maintained the real value of their social 
services and 27% even increased it. Only 27% of companies reorganised the 
provision of their remaining services.
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3.2 ‘Explanatory’ variables relating to the companies’ size and performance
• Variables capturing the size, that is number o f employees, o f a company in 1990 
and 1996/7 [Hypothesis 1]: In the East German companies the mean number of 
employees fell from 4150 to 577, while in Hungary there was a much smaller 
decline from 4430 to 3173.
• Variables capturing the domestic market share o f a company in 1990 and in 
1996/7 [Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 4]: There have been radical changes in the 
market share22 of the East German companies: a fall from a mean value of 89% in 
1990 to only 15.5% in 1996. It should be noted that only has the share of the 
domestic market decreased, but frequently the size of the domestic market itself 
has shrunk rapidly. Many East German companies are obtaining a smaller slice in 
a smaller domestic pie, making it a matter of survival to achieve high sales outside 
East Germany. Hungarian companies have benefited from much more stable 
demand patterns and fewer new entrants23. From the starting point of a relatively 
less monopolised overall industrial structure the Hungarian companies market 
share only fell from a mean value of 60% to 56% between 1990 and 1997.
• Dummies to capture whether the company is profitable in 1995, 1996 or 1997 
[Hypothesis 3]: In 1995 44% of the companies in my East German data were
22 The market referred to is East Germany.
23 Hungarian companies are not only at times still protected by some remaining trade barriers but, more 
importantly, their very low wage costs and relatively high quality standards, idiosyncratic domestic 
demand characteristics as well as high transportation costs can deter foreign entrants in many sectors.
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profitable rising to 77% in 1997. In 1996 54% of the Hungarian companies were 
profitable and all expected to at least break even by 1999.
• The percentage o f total output sold in world-wide and EU markets [Hypothesis 
5]: In 1996 the East German companies tended to sell about 33% of their total 
output in these markets, while the mean for the Hungarian companies was only 
20% .
• The percentage o f original employees shed and the percentage o f employees made 
unemployed have been included as further indicators of restructuring in the 
enterprise. I find that the East German companies tended to shed about 76% of 
their workforce, making 54% directly unemployed. The mean values for Hungary 
are 57% and 38%. Employees who were shed but not made directly unemployed 
either went into state-run employment programmes (Germany) or are employed by 
separated out non-core units which are now operating as independent companies. 
It should be noted that these shedding figures are well in excess of estimates 
[Estrin (1994, p.l 5)] to the effect that labour hoarding before 1990 might have 
amounted to about 25% of the workforce.
3.3 Variables capturing the role of foreign direct investors, insider power and 
different management styles
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• A dummy to capture whether the company has a foreign direct investor or not 
[Hypothesis 6]24: In the East German data 77% of companies had foreign, 
including West German, investors in 1996. The two companies which at this time 
did not fall into this category were both up for re-sale after failed privatisations. 
The privatisation of D6 failed because the investor ended up asset stripping until 
the company’s board intervened and initiated a re-purchase by the Treuhand. 
When I called in 1998, D6 had been re-privatised to a UK company. The case of 
D7 is very unusual in that this is a company which is very successful in spite of its 
investor who went bankrupt. D7 was the only company in a large conglomerate 
which did not go down with its Austrian investor. It is currently up for resale but I 
gained the impression that it is not particularly keen on being sold.
In Hungary the picture is more varied. 63% of the companies visited have a 
foreign direct investor, H5 and HI 1 have floated on the Budapest stock exchange 
after prolonged government involvement (some would say interference), H6 has 
been going from one crisis and government intervention to the next and H8 has an 
institutional investor who does not interfere in the day-to-day running of the 
company.
24 One could include dummies which try to capture the influence on decision-making that the foreign 
direct investor has. If dummies are included asking the local management whether the investor was the 
main force in the restructuring of the product range or the main force in managerial training, then for 
the questions at hand one obtains results which are very similar to those in the FDI columns.
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• [Hypotheses 7 and 8:] Lastly I have included two dummies which are aimed at 
examining the issue of insider power and to capture the extent to which ethical 
and social values derived from the past influence restructuring in the company.
The first dummy captures whether the trade union co-operated in the restructuring 
process of the company25 and the second whether the management is deemed to be 
and thinks of itself as ‘socially responsible’ or, to use the Hungarian expression, 
‘humane’. These variables warrant some explanation, especially since they are likely 
to effect not only the restructuring of social services but the restructuring process in 
general. They not only relate to the notion of insider power, but also the notion of the 
social embeddedness of economic activity26. Case study evidence is particularly 
useful in illustrating the rationale behind the persistence of attitudes and social norms 
for the provision of social services.
Interview partners frequently used the terms ‘socially responsible’ (Germany) and 
‘humane’(Hungary) 27 in order to describe a managerial approach to restructuring 
which takes into account how restructuring decisions are going to affect employees 
and which tries to cushion the adverse social effects this restructuring process entails. 
Put differently, ‘socially responsible’ managers placed themselves into their 
employees’ shoes when making decisions and took their needs and worries into
25 Unionisation rates are only obtainable for Hungarian companies. When these were included in the 
analysis they proved entirely insignificant. A similar finding was made by Estrin, Schaffer & Singh 
0997, p.46).
26 See Granovetter (1985) for a central chapter on this topic.
The Hungarian expression locates the origins of ‘humane’ behaviour in ‘recognising the other 
persons’ humanity’, while the German phrase locates the origins of this type of attitude in ‘recognising 
the social responsibility entailed by a position of power’.
I l l
consideration. It is for this reason that ‘socially responsible’ is an indication of the 
‘power’ of employees to influence decision-making: their concerns are being heard 
and taken into account.
55% of the German and 45% of the Hungarian companies examined explicitly 
refer to such considerations. Measures which are considered to be humane or socially 
responsible include an extensive use of early retirement, providing employees with re­
training and help in finding new jobs, making an effort not to sack all the members of 
a family employed by the company, paying redundancy payments which are higher 
than the legally required minimum and generally treating employees as individuals 
rather than faceless numbers. A socially responsible management will also have a 
predisposition towards separating out rather than liquidating non-core units in order to 
limit the unemployment impact of restructuring. It is also generally implied that a 
humane management involves employees and their representatives in designing the 
details of restructuring and stick to agreements once they are made. I asked both the 
personnel manager and trade union representative to explain the reasons for managers 
endorsing a ‘humane’ or ‘socially responsible’ approach to restructuring. Their 
answers can be grouped under the following headings:
• a humane approach maintains the motivation o f the remaining workforce by 
reducing the employees’ fears concerning their future* 29301
• the desire to keep social peace in the company32 and its wider community
2* The percentages referred to in this section are all derived from the means of the D(H)socres and 
D(H)coop variables.
29 Dl, D2, D4, D7, D9
30 HI, H2, H4, H5, H7
31 H4 and H5
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• the philosophy o f the investor32 3/  o f the Treuhand representative34
• empathy with the employees being made redundant and personal ethical motives35
Since in Hungary maintaining the internal provision of social services is frequently 
associated with a humane management, it should not be surprising that the reasons for 
maintaining social services are very similar to those given in favour of a humane 
approach to restructuring in general.
In 61% of the East German companies and 54% of the Hungarian ones the trade 
union co-operated in the restructuring process. These high percentages confirm an 
early finding obtained by Svejnar (1991, p.128) who stated that trade unions “have 
generally co-operated with (or at least tolerated) the transition process.” Co-operation 
by the unions consists in:
• Loyalty to the company: keeping back with their wage and non-wage demands36
• refraining from strikes and strike threats37
32 D9, D2, HI, H2 and, after the clash between the employees and the investor in 1992, H7
33 HI, H2, H4 and D1
D9. It should be noted that Hungarian companies who had a choice (e.g. H4) very consciously sought 
out investors who were perceived to have a “European” (that is humane) rather than an “Anglo-Saxon” 
approach to redundancies. The trade union representative stated that “an American investor would have 
lead to a strong cultural mismatch.”
H5, D4, Dl. The personal need and ability on the side of decision makers to consider the fate of 
employees facing redundancy is generally a result of interpersonal relationships which have evolved 
over a long time in the previous economic system where jobs for life were the norm and labour 
turnover in companies was low. Similar sentiments were reported by Major & Voszka (1995) in study 
conducted in 1995 for the APV Rt. on the fate of the 49 large companies which had been given special 
emphasis in the old economic system.
36 HI, H3, H4, Dl, D4, D7, D8, D9
3 7  •H4, H5, H8. A strike only occurred in company H6, while threats of strikes are more common (H4, 
H6, H7). In some instances strikes and their threat were a consequence of the union gaining the 
conviction that the investor or management is in the process of liquidating the company (H6, H7, H4)
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• providing employees with information concerning re-training and job hunting 
opportunities and encouraging employees to have a constructive input into 
workplace innovations38
• In East Germany there are many examples of employees working unpaid overtime 
and doing further training on the week-ends39.
Co-operation by the trade union is only sustained in the long run if the management is 
perceived to be sticking to its side of the deal. In East Germany the implicit contract40 
implies that the workers contribute all they can by restraining their demands 
concerning wages and the work load until the company is doing well enough to meet 
them while the management pays Tarif wages41 and makes every effort not to have 
further redundancies. The basic idea that loyalty, restraint and co-operativeness by the 
union should be met by the management ensuring the company’s long-run success 
and increasing wages and benefits in line with profits was also wide-spread in 
Hungary.42 A management worth co-operating with is also expected to avoid 
‘unnecessary’ redundancies43, to communicate honestly about the company’s situation 
and plans for the future44 and to generally stick to agreements reached with the union.
while in other instances strikes were threatened because the employees are renouncing agreements 
reached with the management previously (H6).
38 D8, D9
39 Dl, D4, D7, D8, D9
40 This was formulated explicitly by the trade union representatives in DI, D2 and D4.
Tarif wages are wages which have been agreed upon through centralised bargaining but which lie 
above the average because very few East German companies honour them.
42 H4, H6, H7, H8
43 H5, H7, H8
44 H7, H5
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Co-operation by the trade union usually only breaks down when local managers or the 
investor renege on agreements made concerning investment or restructuring plans.45 
Such managerial behaviour is extremely damaging to industrial relations and in 
Germany usually results in employees resorting to the courts against the management 
while in Hungary strike threats and strike threats are more common. Both types of 
responses cause internal friction and wasting managerial time and effort.
4. Confronting the hypotheses
This section presents the statistical evidence obtained with respect to Hypotheses 1-9 
in my data set. Tables 4a and 4b in the Appendix list the associations found. Table 5 
summarises the main results obtained.
4.1 Confronting the hypothesis relating the number of benefits provided to company 
size
HYPOTHESIS 1:
• positive association between firm size and number o f benefits provided
Summary: Support in both the East German and Hungarian data
In the East German data companies which were relatively large in terms of their 
employee numbers in 1990 tend to provide an above average number of benefits in
45 Such incidences have happened in company H7, D2 (here the problem was solved by firing the 
managing director by the investor), D5, D6 and D3.
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1996 [0.62, 5%]46. Interestingly the company’s current size is entirely insignificant, 
clearly indicating that it is historical factors which are important in explaining the 
persistence of benefits rather than the company’s current number of employees.
In Hungary I also find support for Hypothesis 1. Companies which were relatively 
large in 1990 tended to provide numerous benefits already then [0.51, 10%] and 
continue to do so in 1997 [0.53, 5%]. In Hungary there has been a strong persistence 
of historical trends with respect to firm size [0.98,1%] and with respect to the relative 
number of benefits provided [0.81, 1%]. Consequently I also find that companies 
which are large in 1997 behave similarly to and tend to be identical to the companies 
which were large in 1990. Furthermore I find that companies which have at least 
maintained the real value of their social services provided an above average number 
of benefits in 1990 [0.42, 10%] and do so in 1997 [0.56, 5%]. These observations 
support statistically the general picture of stability and only gradual change in the 
provision of social services found by other authors.47
Estrin, Schaffer & Singh (1997)48 not only also find evidence for a significant size 
effect in social service provision (p.37) but they also suggest that larger Polish firms 
have experienced a greater decline than small firms (p.46). I find little evidence of 
such a relationship in East Germany or Hungary. In East Germany the relevant 
association is very close to zero, probably because the decline in social service
46 The numbers in parentheses indicate the association found and its statistical significance. Statements 
along the lines of ‘larger than average companies provide a larger than average number of benefits’ are 
meant to indicate that in the case studies there is, for example, a significant positive association 
between company size and number of benefits provided.
Almost all the contributions in Friedman & WOrgStter (1997) support this basic conclusion.
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provision was so universal, with companies scrapping a greater number of services 
the more they had to start off with [-0.77, 1%]. In Hungary the negative association 
between a decline in the number of social services and the firm’s size in 1990 is 
almost significant at the 10% level, suggesting, if anything, that historically larger 
companies have experienced smaller than average declines in the number of benefits 
provided. In contrast to East Germany, the Hungarian companies showed no 
universal decline in the number of benefits provided. Most companies have kept the 
level of provision constant and some companies have even increased the number of 
their benefits. This is reflected in the strong positive association between the current 
number of benefits and changes in benefit provision [0.72,1%].48 9
HYPOTHESIS 2:
• positive association between monopoly power (proxied by market share) and 
number o f benefits provided
In East Germany all the companies have suffered such large losses in their market 
share and such intense competition that the idea that they might have retained any 
degree of monopoly power is highly unrealistic. Accordingly all associations which 
might be relevant to Hypothesis 2 are insignificant. In Hungary on the other hand I 
find a strong relationship between market share and the number of social services 
provided for both 1990 and 1997 [0.72,0.70,1%]. The interpretation of this finding is
48 Commander & Schankerman (1997) find the same basic size effect for both Russia and the Ukraine.
49 My finding is similar to that made by Commander & Schankerman (1997, p.7) who find that in their 
Russian data set larger firms were actually less likely to reduce the number of benefits.
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not, however, straightforward. This will be discussed in greater detail with reference 
to Hypothesis 4.
4,2 Hypotheses relating the number of benefits provided to performance 
HYPOTHESIS 3:
• negative association between profits and number o f benefits provided
Summary: I  find weak support in the East German data and the opposite trend in 
Hungary.
In East Germany there is some evidence that, as the literature suggests, the efficiency 
implications of abandoning social service provision are favourable: Companies with a 
good export performance and hence high international competitiveness have shed a 
relatively high number of benefits [-0.68, 5%]. Furthermore companies who are not 
profitable in 1995 are more likely to have maintained some social services [-0.50, 
10%]50, although it is not a priori clear whether the social services are dragging their 
profitability down or whether benefits are being kept as a compensation for lower 
wages in these companies.
50 At least in part the association above is likely to be reflecting omitted third variables. For example I 
find that companies which provided a large number of social services in 1990 were also less likely to 
have a socially responsible management [-0.53, 10%] and more likely to shed a large percentage of 
their employees [0.66, 5%]. Both these factors are associated with a lower probability of being 
profitable, so that the impression emerges that a higher level of social benefit provision in 1990 is 
associated with greater overall restructuring challenges and for this reason with lower profitability in 
1995. This interpretation is supported by the fact that in 1995 companies which, usually from a 
relatively high starting point, shed a large number of social services are less likely than average to be 
profitable [0.54, 10%]. By 1997 both these effects become insignificant, suggesting that although these
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In Hungary there is absolutely no support for Hypothesis 3. I find that the profit 
dummy is insignificant with respect to all the benefit variables, suggesting that there 
is no evidence that companies which provide a greater number of benefits than others 
are less profitable than average. What is more, I find that companies which have kept 
the real value of their social services at least constant are more likely than average to 
be profitable [0.67, 5%]. Only case study evidence can, however, shed light on the 
causality involved, that is on whether companies maintain their services because they 
can afford to do so, or whether they are profitable because of the positive effects of 
social service provision.51
HYPOTHESIS 4:
• negative association between market share (as an indication o f a company’s 
competitiveness) and number o f benefits provided
Summary: In Hungary there is a strong positive relationship between market share 
and social service provision, but it is unclear whether continued social service 
provision is a consequence o f an insufficient pressure to restructure or whether 
internal provision has positive net efficiency effects, giving these companies a 
competitive advantage.
companies might have faced a greater restructuring challenge initially they now have the same 
likelihood of being profitable than others.
Commander & Schankerman (1997) too find a positive relationship between profitability and the 
number of benefits provided in Russian firms but they do not explore the causality involved.
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Hypotheses 2 and 4 try to disentangle the effect market share is likely to have on 
restructuring. In doing so I am plagued by an age-old problem: Does a high market 
share indicate monopoly power and hence an insufficient incentive to restructure 
(Hypotheses 2) or superior efficiency (Hypotheses 4)? In the East German data this 
problem is resolved by the fact that no company has sufficient market share for the 
monopoly power hypothesis to bear any relationship to reality whatsoever and all the 
associations pertaining to Hypotheses 2 and 4 are insignificant.
In Hungary on the other hand I not only find a strong relationship between market 
share and the number of social services provided for both 1990 and 1997 [0.72,0.70, 
1%]52 but my data even provides a weak indication that companies which have a high 
market share in 1997 have tended to either keep their benefits constant or to even 
increase them [0.44, 10%]. There is no obvious way of deciding whether these social 
services constitute a form of rent dispersion by companies with monopoly power, or 
whether highly efficient companies maintain them because their net efficiency 
implications are positive. The fact that a higher market share is associated with higher 
profits in both 1990 [0.49, 10%] and 1997 [0.48, 10%] is consistent with both the 
monopoly power and efficiency interpretation of a high market share.
52 In both years companies with a high market share tended to be also large in terms of employee 
numbers [0.48,0.49, 10%] Since there is a significant persistence of historical trends, this time with
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HYPOTHESIS 5:
• negative association between export performance and number o f benefits 
provided
Summary: I  find weak support in the East German data and the opposite trend in 
Hungary.
In the East German data I find no significant associations which might shed light on 
Hypothesis 5, except that companies which have shed a large number of benefits have 
also achieved high exports in 1996 [-0.68, 5%], suggesting that shedding benefits 
might have been efficiency improving for these companies.
In Hungary the picture is again radically different. The overall impression is that 
maintaining social services constitutes some form of competitive advantage in 
Hungary: Not only are these companies more likely to be profitable, but companies 
which provide an above average number of benefits in 1997 also tend to have a good 
export performance [0.43, 10%]. What is more, I find than companies which have 
high exports tend to also have shed fewer than average employees [-0.64, 5%], made 
a smaller proportion of their employees unemployed [-0.54, 5%], are larger than 
average both in 1990 [0.84, 1%] and 1997 [0.61, 5%] and tend to have a humane 
management [0.48, 10%]. They exhibit all the signs of ‘insufficient restructuring’, 
‘continued adherence to historically accepted norms’ and an ‘excessive size’. They
respect to market share [0.89, 1%], I find that for any given company the situation looks very similar in 
1990 and 1997.
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seem to be doing very well by doing the opposite of what the literature suggests they 
should be doing.
2.3 Hypotheses relating to management style, that is to the role of insiders and foreign 
direct investors
HYPOTHESIS 6:
• a negative association between FDI and the number o f social services provided
Summary: Strong for this hypothesis in the East German data, no such trend in 
Hungary.
As Hypothesis 6 suggests, in East Germany the arrival of a powerful outsider in the 
form of a foreign direct investor is strongly negatively associated with continued 
social service provision [-0.93, 1%]. The finding that in Hungary companies with FDI 
are no more likely to scrap social services than those without is rather perplexing in 
this context 53, especially since one can expect foreign direct investors to have 
initially exactly the same attitudes as they would in East Germany. What exactly 
happens in the interactions between investors and the local workforce is best resolved 
by case study evidence.
531 am not the first to have a data set suggesting this conclusion, but Carlin, Van Reenen and Wolfe 
(1995) do not explicitly discuss the rather intriguing implication of their Table 4 (p.449) that only one 
Hungarian company with FDI has shed its social assets and no Polish or Check company with FDI has 
done so.
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HYPOTHESIS 7:
• a positive association between insider power and the number o f benefits provided 
HYPOTHESIS 8:
• local managers who, deriving from the previous economic order, have a moral 
conviction that they have a ‘social responsibility' are less likely to shed both 
superfluous employees and the internal provision o f social services
Summary: I  find the associations suggested by Hypotheses 7 and 8, but in both East 
Germany and Hungary the efficiency implications o f restructuring measures based on 
notions o f social responsibility are entirely unexpected.
When delving more deeply into the issues surrounding ‘insider power’ and 
‘historically accepted norms’ my data hold some more surprises. The expectation that 
a management ascribing to historically accepted norms which effectively make them 
highly aware of the enterprises’ social embeddedness generates the associations 
suggested by Hypotheses 7 and 8. Indeed I find that a humane management sheds 
fewer than average employees[-0.53, 5%], tends to provide a relatively high number 
of benefits in 1990 [0.67 and respectively, 5%] and in 1997 [0.84, 1% and 0.67, 5% 
respectively] and keeps the real value of social services at least constant [0.52, 5%]54.
54 Keeping the real value of social services constant is in turn associated with lower labour shedding 
and unemployment figures in the company [-0.46 and -0.44 respectively, 10%].
Due to the almost universal scrapping of social services in East Germany no such observations can be 
made for that data set, but it should be borne in mind that there is some anecdotal evidence (e.g. in D4) 
of socially responsible managers scrapping socially services with ‘sweeteners’ such as an improved 
canteen and working environment.
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In East Germany socially responsible managers make fewer than average employees 
unemployed [-0.76,1%].55
What is not borne out, however, is the expectation that such ‘insufficient’ labour and 
social service shedding as a consequence of humane attitudes is going to have 
negative profitability implications for the company. On the contrary, by 1996/7 these 
companies are more likely to be profitable both in East Germany and Hungary [0.60 
and 0.47 respectively, 10%].
The crucially missing link is that humane managers and socially responsible managers 
tend to be rewarded by a co-operative trade union [0.71, 5% and 0.83, 1% 
respectively], which the case study evidence suggests can greatly facilitate overall 
restructuring. By 1997 German companies with a co-operative trade union are very 
likely to be profitable [0.71, 5%] while Hungarian companies with a co-operative 
trade union are likely to have a higher than average market share in 1990 [0.71, 1%] 
and 1997 [0.670, 5%] as well as an above average export performance [0.49, 10%]. 
Far from keeping companies from adapting effectively to their changing environment 
and restructuring, some of the historically accepted norms seem to be actually 
conducive to efficiency enhancing behaviour.
The reduced labour shedding I observe in companies with a humane management can 
be an indication of two things: firstly of insufficient restructuring on the labour side or 
secondly of the fact that the company is doing well and has enough orders to continue
55 The spirit of these findings is in accord with Clark & Soulsby (1998). 124
to employ a relatively high proportion of its original workforce. The second 
interpretation finds support in the fact that high labour shedding and unemployment 
figures are both associated with lower probability of being profitable in 1996 [-0.57 
and -0.59 respectively, 5%]. It seems that companies with high labour shedding rates 
are not shedding labour because they are restructuring their workforce especially 
effectively but because they have below average business prospects.56
2, 4 Hypotheses relating to a comparison between developments in East Germany and 
Hungary
HYPOTHESIS 9:
• Both East German and Hungarian companies should show an unambiguous trend 
towards shedding the internal provision o f social services.
Summary: The differences in trends are significant. With respect to the provision o f  
social services formerly state owned Hungarian companies seem to have tended to 
chose a different restructuring altogether.
It is quite clear that my data provides no support whatsoever for shared trends 
between East Germany and Hungary. The assumption that the Hungarian and East 
German observations were generated by the same underlying process, that is that they 
come from a homogenous population, can be rejected at least at the 10% level for all
56 Although the association between size in 1997 and profitability is only significant at the 15% level, I 
also find that companies which are large in 1997 are so because they have shed less than average labour 
and made fewer employees unemployed [-0.53 and -0.58 respectively, 5%]. In accordance with this 
finding large companies are also associated with a co-operative trade union both in 1990 and in 1997 
[0.58, 5% in both cases].
125
benefit related variables, the market share variables, the export variable, the labour 
shedding variable as well as the variable capturing the enterprises’ size in 1996/7.57 
Although previously state owned East German and Hungarian companies started at 
historically similar starting points, they have embarked on very different trajectories 
with respect to the internal provision of social services and the Hungarian companies 
are showing no signs of catching the German trend after some delay.
5. Conclusions
The economic literature on enterprise restructuring strongly suggests that maintaining 
the internal provision of social services complicates the general restructuring process 
and reduces per capita productivity. Insider power and historically accepted norms 
concerning the management’s social responsibility are usually cited as the main 
reasons for delaying crucial efficiency-enhancing restructuring. The general 
expectation is, however, that once the general transition process gains momentum and 
companies are sufficiently subject to market pressures, the insiders and their now 
outdated norms will have to give way. Consequently it can be only a question of time 
until the shedding of social services will take place in all transition economies.
Although the East German data provides weak support for some of these contentions, 
surprisingly few of these expectations find empirical support in the Hungarian 
context.
57 In this instance I am effectively examining whether the Hungarian and East German data could be 
pooled. In the case of two dummies the appropriate test is a chi-square test of independence and in the
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There is strong evidence that companies which maintain their internal social service 
provision and shed less employees actually outperform other companies. This 
outperformance can be measured in terms of profits, domestic market share and 
exports. The surprising fact that Hungarian companies with FDI show just as strong a 
persistence in social service provision as those run by local managers and that several 
investors explicitly endorse a humane restructuring philosophy suggests that we have 
to search for explanations other than the persistence of insider power and outdated 
norms.
The differential behaviour of investors in the Hungarian and East German companies 
was generally not due to different initial restructuring approaches. In Hungary 
investors tend to arrive with preconceived ideas and a desire to more or less transplant 
structures and practices which work well or are commonly accepted in the West. They 
tend to realise soon that they have not acquired a clean slate but a company with its 
own traditions and culture which are ignored at the cost of demotivating the 
workforce, generating industrial unrest or at least apathy, creating distrust in the local 
management as well as a general lack of communication and co-operation. Since all 
of this is not conducive to an acquisition’s success, investors tend to accept after some 
initial clashes that they have to work with these traditions rather than against them. In 
this context maintaining the internal provision of social services is a highly symbolic 
and effective gesture. By recognising the historically grown social role of the 
enterprise an investor signals that he is humane and worth co-operating with.
case of two continuous variables a t-test for differences of means was used.
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In East Germany the situation was different: In the process of reunification East 
Germany became fully integrated into the West German system of social benefit 
provision. Since East German companies generally needed to find an investor very 
quickly in order to survive, shedding all forms of traditional social services had to be 
accepted as one price one paid for having an investor. This shedding was all the easier 
to accept than in Hungary since East German employees were anticipating wage 
increases and the fast emergence alternative sources of social service provision. 
Nevertheless there were investors who were keen to signal that they were socially 
responsible in their attitudes to general restructuring, even if this did not include 
preserving the provision of social services: These investors tended to abolish services 
with ‘sweeteners’ such as upgraded canteens, changing areas and a generally 
improved working environment.
I find that historically determined attitudes towards restructuring have been adopted 
by some investors and, far from being an atavism, have surprisingly strong positive 
efficiency implications in terms of the companies’ overall performance. Even in East 
Germany, where companies have been subject to very strong transition pressures, this 
unexpected relationship holds. My data suggests a reason for this which goes beyond 
the effects of social service provision on the individual worker’s productivity and 
which has commonly been overlooked: Companies which ascribe to historically 
accepted norms tend to benefit form a highly co-operative trade union and workforce,
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a factor which greatly enhances their ability to meet the challenges posed by
transition.58
I find little support for the hypotheses relating social service provision and 
management styles to company performance. The hypotheses relating social service 
provision to company size fare better. Both in East Germany and Hungary there is 
strong evidence that larger companies do indeed provide an above number of benefits. 
What is somewhat unexpected are the efficiency implications of staying large: large 
Hungarian companies again tend to exhibit ‘insufficient’ social service and labour 
shedding, but they also have an above average market share and export performance.
The fact that seven years into transition I find few companies who are perturbed by 
the persistence of internal social service provision and none who want to shed rather 
than fine-tune their services suggests that it is not simply a question of time until 
Hungarian companies follow East German trends and shed their social services. 
Hungarian companies seem to have chosen a long-run position characterised by 
continuing social service provision. It is not that Hungarian companies are laggards in 
restructuring social service provision, it is that they have chosen a different
581 am not the first to suggest that maintaining social benefits might have efficiency enhancing effects 
by improving individual employees’ productivity. Those suggested by, for example, Rein, Friedman & 
WfirgOtter (1997) are that social services attract the desired kind of worker, increase the loyalty of 
existing workers and enhance productivity. Similarly to Aghion, Blanchard & Burgess (1994) they also 
suggest, however, that on the downside maintaining social service provision might complicate 
restructuring. The reasons given in my studies for maintaining the internal provision of social services 
support the hypothesis that social benefit provision increases productivity by improving loyalty, morale 
and work motivation of the remaining workforce. The handling of housing subsidies also suggests that 
some benefits are being restructured in such a way as to attract scarce middle-ranking and managerial 
employees. What is unusual is my finding that maintaining social services, which is a clear symptom of 
a humane management, not only improves the productivity of individual workers but also induces co­
operation in the trade union which facilitates the whole process of overall restructuring.
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restructuring path. Instead of admonishing Hungarian companies for their lack of 
restructuring we should turn our attention to examining the efficiency rationale behind 
the choices they have made.
My conclusions have indicate that much of the literature on enterprise restructuring 
has failed to adequately capture developments in Hungary. In particular my results 
call for a re-examination of the efficiency implications of managers being guided by 
social considerations in designing and implementing restructuring measures. Such a 
re-examination is all the more pertinent because empirical evidence for the 
persistence of social service provision and of ‘socially responsible’ attitudes is 
mounting also for transition countries other than Hungary59. The importance of 
restructuring wage and non-wage costs has to be put into relationship with the other, 
more pressing, transition challenges a company faces, such as the challenge of finding 
a new market niche in a market that is frequently rapidly changing both on the 
demand and supply side, the restructuring of its product range and supplier networks, 
the upgrading of its technology and the need to find new marketing and sales 
channels, to name just a few. There are strands of literature which suggest that the 
importance of wage costs has been greatly overestimated in this context, as has been 
the contribution internally provided social services make to a company’s total wage 
costs60.
59 See, for example, Clark & Soulsby (1998) for the Czech Republic, Commander & Schankerman 
(1997) for Russia and the Ukraine, Estrin et al (1997) for Poland.
Amsden et al (1994, p.81ff) emphasise, for example, that wages are estimated to constitute only 15 
to 25 percent of total costs in Eastern European companies. Schaffer (1995) suggests that the internal 
provision of social services is not a very pressing policy issue because the costs incurred are 
comparable to non-wage compensation in Western firms. He argues that differences between Eastern 
and Western firms relate to the ownership of the assets used for provision and the types of benefits on
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It is important to note that my findings were made in a context where environmental 
pressures are so strong that both managers and employees cannot ignore the need 
engage in overall restructuring. In such a context a socially responsible management 
with progressive ideas concerning which overall direction the company should take is 
much better able to lead a company with a co-operative trade union than a 
management which excels at shedding employees and social services, but induces low 
productivity, demotivation, disillusionment and unrest in the process.
offer, but not to the cost of provision itself. Rein, Friedman & WOrgfitter (1997) suggest that enterprise 
benefits exclusive of social protection, which is what enterprise benefits in the East should be 
compared with, amounted to 9.9% of total labour costs in the US. With this figure in mind Fajt & 
Lakatos (1997) estimate that the percentage of social services in labour costs is 14% in Hungary, while 
Rein & Friedman (1997) put this figure at 10%. Against the argument that companies cannot be 
efficiently involved in the provision of social services stand suggestions that the economies of scale 
involved in these social services might be relatively small [Schaffer (1995)] and that competition 
between firms in their provision might lead to efficiency improvements [Jackman (1995)]. On these 
accounts the whole debate surrounding the importance extensive of labour and social service shedding 
is somewhat irrelevant. This contention is strongly supported by my case studies. Many Hungarian 
companies suggested that although there is room for increases in productivity, their total wage costs are 
so low that they constitute a competitive advantage, rather than a major worry. Interview partners also 
estimated that wages would reach Western levels in about 10 years time, but no-one seemed 
particularly worried about this prospect. Worries about collapsed Russian markets, insufficient funds to 
obtain the newest production technology etc. were a lot more common than those related to wage costs.
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Data Appendix
Table 1
List of variables summarising the data on the internal provision of social services
D(H)FDI 1 if the company has a foreign direct investor, 0 otherwise
D(H)COOP 1 if the union co-operated in restructuring, 0 otherwise
D(H)SOCRES 1 if the company explicitly endorsed a socially responsible approach to 
labour shedding, 0 otherwise
D(H)LEAVING The percentage of employees leaving the company (1990=100%)
D(H)UNEMP The percentage of employees (1990= 100%) becoming unemployed
D(H)SOCIAL 1 if the level of social services in the company has stayed constant in real 
terms, 0 otherwise
DPROFIT95 1 if the company was profitable in 1995, 0 otherwise
DPROFIT97 1 if the company was profitable in 1997, 0 otherwise
HPROFIT96 1 if the company was profitable in 1996, 0 otherwise1
D(H)SIZE90 number of employees in 1990
D(H)SIZE96(97) number of employees in 1996/7
D(H)BENNUM90 number of internally provided social services in 1990
D(H)BENNUM96
(97)
number of internally provided social services in 1996/7
D(H)DELBEN change in the number of benefits provided: D(H)BENNUM96/7 minus 
D(H)BENNUM90
HSOCIALINC 1 if in 1997 the level of social services has increased in real terms in the 
company, no East German company falls in this category
HSOCCONST 1 if in 1997 the level of social services has at least stayed constant in real 
terms in the company, no East German company falls in this category
HSOCREORG 1 if the delivery of the social services which the company continues to 
provide has been reorganised by 1997, no East German company falls in this 
category
D(H)MS90 market share of the East German (Hungarian) market in 1990
D(H)MS96(97) market share of the East German (Hungarian) market in 1996/7
D(H)EXPORT96
(97)
proportion of output exported world-wide or to the European Union in 
1996/7
1 In 1997, when the Hungarian interviews were conducted, this was the latest available profit figure. 
The German profit figure for 1995 was obtained in the interviews conducted in 1996 and the one for 
1997 was obtained in follow-up calls which were made in 1998 in order to update the East German 
data.
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Table 5: Summary of the main statistical findings
Hypo­
thesis
East Germany Hungary
1 YES
- historically larger companies still tend to provide 
more benefits in 1996
YES
- strong persistence in trends for size and number of 
benefits provided
- no evidence for the hypothesis of Estrin et al (1997) 
that larger firms experience larger declines
2 NOT APPLICABLE
- large losses in market share for all companies, no 
East German companies with monopoly power in 
data
YES (?)
- strong positive relationship between market share and 
social service provision: result of insufficient 
restructuring pressures due to lack of competition?
- strong persistence of historical trends
3 WEAKLY YES
- it is not clear whether companies are less profitable 
because of continued provsision or whether social 
services are a compensation for lower wages in less 
profitable companies
- companies which provided more social services in 
1990 seem to have faced a greater restructuring 
challenge overall and were less profitable than 
average in 1995 but no longer in 1997
NO - on the contrary
- companies which have at least maintained the real 
value of their social services are more likely to be 
profitable in 1996
4 NO
- all relevant associations are insignificant
NO (?)
- strong positive relationship between market share and 
social service provision: does maintaining the latter have 
a positive net effect on efficiency?
5 WEAKLY YES
- companies which have achieved high exports in 
1996 have shed an above average number of benefits
NO- on the contrary
- companies with a good export performance provide 
many benefits
- they shed fewer than average employees
- they are larger than average
- they tend to have a humane management
- they are more likely to be profitable
6 STRONGLY YES NO
7 and
8
YES- BUT UNEXPECTED EFFICIENCY 
IMPLICATIONS
- socially responsible management makes fewer than 
average employees unemployed
- results in co-operative trade union
BUT far from this insider involvement and these 
inherited social norms being efficiency reducing we 
find that:
- these companies are more likely to be profitable
YES- BUT UNEXPECTED EFFICIENCY 
IMPLICATIONS
- humane management sheds fewer than average 
employees
- keeps the real value of social services at least constant
- results in co-operative trade union
BUT far from this insider involvement and these 
inherited social norms being efficiency reducing we find 
that:
- these companies are more likely to be profitable
- have higher than average market shares
- better than average export performance
- tend to be bigger than average
- high levels of labour shedding likely to be due to bad 
business prospects rather than due to insufficient 
restructuring
9 NO- The differences in the trends are significant. There is no indication that the Hungarian companies are 
aiming following the West German trends by significantly reducing their social service provision rather than 
just fine tuning existing arrangements.
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Chapter 3
Integration with the investor:
Strategic restructuring, knowledge transfer, new products
and production methods
Abstract
This chapter examines the role o f foreign direct investors in the strategic restructuring o f  their 
subsidiaries. Strategic restructuring is interpreted as the development o f new capabilities and final 
products, which improve a company's performance both in terms o f profits and exports. The notion 
that companies with FDI will outperform their rivals because o f knowledge transfer from their 
investor and his role in introducing new products and production methods is examined both 
qualitatively and statistically. This is generally supported in the East German data but not in the 
Hungarian one. It emerges that a) investors are frequently unaware o f local idiosyncrasies and 
consequently endorse the same restructuring in both East Germany and Hungary and b) these 
strategies are proving successful in the East German context but not the Hungarian one. I  argue that 
the East German context is sufficiently ‘similar’ to the Western one for managerial approaches which 
have been developed elsewhere to work well. In Hungary, however, a mutual learning process has to 
take place; a simple one-way diffusion process from the investor to the local management is not 
enough. I  also find little evidence that the valuable knowledge transferred to East German subsidiaries 
is being diffused down a local supply chain, while in the Hungarian context it is not clear how 
valuable the knowledge being diffused really is.
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Introduction
Under the previous economic order the horizontal product range1 of most formerly 
state owned companies in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe 
tended to be determined on the basis of non-market considerations. The dictates of 
planners were frequently more important than the preferences of consumers. To the 
extent that in any given case this is true there is a need to change the composition of a 
company’s product range, both to ensure its future competitiveness and in order to 
improve allocative efficiency on an economy-wide scale.
In addition frequently even companies producing goods which were previously 
attractive to consumers are facing problems. This could be due to factors such as 
shifts in demand patterns making ‘old’ products intrinsically less desirable or due to 
entrants offering attractive new substitutes. Alternatively consumers, especially in the 
case of many export goods to the former Soviet Union, may lack the purchasing 
power to continue buying the company’s output. Whatever the cause for the 
frequently sharp fall in a company’s demand, it will have to have to find ways to 
improve its performance by developing new products and capabilities. This chapter 
examines the contribution of foreign direct investors in this process of strategic 
restructuring. Two main questions are asked:
1 The “horizontalproduct range" will only refer to physical products which do not use other internally 
produced physical products as inputs and are not themselves inputs to physical products which are 
further up the value added chain. Whether we are concerned with changes in horizontal product range 
rather than vertical integration depends on which section of the value-added chain the affected product 
range is on. If a company closes down the manufacturing of a product which it uses as an input or 
which uses internally produced inputs, then it is reducing its vertical integration. If, on the other hand, 
it closes down a final product which is not used as an input into another product made by the company, 
then it has reduced its horizontal product range.
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• Do companies with FDI outperform their rivals because of the knowledge transfer 
from their investor and his role in introducing new products and production 
methods?2 How important is the potential contribution of local managers in this 
context?
• Do foreign direct investors contribute to transition by inducing a knowledge 
diffusion process down the local supply chain?3
The chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 provides a survey of the literature. 
Section 2 derives empirical hypotheses. Section 3 presents the empirical evidence 
found in my case studies and derives statistical variables. Section 4 confronts the 
hypotheses. Section 5 concludes by interpreting the statistical evidence found.
1. Literature survey: The expected contribution of foreign direct investors 
The claim is frequently made that ‘strategic’ or ‘deep’ restructuring as opposed to 
‘reactive’ and ‘ambiguous’ behaviour is commonly only observed in companies with 
FDI [Grosfeld & Roland (1995, p.10), Carlin, Van Reenen & Wolfe (1995, p.448 ff.), 
Carlin & Landesmann (1997, p.77), Meyer& Moller (1998, p.412)]. The whole notion 
that there are different types of restructuring developed as a result of the, for some, 
unexpected observation that, given sufficiently hard budget constraints and sufficient 
(potential) product market competition, managers in state-owned enterprises engaged 
in a wide variety in restructuring measures even before companies were privatised
2 See, for example: Grosfeld & Roland (1995, p.10), Carlin, Van Reenen & Wolfe (1995, p.448 ff.), 
Carlin & Landesmann (1997, p.77), Meyer& Moller (1998, p.412)].
See, for example, Grabher(1996, p.181 ff.)
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[Carlin & Landesmann (1997)]. The restructuring measures which different authors 
list as evidence of deep or strategic restructuring vary over time and between authors, 
so that it is hard to avoid the impression that to some extent strategic restructuring is 
simply ‘what local managers cannot do by definition’.
In essence reactive restructuring is generally seen as survival orientated behaviour 
which aims at maximising enterprise performance within the company’s existing 
resources and capabilities. Grosfeld & Roland (1995, p 6) have a narrow definition of 
reactive restructuring, namely activities which seek to “reduce costs and scale down 
enterprise activity: cutting obsolete production lines, shedding labour, getting rid of 
non-productive assets.” On such an account reactive restructuring becomes 
indistinguishable from a managed winding-down o f the firm. Estrin et al (1995, p.19 
ff.), give a list of ‘short-run’ responses local managers actually engaged in: 
“adjustments to the production process (closure of lines) changing the product mix 
toward more sellable goods, laying off workers, selling machines or even plants and 
reorganising production toward cheaper or higher quality inputs”.
The key feature of all the definitions of strategic restructuring is the development of 
new capabilities and final products, which enable a company to be internationally 
competitive in the long-run. The contention is that although managers in companies 
without FDI might have had the incentives to engage in reactive restructuring, they 
lack the resources and know-how to restructure strategically. Investors are expected to 
contribute both [Meyer & Moller (1998), Grosfeld & Roland (1995)]. Particular
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importance is ascribed to investors providing substantial new investments and 
changes in technology, new products and management structures [Carlin & Aghion 
(1996)].
Skills which researchers detect shortages in and which are needed as a prerequisite of 
strategic restructuring include accountancy, financial control, organisational 
restructuring, marketing and sales, quality control and information systems [Estrin et 
al (1995)]. It is also hoped that investors will aid restructuring by giving their 
subsidiaries access to Western supplier and marketing networks.
The extent to which companies with FDI use local suppliers is central in determining 
the degree to which the knowledge transferred from investors becomes diffused 
through the wider economy. In this context Grabher (1996, p. 181) claims that 
globally focused strategies which entail the total integration of the local company with 
the investor have “culminated in the construction of cathedrals in the desert”, while 
investors with multidomestic strategies have favoured the emergence of locally 
integrated production networks.
A question which is rarely asked is the extent to which the knowledge investors bring 
with them is relevant in the transition context in the first place. The greater the 
country specific idiosyncrasies, for example, the more important is the historical and 
cultural knowledge of local managers. Since this increases the importance of the local 
manager’s relationship specific investment an implication of the Grossman and Hart 
(1986) model is that the greater the importance of local factors and knowledge the
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less tightly the subsidiary should be integrated with its investor, allowing local 
managers to retain a greater share of the residual rights of control.4
The potential contribution of local managers is, however, frequently downplayed. 
Dyck’s (1997) model of managerial selection in transition provides an extreme 
example since it is based on the underlying assumptions that there is a need to sack all 
East German managers and that a manager’s quality in the West German context 
translates one to one to his abilities in the East German one. On the basis of adverse 
selection problems faced by central privatisation agencies he advocates a rapid sale of 
companies to direct investors who can internally transfer managers of the ‘right’ 
quality. Dyck does point out that one needs to distinguish, however, between 
functional skills, such as marketing, sales and accounting and restructuring skills 
which refer to a manager’s ability to implement a wide-ranging process of change.
Only in the specific West German- East German example can one assume that 
functional skills are fully transferable, since both countries have the same set of laws, 
regulations and competitors. In Hungary, however, where Western managers face 
different societal norms, traditions, a frequently idiosyncratic market and language 
problems, it is not at all clear that a manager who might have shown good 
restructuring skills in, say West Germany, will do well in Hungary. Meyer & Moller 
(1998, p.417), for example, observe that frequently “Western managers apply
4 Grabher & Stark (1996, p. 18ff.) discuss the advantages of such ‘loose coupling’ from an evolutionary 
perspective, arguing that it increases a company’s learning interface and helps to avoid possible 
cognitive lock-ins.
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concepts of management developed elsewhere and adapted insufficiently to the local
conditions.”
Another question which needs to be considered is whether the ‘reactive restructuring’ 
-’deep restructuring’ literature is not simply observing a natural progression of 
different phases of restructuring. Grosfeld & Roland (1995) argue that defensive 
restructuring must not necessarily precede strategic restructuring, since both could 
and should be done simultaneously. Such a point of view ignores two issues. Firstly 
there is the question as to how much genuine change an organisation and its 
employees can cope with and adjust to at any given time. It might well be that 
sequential and targeted change is more effective in the long run than ‘revolutionary’ 
programmes which try to change all aspects of a company’s operation at once and put 
too pressure on the employees’ ability to learn and adapt. Interviewees in my case 
studies regularly gave examples of the organisational chaos and individual 
bewilderment which resulted from having to cope with ‘too much’ change5.
The second argument against ‘revolutionary’ restructuring is the possibility that 
delaying some aspects of restructuring might preserve valuable options. Measures 
termed as ‘defensive’ increase the efficiency of a company’s existing operations and
5 The procurement manager in H2 stated, for example: “When we give tenders, we find that Hungarian 
companies have a lower amount of experience and economic knowledge than foreign ones. An 
exception to this previous statement are Hungarian companies with FDI, which are even more confused 
than those without an investor because their investors are constantly introducing new systems and 
procedures.” Baden-Fuller & Volberda (1997) claim as well that too much change will lead to chaos, 
loss of cultural glue, fatigue and organisational breakdown. They argue that the scope of change should 
be contained either through spatial or temporal separation.
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maintain the option of branching out into new areas as opportunities emerge over time 
in a highly uncertain environment. As new information emerges, managers can 
implement ‘strategic’ restructuring measures with much greater confidence that their 
strategy is a good one. Ericson (1998) suggest that companies in transition economies 
have gone through ‘noisy’ and ‘niche-discovery’ (1990-94) and ‘cost-reduction’ 
phases (1995 onwards) which seem to reflect stages of learning as a prelude to real 
restructuring rather than restructuring itself.
2. The empirical hypotheses
The main hypothesis emerging from the literature survey is that companies with 
foreign direct investors will outperform their rivals because of the unique and positive 
contribution investors make to enterprise restructuring. Hypotheses la & b formulate 
this contention. Hypotheses 2-5 state specific contributions investors are supposed to 
make to strategic restructuring. Hypothesis 6 asks whether investors are merely 
creating ‘cathedrals in the desert’ or contributing to the dissemination of know-how 
down the supply chain.
HYPOTHESIS 1:
• A positive association between profitability/ export performance to Western 
European markets (as proxies for successful restructuring) and functional 
integration with the investor/ companies in which the investor is the main force in 
managerial training (as proxies for knowledge transfer) This hypothesis is deduced 
from the ‘strategic’ versus ‘reactive’ restructuring literature. See, for example: Grosfeld & Roland
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(1995, p.lO), Carlin, Van Reenen & Wolfe (1995, p.448 ff.), Carlin & Landesmann (1997, p.77), 
Meyer & Moller (1998, p.412)].
Background assumption:
• The larger local idiosyncrasies are, the more important is the potential 
contribution o f local managers. [See in this context: Grossman & Hart (1986), Dyck 
(1997),Grabher & Stark (1996, p.l8ff.)]
Hypotheses 2-5 are secondary hypotheses which will help us interpret the findings for 
Hypothesis 1. Unless otherwise stated they as well originate directly from the 
‘strategic’ versus ‘reactive restructuring’ literature surveyed.
HYPOTHESIS 2:
• A positive association between the introduction o f new products and the closure 
o f old ones in companies with FDI only This hypothesis is introduced to distinguish
between a controlled winding down of a company, when only closures occur, and a strategic 
reorientation in a company’s product range.
HYPOTHESIS 3:
• A positive association between FDI and the introduction o f new products 
HYPOTHESIS 4:
• A positive association between FDI and the introduction o f new production 
methods and forms o f work organisation If the new products introduced by investors
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genuinely augment the core capabilities of the company and entail knowledge transfer from the 
investor, then the new products should be associated with new production methods and 
concomitant new forms of work organisation.
HYPOTHESIS 5:
• A positive association between FDI and relative investment levels
Hypothesis 6 relates to the extent of knowledge diffusion from companies with FDI 
through the wider economy [See Grabher (1996, p. 181 ff.) on the topic]. Even is 
extensive knowledge transfer from the investor to his subsidiary is taking place, 
investors might still be creating ‘cathedrals in the desert’. The hypothesis is 
formulated in accordance with this latter suggestion.
HYPOTHESIS 6:
• A negative association between FDI and companies using local suppliers
The relative contribution of local managers [see Grossman & Hart (1986) and Dyck 
(1997) in this context] and the degree of loose coupling between the investor and its 
subsidiary [Grabher & Stark (1996, p.l8ff.)] are captured by dummies which 
represent the relative influence the investor had on the restructuring of the product 
range, production methods and in determining managerial training respectively. These 
dummies are included in all the hypotheses involving a relationship between FDI and
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another variable. The background assumption is in this context that the larger local 
idiosyncrasies are, the more important is the potential contribution of local managers.
3. The variables and case study evidence6
This section serves two functions: Firstly to introduce the variables used and secondly 
to present the case study evidence relating to each variable. The case study evidence is 
presented in two ways. Trends in the data can be seen from a discussion of the means 
of the variables. Valuable information is obtained from asking whether these means 
show statistically significant differences for the East German and Hungarian case 
studies. Excerpts from interviews provide qualitative illustrations of some of the 
issues which easily get lost in statistical discussions.
3.1 Investor related variables7
• A variable capturing whether the company has a foreign direct investor or not: By 
1996 companies with FDI are usually wholly owned subsidiaries
6 The case study evidence not only serves as a basis for the statistical variables used in Section 4, but 
will also help to interpret the statistical results obtained.
7 Table 1 lists and explains all the variables used. Table 2 summarises the extent and type of functional 
integration companies have with their investor. Tables 3a&b summarise the variables and their 
respective means. Tables 4a &b show the correlation matrices obtained. All tables can be found in the 
Appendix.
In order to examine whether differences between the means of two country specific variables are 
significant a small-sample t-test was used for continuous variables and a chi-square test of 
independence for dummies. Such a procedure effectively tests whether it can be assumed that the 
Hungarian and East German data has been generated by the same underlying processes, that is we are 
testing for homogeneity between the two countries. Unless it is otherwise stated the null cannot be 
rejected for the variables used in my case studies. If the null hypothesis of homogeneity cannot be 
rejected, then the two country specific variables can be pooled. Correlation matrices were obtained for 
the pooled data but did generally not contradict previous findings or add something new.
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In the East German data 77% of companies had foreign, including West German, 
investors in 1996. The two companies which at this time did not fall into this 
category were both up for re-sale after failed privatisations. The privatisation of D6 
failed because the investor ended up asset stripping until the company’s board 
intervened and initiated a re-purchase by the Treuhand. When I called in 1998, D6 
had been re-privatised to a UK company. The case of D7 is very unusual in that this is 
a company which is very successful in spite of its investor who went bankrupt. D7 
was the only company in a large conglomerate which did not go down with its 
Austrian investor. It is currently up for resale.
In Hungary the picture is more varied. 63% of the companies visited have a foreign 
direct investor, H5 and H ll have floated on the Budapest stock exchange after 
prolonged government involvement (some would say interference), H6 has been 
going from one crisis and government intervention to the next and H8 has an 
institutional investor who does not interfere in the day-to-day running of the company. 
Only in four of the East German and five Hungarian companies did the investor have 
a determining influence on the restructuring of the product range.
• Variables capturing the relative influence o f the investor in the restructuring o f 
the product range and production methods
In each company with FDII asked East German and Hungarian general, production 
and personnel managers to assess the extent to which the investor, rather than they, 
was the determining force in the restructuring of the (horizontal) product range and
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production methods. These variables capture two things: firstly the potential 
knowledge transfer which has occurred from the investor and secondly the input 
which local managers had into the restructuring process. The fact that the investor 
was the main force in the restructuring of the company’s operations does not 
necessarily entail that he has transferred any know-how to the local management, 
since the restructuring process might have been ‘dictatorial’ rather than consultative. 
In companies where the local management was consulted in the strategy formation 
and involved in the implementation stage but where the investor gave important 
impulses and had the last word, managers usually claimed that they had about equal 
influence. The claim that the investor had sole influence usually stood for 
‘authoritarian’ investors. It was not uncommon for a dictatorial investor to face a 
highly antagonistic local management.
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The main determining force in the restructuring of H2’s products and production processes was the 
investor. The Budapest factory’s general manager claims that “in theory market forces play an 
important role, but in practice H2 is not innovative or very aggressive. The market is saturated and all 
the players have a large excess capacity.“ The “old” management had a secondary influence on the 
restructuring process of production, but this was not for lack of trying. Apparently there were large 
clashes between the old management and ex-pat managers in the factory in northern Hungary. My 
interview partner described them as follows: “ Two internally closed groups were facing each other. 
My colleagues had to deal with ex-pats who had little understanding of our products. The ex-pats 
wanted to get rid of all local brands. Many local managers got sacked over this issue and the ex-pats 
got their way. But the introduction of the Western brands was a flop: There was a big price difference 
between the new brands and the local brands which had been scrapped and this price difference was, in 
the eyes of the Hungarian consumer, not justified by quality differences. Introducing new brands also 
entails large advertising costs etc. The ex-pats learned it the hard way that it is worth keeping local 
Hungarian brands and have re-introduced the very brands they had been so keen to scrap and re-place 
by their own Western ones.”
***
The investor “got all these young, dynamic people from Austria in who did not understand the situation 
here and wanted to introduce revolutionary changes. However if a company has been run differently for 
40 years, then one cannot expect that even after 2 years of schooling everybody will support the new 
measures, that even if we understand the theory, in practice everything will work as people in the head
offices have thought it out....The new people who were supposed to run the company from the top did
not know the market and had no contact with the people here. This lead to arguments and 
disagreements with the “old” management and workforce.”8
8 Notes on a round table discussion with the personnel, procurement and technical managers in D7.
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Overall, however, investors tended to have a relative hands off stance, with only 
about a third of the East German and Hungarian companies experiencing a strong 
involvement in the restructuring of their product range and production methods.
• A variable capturing whether the investor was the main force in managerial 
training
Managerial training usually encompasses sector specific training in sales, marketing, 
communication, accounting and finance. In particular the following training needs 
were identified by interview partners9:
1. English language courses10
2. Quality control measures11
3. Computing/ computer related skills12
4. General management skills (e.g. the ability to take responsibility and make 
decisions, cost consciousness)13
5. Commercial law, book-keeping, accounting, financial analysis14 
9. Logistics, procurement, sales and marketing15
Investors have overall been a lot more active in providing managerial training than in 
their direct involvement with the restructuring of the product range and production
9 This list reflects the findings made by Estrin et al (1995).
10 D4, D5, D6, HI, H2, H4, H5, H7, H9, H 11
" D6, D7, HI, H3, H4, H5, H6, H7, H8
12 HI, H4, H5,H7, H8,H10,H11
13 H2, H7, H9, H10, HI 1, Dl, D4
14 D5, D6, D7, D9, H10
15 H10, HI 1, D9
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methods. The company’s investor was the main force in managerial training in 55% 
of the East German companies and 36% of the Hungarian ones.16 In companies with 
a foreign direct investor these managerial skills are typically transferred in two 
different phases: In the first phase the investor tends to put managers from Western 
subsidiaries into the top positions. Furthermore there is a tendency to send the 
remaining local managers on training and exchange programmes. Ex-pat managers 
can provide further on-the-job training17. In the second stage the number of expat 
managers is reduced and they are replaced by newly hired young local employees or 
old managers who are thought to have now acquired the necessary skills. Clear 
evidence for knowledge transfer only occurs when the investor phases his direct 
presence out as soon as he feels that the subsidiary can run itself on its own18.
16 Although there is a relatively large difference between these percentages, the assumption of 
homogeneity cannot be rejected.
17 D2, D8, D9, H2, H3, H7, H9, H10
18 The investor of D2 explicitly had such a policy.
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H2 provides an extreme example of a strong reliance on ex-pat managers and a lack of knowledge 
transfer. Only two people (the general manager of H2’s Budapest factory and the MD of H3) remain in 
the top management of all of what used to be the Budapest sweets’ industry before 1990. In H2’s top 
and upper middle management local managers were replaced almost entirely by ex-pat managers. 
Middle managers tended to be replaced by young Hungarians who “have the language and computing 
skills but lack the knowledge which based on experience. The ex-pat managers have learnt some 
Hungarian, but nevertheless it still has great problems in picking up information from the surroundings 
in which H2 operates. This is a particular problem for the marketing department.”19
***
In addition sacking local managers can have a very de-motivating affect on the workforce. “Some “old” 
managers were simply untenable, everybody knew who they were. But with every competent and 
respected old manager the investor sacked, the investor signalled to the workforce that they were 
regarded as useless as well, the workforce identifies with these managers and thus is demotivated with 
every further manager being sacked.”20
Companies without FDI buy training courses on a steadily growing market and focus 
on hiring young employees with the requisite skills. This process, however, requires 
the incumbent management to realise out of their own volition that they need training.
• A variable capturing the extent o f functional integration with the investor 
Table 2 summarises the case study evidence on the type and extent of functional 
integration companies have with their investor. In four out of nine of the East German 
companies with FDI the investor provides design as well as R&D facilities. The 
provision of computing facilities by the investor plays a role in one third of the
19 Interview with the general manager of H2’s Budapest factory.
159
companies and in only one company does the investor provide the subsidiary with 
centralised procurement. All the East German companies are responsible for 
organising their personnel, quality control, maintenance, sales, transportation, 
marketing and customer service needs.
In Hungary the picture as to what types of functions are typically provided by 
investors is less clear. Rather companies tend to fall into two camps, that is those 
which are closely integrated with their investor and those which are not. In addition I 
find that investors tend to concentrate on different types of functions in the Hungarian 
companies than in the East German ones. In the Hungarian companies there is more 
involvement in sales, marketing and procurement and less in the areas of R&D, 
design and computing facilities. In strong contrast to the East German ones the most 
commonly provided functions in the Hungarian companies are procurement and 
marketing (in four out of nine companies), followed by co-operation in R&D, sales 
and design (in one third of the companies). In two out of eleven companies is the 
investor involved in quality control and computing facilities, while in only one 
company each does the investor concern himself with personnel and customer 
services. The only area experiencing no involvement by the investor in all cases is 
maintenance.
Companies cite as the main advantages of being functionally more integrated with the 
investor: 20
20 Interview with the manager in charge of change management in company D8.
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• Integration of the local company with the investor’s world-wide procurement 
activities leads to cost savings.21
• If the investor provides computing facilities, this can lead to an knowledge 
transfer22
• Integration of the marketing functions can open up new trade channels to the 
Hungarian subsidiary23
• Functional integration with the investors enables the subsidiary to make use of 
synergies, especially in R&D24
Companies cite as the main disadvantages of being functionally more integrated with
the investor:
• Some investors try to import practices and policies which are ill-adjusted to the 
subsidiaries’ environment25
21 H4, H7, H9
22 H4
23 H4
24 D4, D5, D8, D9
25 H2, H3, H7, D7
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H2 is highly integrated with its investor and the production manager interviewed made the following 
comments: “(Our parent company) tries to have a coherent organisational methods on a world-wide 
level. This results in very hierarchical structures and in methods which in their uniformity do not 
always adjust well to local conditions. In particular, the Hungarian subsidiary suffers from information 
flow problems. This is particularly true for the investor’s marketing department, which seems to be 
unable to get to grips with Hungarian idiosyncrasies because they are unable to take in information 
from the Hungarian subsidiary. The overall consequence is that H2 is very slow in reacting to market 
developments.”
***
H7 is very successful and has a good relationship with its investor. This has not always been the case. 
Around 1992 the company’s employees reached the conviction “with 75% certainty” that the investor 
had only been really interested in gaining market share for himself by acquiring H7 and was now 
systematically working towards H7’s closure. For example, H7 had a 7% market share in Western 
Europe in its main product lines in 1989. By 1992 this percentage had almost halved due to “the 
investor’s insistence of introducing American methods into the European market leading to a total 
disorganisation in H7’s sales and marketing activities”26 . The investor did furthermore not realise the 
international strength of H7’s brandname and insisted on H7’s brand being replaced by the investor’s 
brand on all of H7’s products from one day to the next. “Our sales people had to pick up the phone and 
introduce themselves as employees of our investor. We literally had buyers calling up and responding 
‘Sorry, I misdialled. I wanted to speak to company H7’ and hanging up.”27
A general reduction in the subsidiaries’ flexibility28
26H7 was very unusual in the fact that ever since 1957 it (rather than a central government agency) was 
in charge of its own export activities and had a very high proportion of its output being exported into 
Western countries.
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For example the change manager in D8 complains that if D8 wants to introduce changes, the interests 
and position of other companies within the investor’s conglomerate (some of its suppliers belong to the 
same investor) have to be taken into consideration.
3.2 Variables capturing changes in the companies’ product range
• Variables capturing the total number o f restructuring measures affecting both the 
company’s vertical and horizontal product range, the number o f horizontal 
products closed and newly introduced as well as the net change in horizontal 
integration [Hypotheses 2,3 and 4]
In both the East German and Hungarian companies net horizontal integration has
declined only marginally. This process of changing the composition of a company’s
horizontal product range tends to take place in three steps:
• Firstly all companies have closed down some lines of production which were not 
inputs to other activities nor used internally produced products as inputs.
Secondly companies intensify their activities (that is further specialise within the 
core and increase the proportion of physical and human capital used in 
production) on the smaller section of the value added chain that has been defined 
by the reduction in vertical and horizontal product range. The newly defined core 
activity always closely relates to a line of production which the company has 
previously engaged in, even if not focused on. 278
27 All quotes from an interview with H7’s trade union representative.
28 H3, D8
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• Once this new core has been established, companies tend to partially reverse the 
reduction in horizontal product range they have experienced by introducing new 
products. These tend to aim at market niches which are new but closely related to 
the company’s perceived core competency. To the extent that these new horizontal 
products entail more complex production processes their introduction can have 
adverse effects on the company’s productivity.
“In the West one factory produces one product. Before privatisation, different factories in the food 
industry specialised as well. Now these factories have been privatised to different investors and all the 
new companies want to produce everything, reversing the previously existing division of labour within 
the food industry. This leads to a very high degree of complexity in each factory and when you 
compare such a factory to a specialised Western factory, you are not comparing like with like. Our one 
factory which is specialising in one product almost fulfils Western standards.”29
3.3 Further variables
• Dummies to capture whether the company is profitable in 1995, 1996 or 1997 
[Hypotheses la &b]: In 1995 44% of the companies in my East German data were 
profitable, rising to 77% in 1997. In 1996 54% of the Hungarian companies were 
profitable and all expected to at least break even by 1999. In each case interview 
partners were simply asked whether or not the company was making profits. 
Absolute profit levels were not explicitly sought because of the measurement 
problems entailed.
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• Variables capturing a company’s export performance to the EU, including West 
Germany [Hypothesis la]
Since the East German companies suffered particularly strong declines in their 
domestic demand, breaking into the West German market was a matter of survival in 
most cases. It is a reflection of this fact that they tend to sell 33% of their output in the 
EU, which is significantly higher (at the 5% level) than the 12% typically obtained by 
the Hungarian companies. Similarly East German companies increased their exports 
to the EU by a mean value of 23 percentage points, compared to 5 percentage points 
for the Hungarian ones (significant at the 10% level).
• Variables capturing a company’s know-how requirements, new production 
methods andforms o f work organisation introduced [Hypothesis 4]
To assess the extent to which a company has a ‘knowledge gap’ I asked managers to 
assess the extent to which their new products required more, equal or less: 1. 
technological know-how, 2. modem production technology and technological know­
how, 3. organisational knowledge, 4. qualified and trained personnel. The experiences 
of the companies in the two country samples seem to have been very similar in terms 
of the additional know-how required after 1990, giving the know-how variable a 
mean of 3.3 in Hungary and of 3.4 in Germany. At no time was it claimed in any 
company that less know-how was required in any area. It is noticeable that in 
Germany there were generally less complaints about shortages in organisational and 29
29 Personnel manager in H2.
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managerial skills, but in both countries the overriding concerns were with 
technological know-how and the training new technologies required.
I also enquired about the new production methods required by a company’s upgraded 
product range. Interview partners were asked whether they had newly introduced or 
significantly upgraded their computing facilities in the commercial area, in production 
planing, in production co-ordination, in R&D, in the management of their stocks as 
well as their CAD systems, industrial robots etc. I found that the East German 
companies tended to introduce significantly (at the 1% level) fewer new production 
methods.30
Lastly interview partners were required to state whether they had introduced 
quality control groups, job rotation, job enrichment, flexible working hours, project 
groups and other new forms of work organisation. I find that 77% of the East German 
companies did so, but only 54% of the Hungarian ones.
30 This finding is not due to the possibility that the East German companies had a better pre-existing 
stock of capital. If anything, the Hungarian companies had a more up-to-date starting point after the 
investment drive in the 1980s in many ‘key’ sectors.
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Both in Hungary and East Germany the introduction of new working methods tended to meet with a 
mixed response. Whereas flexible working hours were usually accepted as a necessity, project groups 
tended to attract negative comments: “Our investor decided to introduce project groups. We were given 
leaflets explaining ‘our values’ and how these project groups would improve both productivity and 
quality. The investor thought that this was all new to us. It wasn’t. Previously such groups were called 
socialist brigades and our mission statements weren’t on leaflets but on banners. The investor did not 
understand the general apathy which greeted his initiative, nor why these groups were no success.”31
• Investment related variables: total investment, investment as a fraction o f sales 
and a variable capturing the extent to which a company benefits from up-to-date 
machinery [Hypothesis 5]
For the East German and Hungarian companies accumulative investment between 
1990 and 1996 tended to be of the same size as, respectively, 30% and 44% of sales in 
1996. The companies’ machinery tends to be characterised by an overall comparable 
degree of obsolescence. In both countries the mean value of this variable suggests that 
by 1996(7) the typical company’s machines still have between 47% and 41% of their 
technical lifetime left.
From the interviews it was quite clear that if a company was unable to obtain money 
from an institutional investor, domestic or foreign, or to float on the stock exchange, 
it needed a direct investor to ease its liquidity constraints. The former options were 
typically open to only a few large Hungarian companies. In the East German case the 
Treuhand generally did not encourage any alternative methods of privatisation. In this
31 Interview with the manager in charge of change management in company D8.
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sense investors do seem to play an important role in easing liquidity constraints, but in 
Hungary this is mostly a function of the underdeveloped domestic banking and stock 
markets rather than of the subsidiary’s wish to obtain foreign involvement and know­
how. Several Hungarian interview partners also made the claim that, given the 
finances, Hungarian managers will always want to buy the best and most up-to-date 
technology they can possibly afford, while foreign direct investors tend to give them 
second-hand machinery from Western subsidiaries.
“Usually we get machines which have been replaced in Western factories. We are expected to be 
happy with outdated machines and generally there is very little investment by foreigners which is of a 
high quality.”32
***
“It is easy for Western factories to have a higher productivity: even the greenfield site which has been 
recently build does not operate with the latest technology which most similar Western factories would 
be employing. We have the latest technology in some areas, but has also received second hand 
machines from the investor.”33
***
“We continuously upgrade our production methods and were on par with our Western competitors 
already in the early 1990s. We always buy into the best technology we can conceivably afford when 
making new capital investments.”34
32 Production manager in H2.
33 Managing director in H3.
34 Deputy CEO of H5. Similar comments were made in H8 and HI 1.
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• Variables capturing the extent to which a company relies on domestic suppliers 
and on suppliers pre-dating 1990 [Hypothesis 6]
It is a reflection of the overall greater stability in the supply networks of the 
Hungarian companies that 50% of their suppliers tend to pre-date 1990, while this 
variable obtains a mean of only 28% in East Germany (significant at the 1% level). 
Hungarian companies also tend to rely to a greater extent on domestic suppliers, a 
trend which is especially pronounced if one only compares manufacturing companies 
with each other, allowing for the relatively large number of construction companies in 
the East German data.
4. Confronting the hypotheses
This section presents the statistical evidence obtained with respect to Hypotheses 1-6 
in my data set. Tables 4a and 4b in the Appendix summarise the associations found 
for the variables introduced.
HYPOTHESIS 1:
• A positive association between profitability/ export performance to Western 
European markets (as proxies for successful restructuring) and functional 
integration with the investor/  companies in which the investor is the main force in 
managerial training (as proxies for knowledge transfer)
Summary: Both in the East German and Hungarian data investors have introduced a 
relatively high number o f changes to their subsidiaries ’ product range. Only in East
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Germany, however, are these restructuring measures associated with improved 
profitability and export performance. In the Hungarian context the quality 
improvements achieved through new production methods rather than new products 
seem to be key features influencing a company’s relative performance. There is no 
evidence that in the Hungarian data companies with FDI outperform those without.
The East German data clearly supports the contention that companies which have 
restructured their product range and production methods effectively tend to achieve 
higher relative exports.35 For example companies which have experienced more 
changes in their general product range [0.54, 10%]36 benefit from an improved export 
performance. My data also indicates that companies which have introduced an above 
average number of new production methods have not only achieved high rates of 
export growth [0.58, 10%] but also have above average total exports in 1996 [0.50, 
10%].
The next question is whether East German companies which have restructured 
effectively have done so because of their investor’s contributions. In the east German 
data functional integration with the investor is associated with an investor who is also
35 In order to assess why for 1995 the data suggests that there is a negative relationship between a 
company’s export performance and its profitability (at the 5% level) one would have to examine the 
companies’ competitive situation in their export markets. One possibility is that companies initially 
achieved relatively high exports by having a loss leadership strategy. Alternatively newly exporting 
companies might have encountered very hostile competitors in their target markets.
36 The numbers in parentheses indicate the association found and its statistical significance. Statements 
along the lines o f ‘companies which have introduced a higher than average number of new production 
methods have experienced higher than average increases in their export performance’ are meant to 
indicate that in the case studies there is, for example, a significant positive association between the 
number of new production methods introduced and the export variable.
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the main force in the restructuring of the subsidiary’s product range and production 
methods [0.78, 1% in both cases]. Furthermore investors who are active in the 
restructuring of the production methods also tend to be the main force in managerial 
training [0.73, 5%].37 The clearest indication of the value of the know-how provided 
by investors is the fact that by 1997 companies in which the investor is active in the 
training of local managers are more likely to be profitable [0.60, 10%] and have also 
introduced more new products than others [0.52, 10%]. Companies in which the 
investor was the main force in the restructuring of the product range also benefit from 
high export growth [0.72, 5%] and total exports [0.71, 5%].38
In the Hungarian data I find that there is no clear relationship between restructuring 
measures affecting a company’s product range and better performance both in terms 
of exports or profitability39. I do find, however, that companies introducing a large 
number of new production methods have benefited from above average export growth 
[0.68, 5%]. In addition increases in exports tended to go to the EU [0.56, 5%] and a 
good export performance to the EU tends to be associated with a high probability of 
being profitable [0.56, 5%].
37 Similarly companies which are highly functionally integrated with their investors tend to have 
investors who are active in managerial training [0.53,10%].
38 In addition FDI in general is associated with higher export growth [0.52, 10%].
39 The association which appear to be significant in this context are entirely due to H7, who is an outlier 
both in terms of its export performance and the number of its overall restructuring measures, especially 
in terms of the closure of horizontal product ranges. The footnotes to Table 4b provide scattergrams to 
illustrate this point. Scattergrams were obtained for all the major associations. They are only reported 
when their visual inspection revealed that a seemingly significant association is entirely due to one or 
two outliers.
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The policies of investors are similar in the East German and Hungarian companies: 
As in the East German data set I find that companies with FDI have tended to be more 
active in the restructuring of their product range. They have introduced more overall 
changes [0.59, 5%]40, closed more horizontal product groups41 and also introduced 
more new ones [0.46, 10%]42. In contrast to the East German data there is little 
evidence, however, that they have introduced an above average number of new 
production methods.
My data suggests that in Hungary investors do not seem to be achieving the desired 
results with their restructuring measures. All the investor related variables are entirely 
insignificant with respect to a company’s export performance and have negative but 
statistically insignificant associations with profitability. In stark contrast to the East 
German data the contribution of investors seems to have been neutral at best in the 
Hungarian context.
HYPOTHESIS 2:
• A positive association between the introduction o f new products and the closure 
o f old ones in companies with FDI only
40 This association also holds for companies in which the investor was the main force in the 
restructuring of the product range [0.62, 5%], for companies who are highly integrated with their 
investor [0.58, 5%] and for companies in which the investor is the main force in managerial training 
[0.64, 5%].
41 This association is especially strong for companies which are highly integrated with the investor 
[0.61,5%].
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HYPOTHESIS 3:
• A positive association between FDI and the introduction o f new products
In the East German there is no evidence whatsoever that the companies experiencing 
a large number of closures are also the ones introducing new product lines. Nor is 
there any evidence that companies with FDI behave any differently in terms of the 
number of closures and new products introduced. The mere fact that a company is 
closing down horizontal product lines is more likely to indicate a managed winding 
down of its operations than the presence of strategic restructuring.
In the Hungarian data I again find no overall relationship between the closure of old 
product lines and the introduction of new ones. As argued in the context of 
Hypotheses la  & b companies with FDI are, however, more likely than average to be 
highly active in both areas, without achieving noticeable improvements in their 
relative performance.
HYPOTHESIS 4:
• A positive association between FDI and the introduction o f new production 
methods andforms o f work organisation
HYPOTHESIS 5: 42
42 This association also holds for companies in which the investor was the main force in the 
restructuring of the production methods [0.43, 10%] and who are tightly integrated with their investor 
[0.57, 5%].
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A positive association between FDI and relative investment levels
Summary: Both in the German and Hungarian data high relative investment levels 
are significantly related to a company’s performance, suggesting a virtuous 
investment circle. The East German data supports the role o f foreign direct investors 
in easing liquidity constraints. It also indicates their contribution to the introduction 
o f new production and work methods, especially by helping to close the subsidiary’s 
knowledge gap. My findings also stress, however, the importance o f a company’s pre­
existing knowledge base in determining its ability to engage in strategic 
restructuring.
In the Hungarian data there is little evidence that FDI has played a unique role in 
easing liquidity constraints, since some companies had access to the stock market or 
institutional investors. I  do find, however, that Hungarian companies with FDI 
engage in a disproportionate number o f changes to their work organisation. In 
contrast to the East German data there is no evidence suggesting that investors 
contribute to closing a Hungarian company’s knowledge gap or that the 
organisational innovations they introduce enhance the subsidiary’s performance.
In the East German data I find a clear support for Hypothesis 4. Companies with FDI 
tend to introduce an above average number of new production methods [0.60, 5%]. 
Changes in a company’s production methods are conducive to both higher total 
exports in 1996 [0.50, 10%] and greater overall export growth [0.58, 10%]. Similarly
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companies in which the investor is the main force in managerial training are also 
likely to introduce more changes to their work organisation [0.60, 5%]. These changes 
increase a company’s probability of being profitable, both in 1995 [0.48, 10%] and 
especially by 1997 [1,1%].
A precondition for the introduction of new production and work methods is the 
availability of the necessary funds. Consistently my East German data suggests that 
companies which tended to introduce a large number of changes to their work 
organisation also had high relative investment levels [0.50, 10%]. These high 
investment levels clearly resulted in more up-to-date machinery in these companies, 
since changes to the organisation of work are also associated with a lower degree of 
technical obsolescence [-0.67, 5%].
The role of investors in easing liquidity constraints is supported by the finding that 
companies in which the investor was the main force in restructuring the product range 
experienced both higher relative [0.57,10%] and total [0.48,10%] investment levels.
As would be expected, higher relative investment levels are associated with a greater 
probability of being profitable [0.50, 10%]. In this context it needs to be stated that 
the flow of causation is ambiguous: Companies might be profitable because they have 
higher investment levels enabling them to introduce more new products etc., or their 
higher profitability might give them the retained earnings needed to finance
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investment. In either case profitable companies are likely to be in a virtuous 
investment circle.
In the Hungarian data there is little evidence that changes in a company’s production 
methods are in any way associated with FDI. Rather the determining factors seem to 
be the relative investment levels a company has experienced [0.71, 1%]. Since in the 
Hungarian data there are companies without FDI which were able to raise significant 
funds by either floating on the stock market or having an institutional investor FDI 
was not necessarily a high precondition for high investment levels. High relative 
investment levels are significantly related to a company’s performance: they are 
associated with higher total exports in 1997 [0.61, 5%], higher export growth [0.75, 
1%] and a higher probability of being profitable [0.48, 10%].43 Since interview 
partners usually indicated that retained earnings are a major source of investment 
funds it is likely that there is a two-way causation.
The Hungarian data supports the notion that the investors who are active in the 
restructuring of the product range [0.60, 5%] and in managerial training [0.69, 1%] 
are also strongly predisposed towards introducing changes in the subsidiary’s work 
organisation. In contrast to the East German data, however, in 1996 these changes in 
the organisation of work do not yet seem to achieve their desired results be it in terms 
of improving the Hungarian subsidiary’s relative export performance or profitability.
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HYPOTHESIS 6:
• A negative association between FDI and companies using local suppliers
Summary: Only the East German data supports Hypothesis 6. In both countries a 
continued reliance on pre-existing suppliers, whether local or foreign, tends to be 
associated with a general lack o f investment and o f changes to the company’s product 
range and production methods. A restructuring o f a company’s supply arrangements 
seems to be a concomitant o f strategic restructuring.
The East German data strongly supports this hypothesis, both with respect to investors 
in general [-0.83, 1%] and investors who are the main force in the restructuring of the 
product range [-0.53, 10%]. The data also suggests that a continued reliance on East 
German suppliers is associated with few general changes to the company’s product 
range [-0.61, 5%] and production methods [-0.48, 10%] as well as with lower than 
average total [-0.58, 10%] and relative [-0.57, 10%] investment levels. The finding 
that companies relying on East German suppliers have also experienced below 
average export growth [-0.67, 5%] and total exports [-0.69, 5%] is partly due to the 
fact that in this data set it is mainly construction companies who still rely on local 
suppliers and customers.
In the Hungarian data there is no indication that companies with FDI rely less on local 
suppliers. What the data does, however, support is the notion that a continued reliance 43
43 With the exception of export growth similar relationships hold for total investment as well.
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on pre-existing Hungarian (and foreign) suppliers44 is indicative of a general lack of 
strategic restructuring. Companies which have introduced a large number of new 
products [-0.42, 10%], production methods [-0.47, 10%] and have experienced above 
average relative investment [-0.42, 10%] are all less likely to continue using their 
pre-existing suppliers. I also find that companies which heavily rely on their old 
supplies tend to have lower additional know-how requirements [-0.44, 10%]. This is 
consistent with the previous finding that strategic restructuring not only tends to entail 
the need to restructure a company’s supply arrangements but also to increase its 
know-how requirements.
5. Conclusions and interpretations45
A hypothesis emerges which has not been clearly formulated in the surveyed 
literature: The pre-existing social, cultural and economic structures will have a large 
bearing on how effective a blanket approach to enterprise restructuring will be.
The problems associated with a blanket approach to restructuring are illustrated by my 
main general finding that both in the East German and Hungarian companies 
investors have tended to introduce more overall changes to their subsidiaries’ product
Pre-existing suppliers tended to be mainly Hungarian ones [0.44, 10%], but not exclusively so.
45 This section is best started by a caveat: All my conclusions relate only to my twenty case studies. 
Although I am hence unable to make statements about trends pertaining to Hungarian and East German 
companies in general, my case studies nevertheless are well suited to show the degree of support found 
for the hypotheses studied.
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range, but only in the East German case do these strategic restructuring measures 
seem to have achieved the desired effect in terms of exports and profitability.
The East German data supports the performance enhancing effect of the knowledge 
transferred by the investor. Functional integration with the investor is associated with 
investors taking an active interest in training the local management and the 
restructuring of the subsidiary’s product range and production methods. All these 
policies are in turn associated with an improved export performance and profitability 
in the subsidiary. Clearly the restructuring measures and training endorsed by active 
investors and the knowledge directly transferred through functional integration 
provide the subsidiary with valuable inputs and a viable strategy.46
It is in rather strong contrast that the investors who are the main force in the 
restructuring of the Hungarian subsidiaries’ product range and production methods 
and are involved in the training of the local management47 pursue similar policies as 
in the East German context without having a noticeably positive result. In the 
Hungarian context the performance enhancing effect of improvements in a company’s 
production methods seems to outweigh benefits obtained from introducing entirely
46 My East German data also supports the important role foreign investors have played in easing 
liquidity constraints, while in Hungary some companies had access to institutional investors and the 
stock market. My Hungarian data provides examples of companies who were able to obtain these 
investment funds without FDI and are using them to implement a successful strategy they have 
independently developed. Whether they have a direct investor or not in both countries profitable firms 
seem to be in a virtuous investment cycle, with their retained earnings financing investment into new 
products and production methods which in turn enhance their future performance.
47 It should be noted again that in several Hungarian subsidiaries ‘being active in the training of the 
local management’ frequently really meant ‘keeping them on a very close lead and making sure that 
they faithfully implement the investor’s policies.’
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new products. Although investors have a disproportionate tendency to close old 
product lines and introduce new ones, they seem to focus more on the introduction of 
new forms of work organisation rather than on providing the Hungarian subsidiary 
with the most up-to-date production methods and high relative investment levels.48 In 
contrast to East Germany, in the Hungarian context investors also have no appreciable 
effect on their subsidiary’s knowledge gap and the organisational innovations they 
introduce do not seem to be performance enhancing.
The question to arise from these conclusions is why a) the same restructuring 
measures are being endorsed by investors both in East Germany and Hungary and b) 
why they are proving successful in the East German context but not the Hungarian 
one. In this context my case studies provide anecdotal evidence that the value of the 
knowledge (frequently West German) investors transfer to their East German 
subsidiaries is very high. Due to the shared language, cultural background, 
competitors, rules and regulations functional as well as restructuring skills developed 
in West Germany are easily transferable to the East German context. This hypothesis 
is supported by the fact that the companies which reported problems with their 
investor in this respect tended to have genuinely ‘foreign’ investors.
48 In both countries closures of products lines tend to be indicative of a managed winding down of the 
subsidiary’s operations rather than of strategic restructuring. The closure of uncompetitive products is a 
necessary step in re-focusing the company’s activities, but not a substitute for actual restructuring. 
Strategic restructuring clearly involves not just the introduction of new products, but also the use of 
new production methods.
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In Hungary anecdotal evidence suggests that investors were frequently unaware of the 
demand and cultural idiosyncrasies they were facing, making the potential input of 
local managers all the more important. Even if local managers frequently lack 
functional skills, their knowledge of the context in which new strategies need to be 
developed and implemented in meant that they have important restructuring skills. 
Investors who did not tap into this source of relevant knowledge and skills frequently 
ended up endorsing restructuring measures which made little sense in the Hungarian 
context. Since, for example, Hungarian consumers frequently have a strong loyalty to 
local brands it makes more sense to improve the quality of these products by 
introducing new production methods and engaging in process innovation rather than 
to simply replace them by Western brands. In East Germany on the other hand such 
demand patterns were relatively rare, making the total replacement of old products a 
much more attractive strategy.
The simple answer to the first part of the question is, therefore, that investors pursued 
the same restructuring measures in both East Germany and Hungary because they 
were frequently unaware of local idiosyncrasies. The strategies endorsed proved to be 
appropriate in the East German context, but not in the Hungarian one for one main 
reason: The East German context is sufficiently ‘similar’ to the Western and 
especially West German one for managerial approaches which have been developed 
elsewhere to work well.
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For an investment to be successful in a highly idiosyncratic context, however, a 
mutual learning process has to take place; a simple one-way diffusion process from 
the investor to the local management is not enough. A mutual learning process 
involving several feed-back loops makes it unlikely that a company will find it 
desirable to implement a ‘revolutionary’ process of change affecting all aspects of its 
operation simultaneously. The reason is that revolutionary processes of change are 
likely to be exclusively based on the investors ‘vision’, not to say his pre-conceived 
ideas, while a more sequential process of change allows for learning, sequential 
adaptation and the temporary preservation of options which might become valuable in 
the future.49
Time is, however, a precondition for a sequential learning process and the exploration 
of future options. The East German companies suffered much stronger competitive 
pressures following reunification which entailed the loss of all forms of protection. 
Consequently one could argue that in East Germany there was not only less need to 
adapt restructuring approaches developed elsewhere to local conditions but that there 
was also less time to do so.
The last issue which needs to be considered is the extent to which any knowledge 
diffusion processes are taking place not only from the investor to the subsidiary but
49 An example of a ‘revolutionary’ approach would be the almost immediate closure of several old 
product lines and their replacement by entirely new ones. The closure of the worst old products and the 
introduction of new production methods to improve the quality of the most promising old product lines 
would be an example of a more sequential approach.
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also within the wider economy. In this context I find that in both Hungary and East 
Germany companies which have strategically restructured50 also have tended to seek 
out new suppliers. In the Hungarian context all companies seem to continue to 
extensively use local suppliers, whether these pre-date 1990 or not. Only in East 
Germany is there a noticeable tendency for companies with FDI to disproportionately 
rely on ‘foreign’ suppliers. This might well indicate that in East Germany investors 
are building ‘cathedrals in the desert’. It is, however, difficult to say whether in East 
Germany the general industrial devastation51 left investors with no other choice than 
to ‘import’ inputs, or whether investors have in part caused this deindustrialisation by 
excessively relying on their pre-existing Western supply networks and never giving 
East German suppliers a chance. There is little evidence that the valuable knowledge 
transferred to East German subsidiaries is being diffused down a local supply chain, 
while in the Hungarian context it is not clear how valuable the knowledge being 
diffused really is.
50 (that is have high investment levels and have engaged in an extensive restructuring of their product 
range and production methods)
51 See Carlin (1994) for an account of the extent of deindustrialisation in East Germany following 
reunification.
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Data Appendix
Table 1: List of variables summarising the data on strategic restructuring
D(H)PRODCH number of major product groups, both vertical and horizontal, which have been either 
closed down or have been newly introduced; this variable captures the overall 
restructuring activity with respect to the company’s product range
D(H)PCLOSED
(hor)
number of major horizontal product groups which have been closed down
D(H)PNEW
(hor)
number of major new horizontal product groups which have been newly introduced
DAhorint H Pnew (hor) minus H Pclosed (hor): This variable captures the net effect on horizontal 
integration of the closure of (horizontal) product lines and the introduction of new ones
D(H)PRODMETH number of new production methods which have been introduced since 1990: a given 
method is given the value of 1 if it was entirely new and 0.5 if its use has been 
significantly expanded
D(H)WORKORG 1 if the company introduced new methods of work organisation, 0 otherwise
D(H)INVS accumulative investment between 1990 and 1996 divided by after tax sales for 1996
D(H)INVEST accumulative investment between 1990 and 1996 in million DM
D(H)AGELIFE average age of machinery divided by its expected technical lifetime; if there are several 
groups of machinery with differing average ages and lifetimes, then the overall figure is 
the average of these averages. Assume, for example, that there are two groups of 
machinery, G1 and G2, with a lifetime of LI and L2 respectively. Then AGELIFE = (Gl/ 
T1 + G2/ T2) 12. The smaller this number, the more up-to-date the machinery in a 
company.
D(H)FDI 1 if the company has a foreign direct investor, 0 otherwise
D(H)IMPPR 1 if the investor was the most important force in determining changes in the product range; 
0.5 if the investor and the company’s “old” management had roughly the same influence;
0 if the “old” management was the main force in determining changes in the product 
range;
D(H)IMPPM 1 if the investor was the most important force in determining changes in production 
methods;
0.5 if the investor and the company’s “old” management had roughly the same influence; 
0 if the “old” management was the main force in determining changes in production 
methods;
D(H)KNOWH sum of the areas in which more know-how is required; if interview partners placed 
particular emphasis on an area, then this area was counted twice
D (H)
96(7) investor
The number of functions (out of a maximum of 11) which are catered for by the investor 
(that is other companies in the acquiring conglomerate) in 1996.
D(H)IMMT 1 if the investor was the main force in managerial training, 0 otherwise
D96%EGer percentage of total inputs (physical and support services) procured in East Germany in 
1996
H97%Hune percentage of total inputs (physical and support services) procured in Hungary in 1997
D(H)%oldsup percentage of current suppliers which pre-date 1990
D(H)Export 96(7) 
EurU
percentage of the company’s total output which was sold in the European Union 
-including West Germany- in 1996(7)
D(H)A Total 
Export
Total Export 96 minus Total Export 90: the in - (or decrease in the company’s overall 
export orientation since 1990
D profit 95 1 if the company is profitable in 1995, 0 otherwise
D profit 97 1 if the company is profitable in 1995 (97), 0 otherwise
H profit 96 1 if the company is profitable in 1995, 0 otherwise
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T ab le  5: Sum m ary  o f th e  m ain statistical findings
Hypo­
thesis
East Germany Hungary
1 YES
- foreign investors introduce an above 
average number of changes to the 
subsidiaries’ product range. These changes 
are associated with improved profitability 
and export performance.
NO
- there is no evidence that companies with 
FDI outperform those without
- the quality improvements achieved through 
new production methods seems to be a key 
factor influencing performance, rather than 
the introduction of new products
2 &  3 NO
- all associations with FD1 are insignificant 
in this respect
- closures are indicative of a managed 
winding down of a companies’ operations 
rather than of strategic restructuring
NO
4 &  5 YES
- high investment levels are associated with 
good performance and there is evidence that 
FDI eases liquidity constraints
Generally NO, with the exception that 
companies with FDI introduce a relatively 
large number of changes the subsidiaries’ 
work organisation
6 YES NO
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Chapter 4
Changing markets:
The economic geography of transition and the companies’ 
competitive situation after trade liberalisation
Abstract
This chapter examines the changes which have occurred in the companies’ forward and backward 
linkages. Transition induced trade liberalisation is found to have had a profound effect on the 
companies ’ supply arrangements, export orientation and competitive situation. Supplier and customer 
relationships have shown a much greater stability in the Hungarian data. The East German 
companies have generally deserted their domestic suppliers in favour ofpre-existing West German and 
EU suppliers who are not suffering from the challenges posed by transition. At the same time in their 
output markets the East German companies themselves have been largely deserted by their customers, 
be it due to the availability o f more attractive substitutes from the West or due to a collapse in East 
German industrial demand. Both data sets show that a pre-existing exporting capability is a deciding 
factor in whether a company can meet the supply side challenges posed by transition. Since the 
rigidities o f the previous economic system meant that especially in East Germany few  companies had 
direct experience with foreign markets, extensive and sudden trade liberalisation early on in the 
transition process is argued to have lead to the destruction o f an excessive proportion o f East German 
industry. Hungary arguably provides an example o f how gradual but fully credible trade liberalisation 
provides restructuring incentives without decimating the domestic manufacturing base.
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Introduction
Companies do not operate in isolation. Hence no study on enterprise restructuring 
would be complete without considering changes in a company’s backward and 
forward linkages. Transition induced trade liberalisation is likely to affect a 
company’s supply arrangements as well as its export performance and domestic 
competitive situation profoundly. Using the literature on economic geography as an 
interpretative framework this chapter examines how in the twenty companies studied 
between 1990 and 1996
• the geographical distribution of supply arrangements changed (Section 2)
• the geographical distribution of sales changed. In particular I examine whether 
have there been any noticeable changes in the companies’ export 
orientation.(Section 3)
Acknowledging that trade liberalisation not only gives domestic companies better 
access to foreign markets, but also foreign companies to domestic ones, the chapter 
proceeds to examine
• how the companies’ competitive situation and domestic market have changed 
(Section 4)
• the main dimensions of competition and the importance of different regional 
characteristics for the companies’ competitive success (Section 5).
Section 1 provides a survey of the literature which serves as an interpretative 
framework for the empirical evidence presented in Sections 2- 5. Section 6 concludes 
by highlighting the main results.
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1. Literature survey: Trade liberalisation and economic geography
As a consequence of their history of central planning and COMECON orientated trade 
East Germany and Hungary started the transition process in 1990 sharing many a 
priori similarities in their likely comparative advantage and underlying production 
structures. Komai (1992, p.341ff) and van Brabant (1994, p.165) especially 
emphasise that trade decisions were bureaucratically controlled and not based on real 
economic scarcity indicators, world prices or genuine comparative advantage. Trade 
within the COMECON also followed the logic of bureaucratic co-ordination [Komai 
(1992, p. 356)]. The underlying idea of international specialisation lead to severe 
distortions in locational decisions, giving rise to industries in some countries which 
probably would not have developed there on the basis of comparative advantage 
considerations.1 Prices as well were distorted in COMECON trade, with, for example, 
Central European countries exporting overpriced manufacturing goods and importing 
underpriced energy in their trade with the Soviets [Marer (1991, p. 329)]. As part of 
the policy goal of limiting dependence on the West, many Eastern European countries 
also sought to restrict international trade with market economies [Hamilton & Winters 
(1992, p.353)]. Even when official policy was one of export encouragement, however, 
producers were frequently unenthusiastic about selling to a buyers’ market abroad 
when they enjoyed a sellers’ market domestically [Komai (1992, p. 349)].2
1 Arguably one example is the presence of a relatively large oil refining industry in Hungary.
2 Hungary’s investment drive in the 1980s nevertheless succeeded in raising hard currency exports from 
$4.4 bn in 1980 to $7bn in 1990 [Amsden et al (1994, p. 104 if.)].
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All these factors contributed to a domestic economy which was both distorted and 
inflexible in its underlying supply structures as well as sheltered from internal and 
external competition. In such a context a strong case can be made for trade 
liberalisation, which can be expected to lead to improved allocative and productive 
efficiency by, for example, providing competition in previously monopolised 
domestic markets, exposing domestic production to world prices and allowing firms 
to obtain better economies of scale and scope due to their increased exports.
Van Brabant (1994, p.167) points out, however, that rapid trade liberalisation can 
only be expected to lead to such benefits once domestic markets function sufficiently 
well to allow for flexible adjustments to new demand and supply patterns. He warns 
that extensive trade liberalisation, if introduced too early in the transition period, 
“might eliminate an inordinate share of domestic production”. On the other hand the 
question arises whether delayed liberalisation just forestalls the collapse of negative- 
value added firms3 and sacrifices the positive restructuring incentives trade 
liberalisation offers to viable companies in the form of improved price formation and 
increased competition.
Not only the desirable speed of trade liberalisation is disputed, but also the likely 
comparative advantage Central European transition economies enjoy. In particular the 
notion that similarly to Southern Europe, Central Europe’s comparative advantage 
might lie in unsophisticated, low-tech and labour-intensive goods [Neven (1994)] has
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been challenged. Amsden et al (1994, p.8), for example, claim that lowering real 
wages in order to specialise according to factor-price comparative advantage “makes 
no sense at all in a semideveloped country, defined as already having a broad base of 
industries, especially mid-tech, and a stock of accumulated human skills”. Hamilton 
& Winters (1992) argue that on the basis of its very high stock of human capital, 
especially Hungary should become an exporter of sophisticated goods with a high 
R&D content. Indeed Carlin & Landesman (1997, p.78 & p.92 ff.) conclude that by 
1995 the representation of R&D and skill intensive exports in Hungary’s exports to 
the EU was similar to that of overall exports from the rest of the world to the EU.
East Germany experienced very sudden total trade liberalisation with West Germany 
through reunification. In addition as East Germany and Hungary become increasingly 
integrated into the EU as well we can generally expect shifts in the spatial 
agglomeration patterns of economic activity, including the location and export 
decisions of companies. For example this chapter will show how by 1996 the 
companies in the Hungarian data set maintained a stronger focus on their domestic 
sales, while the East German companies have more strongly re-orientated themselves 
to EU and especially West German markets. In contrast to the ‘New Economic 
Geography’ literature3 4 considerations based on comparative advantage do not help to 
explain why two countries which had similar starting points in terms of their 
comparative advantage might end up on different development paths subsequently. In
3 Using data from four transition countries and shadow profit rates Hughes & Hare (1994) provide 
estimates of which sectors might have a negative value-added at world prices.
4 See Ottaviano & Puga (1998), Martin (1999) and Krugman (1998) for recent surveys.
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this context an important difference is that East Germany integrated very suddenly 
with West Germany, while Hungary has still maintained its own currency and some 
tariff and non-tariff trade barriers with the EU5.
In deciding on whether to agglomerate their activities or to disperse more evenly over 
a region companies face countervailing centrifugal and centripetal forces [see, for 
example, Krugman & Venables (1990, 1995), Martin (1999), Venables (1998)]. 
Centripetal forces essentially consist of Marshallian localisation externalities arising 
from labour market pooling, technological spillovers and intermediate supply and 
demand linkages [Martin (1999, p.68)].
Assuming increasing returns to scale, market size effects play an especially large role 
in generating pecuniary externalities between agglomerating firms. This gives 
companies an incentive to locate in or at least re-orientate their activities towards 
areas already enjoying good access to large markets.6 Newly arriving companies 
generate higher expenditure on the intermediate products produced by already 
existing firms and agglomeration also leads to transaction cost savings as more inputs 
can be procured in spatial proximity [Krugman & Venables (1995)]. In addition 
integration might increase labour mobility across a region, in which case the 
purchases of the employees of newly arriving firms add to the demand linkages and
3 For an exposition of the 1994 Europe Agreements between the EU and Poland, Hungary the Czech 
and Slovak Republics see, for example, Reynolds (1994).
Learner (1997, p.515 ff.) argues that Central Europe enjoys excellent market access which on the 
basis o f ‘distance to GDP’ consideration should enable it to reach per capita income levels comparable
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market size effects between agglomerating companies [Krugman (1991)]. Empirical 
evidence surveyed by Briilhart (1998, p.792ff) and Amiti (1998) supports the
importance of scale economies, intermediate-good intensity as well as market size 
effects in encouraging the geographical concentration of production.7
This discussion of the factors favouring a process of agglomeration indicates an 
underlying logic of cumulative causation [Venables (1998, p.4)] or path dependence 
[Martin (1999, p.69)]: Firms want to locate in a given region because there are already 
other firms there. It is through the backward and forward linkages with pre-existing 
companies that positive externalities are transmitted. This also suggests that regions 
might have to reach a critical mass of industry before agglomeration and learning 
processes take off [Ottaviano & Puga (1998, p. 722), Porter (1998)]. Allowing such a 
critical mass to develop might provide a basis for infant industry arguments [Lall 
(1998, p.67), Porter (1998)].
Agglomerating companies are, however, also subject to centrifugal forces putting a 
stop on unlimited clustering. Centrifugal forces derive from product and factor market 
competition as well as from pure external diseconomies such as congestion. All these 
factors intensify with the number of companies locating in proximity to each other.
to those of, for example, Austria. He argues that Western European trade barriers act like a 500-mile 
increase in distance between East and West.
Audretsch (1998) and Morgan (1997) emphasise the importance of information exchange and 
technological spillovers made possible by proximity, providing hence an incentive for clustering. Porter 
(1998) similarly argues that geographical concentration occurs because spatial, cultural and 
institutional proximity serves to amplify many of the productivity and innovation benefits of clustering.
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Local product market competition can be circumvented by exporting to markets 
which are further away, but this incurs trade and transportation costs. Immobile 
factors and land rents lead to intensifying factor market competition between 
clustering companies and are likely to be only partially mitigated through the 
migration of workers from the surrounding regions.
A general result from new trade theory models is that if the trading costs between two 
regions are gradually reduced the relative balance between centripetal and centrifugal 
forces shifts over time [Ottaviano & Puga (1998, p.722), Krugman & Venables 
(1995)]. With high trading costs firms concentrate on supplying their local markets 
and manufacturing will be evenly divided between the two regions.
As trading costs fall, this increasingly allows for a separation of production and 
consumption [Venables (1998, p.3)], easing the centrifugal tendencies caused by 
product market competition. Consequently at intermediate levels of trade barriers we 
will observe a predominance of the centripetal forces. There will be a tendency for 
industry to cluster in a core region, deserting what is becoming the periphery. For 
example Krugman & Venables’ (1990) model of trade integration between a large 
core country and a small peripheral region has the implication that for finite trading 
costs and increasing returns the core country becomes a net exporter of manufactures, 
effectively leading to the deindustrialisation of the periphery. In this context Martin 
(1998, p.760) expresses the concern that European integration might lead to a 
situation where increasing returns to scale industries are concentrated in the core of
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Europe, while the periphery might end up specialising in constant returns to scale 
industries such as agriculture and low technology industries.
As the number of firms in the core increases, centrifugal forces based on the increased 
competition for immobile factors will raise their head. Prices for these immobile 
inputs, for example labour, are bid up in the core, creating a wage differential to the 
periphery region. As trade costs become small enough, firms will relocate to the 
periphery region to take advantage of lower factor prices there. Consequently with 
low trade costs, we should expect a more even distribution of industry across the 
region to develop, resulting in factor price equalisation in the long run [Krugman & 
Venables (1995)]. As integration progresses further the presence of immobile factors 
is crucial in reversing the agglomeration tendencies which characterised intermediate 
levels of trade costs.
The predictions from these chapters are that as trade costs decrease between two 
regions, they are likely to start off with a relatively even distribution of industry, 
progress to a core-periphery structure and eventually end up again with a more even 
distribution at very low levels of trade costs. A question which still needs to be asked 
is where clusters are likely to form in the agglomeration phase. Since market size and 
access considerations are important in determining the scale economies and 
transportation cost savings a company can obtain, we can expect locations in the 
centre of a region to be more likely to experience clustering [Krugman (1993)].
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Other regional characteristics are also likely to be important: for example a region 
characterised by a bad infrastructure will suffer from bad market access and is hence 
more likely to become a peripheral region. Consequently a well-developed 
infrastructure is considered to be an important tool in regional convergence [Martin 
(1998, p.758)] and has been found to be an important determinant of foreign direct 
investment flows [Markusen (1998, p.736)8]. Similarly in order to allow companies to 
benefit from the labour pooling externalities and the knowledge spillovers involved in 
clustering a core region will also have to offer a pool of highly trained employees 
[Markusen (1998, p.736), Porter (1998)]. A region which has a rich supply of third- 
party research institutions such as universities will also be able to provide knowledge 
inputs to relocating firms, increasing its attractiveness [Audretsch (1998, p.21)].9
The implications of the literature on trade liberalisation and economic 
geography for companies in Hungary and East Germany
In 1990 East Germany and Hungary shared many underlying production structures, 
but arguably the Hungarian economy was less distorted, more decentralised and open 
as a consequence of the gradualist reform process which started after 1956 and
* He also emphasises a minimum threshold of per capita income (consistent with market size 
considerations) as an important determinant of FDI flows. The fact that FDI is attracted by high growth 
and robust demand means that it reinforces, rather than corrects, initial differences in regional trends 
[Kozul-Wright & Rowthom (1998, p.76)].
One of Martin’s (1999, p70ff) main criticisms against the ‘New Economic Geography’ is that the 
relevant characteristics determining a region’s relative attractiveness are by no way exhausted by the 
list provided in the preceding paragraphs. On his account economists show a general neglect of the 
social, cultural and institutional factors involved in spatial economic development. The argument is that 
since economic activity is embedded in these wider factors, the possibilities and constraints on spatial 
development are also determined by the networks of trust, co-operation, competition and governance 
that characterise regions and the clusters they contain [Martin (1999, p79)]. See, for example, 
Granovetter (1995) for an exploration of the ‘social’ element in interfirm relations and Nelson (1995, 
p.78) on the importance of a firm’s institutional environment.
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accelerated in the 1980s. This makes it likely that many Hungarian companies who 
had accumulated some experience in, for example, directly dealing with Western 
customers were in an a priori better position to provide flexible responses to the 
supply-side challenges posed by transition. The greater rigidity in the East German 
economy and the extreme form of trade liberalisation it experienced with reunification 
lead to a situation where “before we were even able to spell market economy we were 
already being competed to death10 ”. This echoes van Brabant’s (1994, p.167) 
warning that extensive trade liberalisation too early in the transition process can 
devastate domestic industry.
The literature on economic geography points in a similar direction. East Germany 
rapidly integrated with a region (West Germany) which already had pre-existing areas 
with strong industrial agglomeration, such as the Ruhr valley, where companies were 
enjoying increasing returns to scale as well as localisation externalities. The relative 
proximity of East Germany to these clusters meant that companies were unlikely to 
gain access to previously unobtainable markets by re-locating to East Germany. After 
the collapse of the COMECON trading system the most important new market was 
East Germany itself, which could easily be served from West German production 
sites. Market access and market size considerations provided few reasons for 
maintaining production in East Germany. These arguments suggest two conclusions: 
West German companies had few reasons to relocate to East Germany and, following 
the logic of cumulative causation, East German companies had every reason to re­
10 Interview with the production manager in D4.
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orientate their economic activity to West Germany. As would be predicted by 
Krugman & Venables’ (1990) model, East Germany became West Germany’s 
periphery, generating a trend towards deindustrialisation in East Germany. This 
deindustrialisation11 entailed a process of dis-agglomeration in East Germany, 
opening up the possibility that East Germany might loose its ‘critical mass’ of 
domestic industry. A likely exception is the construction sector, which due to high 
transportation costs has an incentive to maintain its East German operations.
As trade costs decrease further one would expect a renewed strengthening of 
centrifugal forces away from West German clusters, favouring production in East 
Germany. For such centrifugal forces to set in, however, it is crucial that factor 
market competition intensifies between companies, increasing the wage differential 
between the core and periphery. At sufficiently high productivity levels such a wage 
differential would give East German companies a comparative advantage in terms of 
factor prices. Unfortunately East German workers are highly mobile between East and 
West Germany and trade union pressure has meant that after reunification wage levels 
have rapidly equalised. This means that companies in West German clusters are 
unlikely to be ‘pushed’ eastwards due to labour shortages nor are they likely to be 
‘pulled’ by low labour costs12. The implication is that the crucial forces evening out 
spatial disparities in regions with very low trade costs are unlikely to kick in and
11 See Carlin (1994) for an account of the extent of deindustrialisation in East Germany following 
reunification.
12 Nuti (1994, p.452) similarly argues that due to the assimilation of wage levels East Germany still 
faces “a risk of protracted underdevelopment as German and foreign investors are attracted by central- 
eastern European countries with much lower wages and similar economic structures.”
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reverse the core-periphery pattern which has evolved after reunification, leaving the 
prospects for a reindustrialisation of East Germany rather bleak.
Hungarian industry, on the other hand, has not only benefited from the protection 
implied by higher trade costs. Hungary as a location has also exerted a ‘puli’ as a 
consequence of its low labour costs and extremely highly trained workforce. 
Consequently Hungarian companies not only had good reasons to stay put in 
Hungary, but also foreign companies had good reasons to invest there.13 On the basis 
of the literature surveyed we would hence expect a much more stable industrial base 
in Hungary than in East Germany.14 Due to its favourable location in the centre of 
Europe and anticipated EU membership, one can expect Hungary to increasingly 
serve as an exporting base both east- and westwards, especially in sectors such as 
food processing where capacity is relatively large compared to domestic market 
size.15
This chapter will proceed by examining statistically questions which arise from the 
literature surveyed.16 With respect to each question I also ask whether there are any 
significant differences between the East German and Hungarian data. The first 
question examines changes in the companies’ backward linkages, that is in their
13 One only has to look at Hungary’s ability to attract FDI since 1990.
14 For example both with respect to the forward and backward linkages of the ten Hungarian companies 
they examine Whitely et at (1996, p.404 ff.) find a relatively limited extent of change.
15 Interview partners from the food sector not only complained about relatively large overacapacity due 
to investors’ overoptimistic initial demand expectations but also about a fragmentation of production 
processes due to the different investors’ desire to be present in numerous market segments. This
fragmentation distroyed the previously existing division of labour in the Hungarian food processing 
industry and makes obtaining scale economies through exports all the more imperative.
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supply arrangements. Trade liberalisation and economic integration both give 
companies a wider spectrum of suppliers to choose from. The choice criteria 
companies use in this context and the relative attractiveness of domestic suppliers are 
of particular interest.
1. How and why has the geographical distribution of supply arrangments changed 
between 1990 and 1996?
The next two questions arise from the consideration that trade liberalisation both 
enables companies to export more easily abroad as well as gives foreign companies 
better access to domestic markets.
2. How has the geographical distribution of sales changed between 1990 and 1996? In 
particular, have there been any noticeable changes in the companies’ export 
orientation?
3. How has the company’s competitive situation and domestic market changed 
between 1990 and 1996?
In trying to interpret the overall trends found, I will ask: 16
16 The literature on economic geography does not easily lend itself to narrowly defined hypotheses/ 
predictions which are empirically tractable. This might be a contributing factor to the relative scarcity 
of empirical work in this area [see, for example, Krugman (1998, p.15)].
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4. What are the main dimensions of competition? Are companies specialising in low- 
tech cheap products? How important are different regional characteristics for the 
companies’ competitive success? For example, how important is the availability of a 
cheap workforce?
The following section deals with changes in the companies’ supply arrangements. 
Section 2.1 provides a description of the geographical shifts which have taken place 
and Section 2.2 provides qualitative evidence which is of help in interpreting the 
observed trends.
2 1 1
2.1 Description of the chaises in the geographical structure of supply 
relationships
In my 1990 data17 there were few differences between the Hungarian and East 
German manufacturing companies’ procurement policies.18 They tended to rely 
predominantly on domestic suppliers and Eastern European ones. The fact that 
Hungarian companies seem to have had a overall stronger reliance on EU and world­
wide suppliers is notable but not statistically significant.
For 1990 I find that in the complete [manufacturing] East German data set the 
“average” company19 procured 79% [66%]20 of its input in East Germany, 8.7% 
[16%] in West Germany, 11% [16%] in Eastern Europe, 1% [2%] in the EU and no 
company procured inputs on a world-wide scale. All companies depended to 70% or 
more on input supplies from the GDR. The only exception is the pharmaceuticals 
company which procured inputs for medications world-wide through state 
organisations as there was no significant pharmaceuticals input synthesis in the 
former GDR.
17 All the procurement and sales figures have been obtained from interviews. Although based on 
memory, the 1990 figures are reasonably reliable, since in the previous economic order there was not 
much change in these areas.
18 The larger number of construction companies in the East German data is significant at the 10% level, 
as is the high number of food companies in the Hungarian data. These differences in the composition of 
the two data sets could introduce biases when making comparisons, should I find that either 
construction companies or food companies systematically differ from manufacturing ones. My data 
suggests that in their procurement policies food companies on aggregate tend to diverge little from 
other manufacturing companies. Furthermore there are such large differences within this group itself, 
that their inclusion is unlikely to lead to systematic biases. Including construction companies can, 
however, lead to systematic biases, since they face high transportation costs and are hence strongly 
localised in their operations. These biases will be referred to explicitly throughout this discussion. 
Table 1 contains more information on this issue.
The ‘averages’ refer to the means of the variables listed in Table 1.
Values in parentheses indicate the mean values obtained for the manufacturing companies only.
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□  %90sEGer 
■  %90sWGer
□  %90sEEur
□  %90sEU
The ‘average’ company in my Hungarian data set procured 54.5% of its inputs in 
Hungary, 23.6 in the EU (including West Germany) and 10.9% each in Eastern 
Europe and world-wide.
D ia g ra m  2 : (G e o g ra p h ic a l d i s t r i b u t io n  o f  in p u t  p r o c u r e m e n t  in  1990 . m e a n  v a lu e s  f o r  th e  H u n g a r ia n  d a t a
□  %90sHung 
■  %90sEU
□  %90sEEur
□  %90sWW
By 1996 significant shifts and differences emerge. Now the ‘average’ company in my 
East German data procures only 38.3% of its inputs locally. If we consider the five 
manufacturing companies only, then this average is as little as 13.5%. West Germany 
directly accounts for 34.7% [39%] of inputs, but we have to bear in mind that the true
20 Values in parentheses indicate the mean values obtained for the manufacturing companies only.
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role of West German companies is much larger because East German suppliers 
usually tend to be subsidiaries of West German companies. Input procurement from 
Eastern Europe has generally all but collapsed. The average company procures 13% 
[24%] of its inputs in the EU and 3.5% [6%] world-wide. Overall21 between 1990 and 
1996 the ‘average’ East German company in my data set has reduced input 
procurement from companies located in East Germany by 41 percentage points [52] 
and from those located in Eastern Europe by 10 percentage points [14], while 
increasing its procurement from West Germany by 26 percentage points [23], from 
the EU by 12 percentage points [22] and from companies world-wide by 3.5 
percentage points [6].
D ia g ra m  3 : G e o g ra p h ic a l  d i s t r i b u t io n  o f  in p u t  p r o c u r e m e n t  in  1996 . c o m p le te  E a s t  G e r m a n  d a t a  22
□  %96sEGer
□  %96sWGer
□  %96sEEur
□  %96sEU 
■  %96sWW
In stark contrast between 1990 and 1996 the pattern of input procurement as changed 
surprisingly little in the Hungarian data. In my data on average input procurement 
from Hungary has decreased by 4.3 percentage points to 50.2%. The mean value for
21 All these statements refer to changes in the percentage of total inputs procured from a given 
geographical area. See Table 1 for the descriptions of the relevant variables.
22 Taking the averages for the complete data set introduces two biases: the extent to which companies 
still rely on Eastern European suppliers is overstated by the inclusion of the strong outlier D3, whose 
owner, a Slovak steel mill, is also its main supplier. The second bias is that including construction 
companies biases downwards the extent to which companies have switched away from East German 
suppliers in comparison with the Hungarian data.
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input procurement from the EU remains unchanged, procurement from Eastern 
Europe increased by 4 percentage points to an average of 15% and input procurement 
on a world-wide scale has essentially remained unchanged at 10.6%.23
Diagram 4: Geographical distribution of input procurement in 1996. Hungarian data set
□  %96sHung
□  % 9 6 s E E u r
□  %96sEU
□  %96sWW
The mean values of the variables indicating the geographical distribution of supply 
arrangements suggest that from similar starting points by 1996 strongly diverging 
developments have taken place in the East German and Hungarian data set. Most 
importantly, the Hungarian companies continue to show a much stronger reliance on 
their local suppliers.24 At the same time the fact that East German companies have 
been predominantly switching to suppliers from West Germany and other countries in 
the EU, while Hungarian companies have been experiencing a much smaller increase 
in their reliance on these markets. This results in Hungarian companies procuring
23 The relative stability of overall procurement is clearly supported by the fact that when I obtained the 
associations for the percentage of input procured in 1990 and 1996 from a given geographical area, I 
found associations which were significant at the 1% level in each case between the percentage of
inputs procured from Hungary, Eastern Europe, the EU and world-wide respectively in 1990 and the 
relevant percentages for each geographical area in 1997. Reporting on ten Hungarian case studies, 
Whitley et al (1996, p.409 ff.) also report a surprising stability in supply arrangements.
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in their reliance on these markets. This results in Hungarian companies procuring 
significantly fewer (at the 5% level) inputs from the EU and West Germany in 1996.25
There are few differences between the Hungarian and German companies in the 
extent of their reliance on world-wide and Eastern European markets in 1996. The 
general trend has been for companies to reduce their reliance on Eastern European 
suppliers, but both in the East German and Hungarian data set we have one company 
each which has strongly increased its reliance on suppliers from this region, leading to 
very small overall average changes. The East German manufacturing companies have 
almost all been increasing their reliance on world-wide markets, while in Hungary we 
observe, from a higher starting point, a more mixed trend which averages out to very 
little average change in this area. Consequently in 1996 we have a situation were the 
average East Germany manufacturing company shows the same reliance on world­
wide suppliers as its Hungarian counterpart, even though the East German company’s 
reliance on these markets has increased at a noticeably higher rate.
Considering the relatively large changes the East German companies have been 
making in their supply arrangements it should not come as a surprise that only 28% of 
their suppliers pre-date 1990. In Hungary this number is significantly (at the 1% level) 
higher at 64%. Interview partners tended to indicate that in East Germany “old” 23
23 The differences in the magnitude of the switch away from domestic suppliers and in favour of EU 
suppliers are both significant at the 1% level, suggesting that in 1996 Hungarian companies not only 
rely more heavily on domestic suppliers in total but have also tended to maintain the overall level of 
their orders by not switching away from the Hungarian market.
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suppliers are predominantly pre-existing West-German and EU suppliers, while in
Hungary they tend to be domestic suppliers.26 278
2.2 Searching for the driving forces behind these geographical shifts in supply 
arrangements
To examine the driving forces behind the diverging geographical shifts in greater 
detail I obtained qualitative data on a) why companies stopped dealing with 
(domestic) ‘old’ suppliers, b) whether they think that there are any significant 
differences between domestic suppliers and those in the EU / West Germany and c) 
on which future developments they anticipate in their supply arrangements. All the 
answers are summarised in Tables 2a & b.
The East German interview partners indicated that the main reason for abandoning 
pre-existing East German supply relationships, other than that the supplier goes out of 
business , is that supplies were not up to scratch as far as quality requirements and, 
less frequently, price competitiveness29 go. The response to such problems has 
generally been to discontinue pre-existing supply arrangements and to turn to 
suppliers from the EU and West Germany. The companies continuing to rely on East
26 When I obtained associations for the percentage of old suppliers a company has in 1996 and its 
supply arrangements in 19901 found that East German companies which have a large number of old 
suppliers already procured a relatively high proportion of their inputs from the EU in 1990 (significant 
at the 5% level). For the Hungarian data I found that companies with a large number of old suppliers 
showed a greater than average total reliance (significant at the 10% level) and increase in their reliance 
on Hungarian suppliers (significant at the 10% level).
27 This factor is explicitly mentioned by D3, D6, D8, D9.
28 This is mentioned by Dl, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D8.
29 This is mentioned by D7, D8.
217
German suppliers are predominantly construction companies. In this case it is clearly 
transportation cost consideration which maintain the East German suppliers’ 
competitiveness.
Both Hungarian and East German companies turning to EU suppliers indicated that 
they are highly concerned about the quality of their inputs and hence willing to forgo 
the transportation cost savings offered by domestic supplier, confirming that quality is 
an area where many domestic suppliers still have problems. Interview partners also 
suggested that world-wide suppliers are mainly sought out on the basis of price. 
However, the companies searching out world-wide customers do not tend to procure 
homogenous goods, which could be obtained in greater proximity at a transportation 
cost saving but rather it is customers buying idiosyncratic products who are searching 
for a good price from world-wide suppliers30.
When I asked Hungarian interview partners for the main reasons behind abandoning 
“old” Hungarian suppliers, insufficient product quality is mentioned by seven 
companies31 and unreliability and lack of punctuality is mentioned by six 
companies32. On the other hand, uncompetitive prices and bankruptcy are only 
pointed out by two companies33.
30 This point was made, for example, by the procurement managers in both the pharmaceutical 
companies D5 and H4.
31 HI, H2, H3, H5, H6 H7.H10
32 H2, H3, H5, H6, H8.H11
H2, H10 and H3, HI 1 respectively. Far more common are stories about problems which can be 
termed transition specific: Bankruptcy (H3, H4, HI 1), an inability to agree on payment methods (H3), 
opportunism (H4, HI 1), financial instability on the side of the supplier or customer (H6, H7) and an 
inability to adjust to the customer’s new demands and product range (H7, H9, H10) all feature.
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Next I asked interview partners whether in their opinion there are significant 
differences between West and surviving East German/ Hungarian suppliers. As Table 
2a indicates the general answer was that the surviving East German suppliers are not 
significantly different. However some companies perceive differences which favour 
East German suppliers: Interview partners in D5 refer a sense of solidarity, while the 
need to build a good reputation induces the East German suppliers of D6 and D8 to 
be more co-operative and flexible than West German ones. D9 claims that East 
German suppliers are better than West German ones because they have more modem 
machinery and production methods.
On the other hand when I asked Hungarian interview partners whether there remain 
any generic differences between domestic and foreign suppliers in 1997, companies 
tended to give an affirmative answer. Most frequently interview partners claim that 
some of the quality problems experienced in the initial phases of transition still 
persist. At the same time, however, the general tenor is that Hungarian suppliers are 
reaching Western standards fast and that, given that they are financially stable and 
have up-to-date technology, they offer relatively price competitive and, due to their 
proximity, also flexible and accommodating business partners.
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To conclude this section I enquired how supply relationships were expected to change 
in the medium-run34. East German interview partners generally indicated that the 
structure of supply relationships is not expected to change significantly in the near 
future. If anything companies tend to aim at consolidating their relationship with a set 
of core suppliers (D5, D7, D8, D9). Thus the structure of the new supply 
arrangements, which are based on the West German and EU supply networks to 
which especially the East German companies receiving FDI have gained access to, is 
expected to consolidate itself without any major structural shifts. Consequently we 
cannot expect a greater reliance on East German inputs to develop in the near future.
When I asked Hungarian interview partners how they expected the supply 
arrangements in their company to develop in the next five years, the most frequently 
cited aim was to develop of a set of core (frequently Hungarian) suppliers with which 
the company was hoping to develop long-term relationships offering the additional 
non-price benefits of greater co-operation.35
34 Tables 2a &b summarise the answers.
H2, H3, H4, H6, HI 1. In this context it was frequently claimed the current level of economic 
uncertainty and instability forces the company to make contracts of a sub-optimal length (that is they 
are shorter than would be desirable given a more stable environment) which entail large re-negotiation 
costs.
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3. How has the geographical distribution of sales changed between 1990 and 
1996? In particular, have there been any noticeable changes in the companies’ 
export orientation?
I find that in 1990 the ‘average’36 East German company was heavily focused on its 
domestic market, selling 85% of its output locally and generally exporting, if at all, to 
Eastern Europe37. West Germany and the European Union accounted for as little as 
1.8 and 0.7% of sales on average.
Diagram 5: Geographical distribution of the average East German company’s sales in 1990
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By 1996 the geographical distribution of sales has shifted quite dramatically. The 
average company now sells only 61.6% of its total output in East Germany and 
exports 38.3 %. This constitutes an average net increase38 in exports of 23.3 
percentage points between 1990 and 1996. The most important export markets are 
now West Germany39, accounting for 24.6% of sales, followed by the European
36 Throughout the ‘averages’ refer to the means of the variables listed in Table 4a & b.
37 Table 5a confirms this: in 1990 there is a negative association [-0.77, 1% level] between the 
proportion o f sales a company realises in East Germany and those it exports to Eastern Europe. 
Furthermore exports to Eastern Europe are associated at the 1% level [-0.77] with total exports, while 
the associations between total exports and all other geographical areas are insignificant.
38 All these statements refer to changes in the percentage of total sales realised in a given geographical 
area. See Table 3 for the descriptions of the relevant variables.
39 Although after reunification sales to West Germany do not cross country borders, I will still refer to 
them as exports in order to be able to compare the geographical distribution of sales in 1990 with that 
in 1996 using the same categories.
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Union (8.3%), Eastern Europe (5.3%) and the rest of the world (1.1 %)40. Interview 
partners indicated that breaking into the West German market was a matter of 
survival for all companies who did not have a fairly captive pre-existing export 
market due to a fairly inelastic demand (as is the case in pharmaceuticals) or who are 
localised in their operations due to high transportation costs (as is the case in the 
construction business).
Diagram 6: Geographical distribution of the average East German company’s sales in 1996, complete data
set
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These overall figures hide even greater changes in the manufacturing, rather than 
construction, sector. The average of output sold in east Germany is only 25% for the 
manufacturing companies in 1996, down from 80% in 1990. This constitutes an 
increase of 55 percentage points in net exports for the average manufacturing 
company in my German data set.41 The average manufacturing company now exports
40 The new relative importance o f  different export markets is reflected in Table 5a: Companies which 
in 1996 sell a small proportion o f their output in East Germany are strongly focused on West Germany 
instead [-0 .9 1 ,1%], secondarily on the European Union [-0.63, 5%] and thirdly on the world-wide 
market [-0.56, 10%]. Increases in exports are associated with increased sales in these three markets, 
especially the West German one (significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively).
41 Any statistical trends which are specific to the manufacturing sector are captured by the 
manufacturing dummy in Table 5a which confirms that manufacturing companies have experienced 
above average reductions in the proportion of sales realised in East Germany [-0.74, 5%], strong 
increases in the proportion o f sales going to West Germany [0.68, 5%], reductions in the proportion of
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43% of its total output to West Germany (an increase of about 40 percentage points 
since 1990), 15% to the European Union (up from 0.7%) and 9% to Eastern Europe 
(down from 14%). The proportion of output being sold world-wide is essentially 
unchanged at 2%.
Diagram 7: Geographical distribution of the average East German manufacturing company’s sales in 1996
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Associations found in Table 5a suggest pre-existing sales to West Germany and the 
EU were central in enabling companies to expand their sales in Western markets.42 
Eastern European markets have played no statistically discernible role in absorbing 
sales which were re-directed from the East German market after 1990. If anything 
there has been a trend for a retrenchment for the Eastern European market: companies 
which had high exports to Eastern Europe are likely to have reduced these by 1996 [-
sales realised in Eastern Europe [-0.55, 10%] and increases in the proportion o f sales going to the 
European Union [0.57,5% ].
42 Companies which exported to West Germany in 1990 already have found it easier to reduce their 
overall dependence on the East Germany market by 1996 [ -0.57, 10%]. The Furthermore, the higher 
the proportion o f sales a company realised in West Germany in 1990, the higher the total sales it 
realises there in 1996 as well [0.71, 5%] and the higher the increase in the company’s West German 
sales [0.65,5%  level]. In addition it appears that experiences gained in the European Union were 
conducive to breaking into the West German market by 1996, both in terms o f the total percentage of 
sales going to this market [0.59, 5%] and of higher than average increases in these sales [0.58, 5%].
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0.62, 5%] and companies without previous experience in the region have not entered 
Eastern European markets between 1990 and 1996 [0.95,1%].
When examining changes in the Hungarian companies’ product markets find that 
already in 1990 the average company exported 35% of its total output. Even the civil 
engineering company, H10, exported 13% of its output by winning infrastructure 
projects in the Soviet Union and Libya.43 Eastern Europe was the most important 
export market with on average 19% of total sales, with the Soviet Union typically 
accounting for the lion’s share in this category. The European Union and the world­
wide market took similar shares with 8% and 9% of total sales respectively. A 
comparison of these ‘averages’ with those found in the East German data suggests 
that by 1990 Hungary’s greater tradition of openness and gradualist reform resulted in 
Hungarian companies noticeably less output domestically and exporting significantly 
more to the EU (significant at the 5% level for the complete data set and at the 10% 
level for the manufacturing companies44) and world-wide (significant at 10% level).
Table 5b indicates companies with exports to the European Union are also likely to 
have exported world-wide [0.72, 1%] in 1990. This suggests that my data contains a 
group of companies which specialised in exporting to the European Union and world­
43 Some of the lowest exporters can be found in the sweets’ industry. H2 and H3’s main problems 
seemed to have been that in 1990 they were producing goods which were generally of an inferior 
quality to that acceptable on Western markets but which were of a superior quality and crucially higher 
price than sweets produced by local companies in potential Eastern European export markets. H8 
(packaging materials) faced similar problems.
44 These significance levels relate to t-tests on the means of pairs of country-specific variables.
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wide (especially H5 and H7), rather than to COMECON countries (as H I, H6, H9,
H10).45
D ia g ra m  8 : T h e  g e o g ra p h ic a l  d is t r i b u t io n  o f  t h e  a v e ra g e  H u n g a r ia n  c o m p a n y ’s sa le s  in  199 0
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By 1996 there have been significant changes in the two countries’ relative 
comparative export orientation resulting in the observation that the average 
Hungarian manufacturing company realises a much larger proportion of total sales 
domestically (60% as compared to 25%, significant at the 10% level). These 
comparatively high domestic sales for the Hungarian companies are reflected in their 
significantly lower exports in general and exports to the EU (including West 
Germany: 12% in the Hungarian data and 58% in the East German one, significant at 
the 10% level).46
45 Only H4 exported in even proportions to Eastern Europe on the one hand and the EU and world­
wide markets on the other.
46 No statistically significant differences emerge in the manufacturing companies’ exports to Eastern 
Europe and world-wide. The East German companies have experienced significantly greater increases 
in their total exports and reductions in the proportion o f output sold domestically (both significant at 
the 1 % level). The relatively larger increases in exports are mainly due to the East German companies’ 
strong reorientation to the West German market (significant at the 5% level).
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To the extent that the Hungarian companies have been increasing their exports this 
has been done by re-directing sales from Hungary to the European Union47. 
Consequently domestic sales fall on average 5 percentage points to 60% of total 
output. In contrast to East German interview partners none of the Hungarian 
companies complains about a sustained fall in the overall volume of domestic 
demand, although the food industry tends to find fault with smaller than anticipated 
demand growth.48 Overall average total exports increased by 5 percentage points to 
40% of output.49 Exports to the EU increased by an average of 4 percentage points to 
12% of total output, while world-wide sales have been overall stable.
D ia g ra m  9 : T h e  g e o g ra p h ic a l  d is t r i b u t io n  o f  th e  a v e ra g e  H u n g a r ia n  c o m p a n y ’s  s a le s  in  1996
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Sales to Eastern Europe increased by an average of 2 percentage points to 21% of 
total output. In this case it is important to distinguish between sales going to the 
former Soviet Union and those going to Central Europe. Sales to the former Soviet
47 In 1996 high sales to the European Union are associated with high world-wide exports [0.81, 1%],
high falls in domestic sales [-0.87, 1%] and also with high growth in exports in general [0.54, 5%] and 
to the EU in particular [0.66, 5%]. It is worth noting that not only was a company’s export orientation 
statistically insignificant in determining whether a company received FDI after 1990, but also whether 
a company had FDI or not seems to have been entirely immaterial in determining subsequent changes 
in the geographical distribution o f its sales.
The extent to which companies face increased competition and hence smaller residual domestic 
demand curves is going to be discussed later on.
226
this problem). My data suggests that the world-wide markets have been playing an 
important role in absorbing sales displaced from the Eastern European market [-0.71, 
1%].
On the other hand some companies have been experiencing dramatic increase in sales 
to other transition economies in Central Europe. This is especially true of companies 
in the food and the related packaging industry (HI, H3, H8). Their previous 
competitive disadvantage has turned into a competitive advantage as income levels 
rise in Central Europe for a significant proportion of the population. People are now 
willing to pay a higher price for better quality products, but many are not willing to 
pay the extra it takes to purchase, for example, sweets made by western, rather than 
the relatively cheaper, Hungarian companies. The interviews indicate that many 
managers are increasingly thinking in regional terms which typically include the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia, Austria and Switzerland rather than in historic 
categories.
Associations found in Table 5b support the impression of a general persistence of 
historical trends: companies which were relatively strongly focused on the Hungarian 
market in 1990 remain so in 199650, while a high export orientation in 1990 is 
associated with high exports in 1996 [0.93, 1%]; companies which have a high export 
orientation to Eastern Europe in 1996 have historically sold a high proportion of their
50 The percentage of output sold in Hungary in 1996 is positively correlated with the percentage of 
output sold domestically in 1996 [0.93, 1%] and negatively associated with the 1990 levels of exports
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output in this market [0.88, 1%]; companies which have high exports to the EU in 
1996 also did so in 1990 [0.96, 1%]; companies which had a high world-wide export 
orientation in 1996 had both higher than average world-wide exports [0.68, 5%] and 
exports to the EU [0.72, 1%] in 1990.
A remaining question is how the geographical distribution of a companies’ sales 
affects its probability of being profitable. Table 5a suggests that in 1995 a high focus 
on the East German market51 was associated with higher profitability [0.64, 5%], a 
trend which is insignificant by 1997. Similarly the trend that high exports [-0.64, 5%] 
are associated with lower profitability becomes insignificant by 1997. The negative 
results achieved by export orientated companies in 1995 are mainly due to a strong 
negative association between profitability and exports to West Germany [-0.66, 5%] 
on the one hand and to the European Union [-0.56,10%] on the other. A possible 
explanation of these trends is that in 1995 we still have a situation where:
1. a residual inelasticity in demand due to “patriotism” or historic factors can 
cushion some East German companies (especially D5, D8 and D4) in the short- 
run before entrants can fully affect their market share and profitability while
2. other companies are experiencing the medium-run costs of trying to break into 
fairly saturated and sometimes collusive West German and European Union 
markets. The frequently strong demand decline in the traditional East German and 
East European markets usually occurred much faster than companies were able to
to Eastern Europe [-0.64, 5%], to the European Union [-0.46, 10%], exports world-wide [-0.73, 1%] 
and exports in general [-0.93, 1%].
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break into new markets. Consequently many interviewees indicated that they spent 
the first few years of transition trying to break into unwelcoming Western markets 
while having lost much their traditional sales outlets.
It seems that by 1997 the companies which have strongly refocused their sales 
westwards have managed to sufficiently overcome these entry costs and to increase 
their sales in these markets to be no less profitable on average than the companies 
which have experienced smaller demand declines and hence have restructured the 
geographical orientation of their sales less.51 2
The Hungarian data supports the importance of a pre-existing exporting capability. I 
find that companies which already sold a high proportion of their output in the EU 
[0.57,5%] or world-wide [0.55, 5%] in 1990 are more likely to be profitable than 
average in 1996. High sales in the EU in 1996 are also positively associated with 
profits [0.56, 5%]. A good export performance to EU markets not only indicates that 
the company is producing internationally competitive products but also suggests that 
these companies have been better equipped to meet the challenges posed by transition.
51 When I obtained the relevant associations I found that the geographical distribution of input 
procurement tends to be generally insignificant with respect to a companies’ relative performance.
By 1997 only two companies are not profitable, namely D6 and D3. Their problems are industry 
specific and the associations found in the Dpr97 column reflect the average (usually of one very high 
and one very low value) of the entries for D6 and D3 rather than trends they share in the geographical 
distribution of their sales.
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4. How has the company’s competitive situation and domestic market changed 
between 1990 and 1996?51
This section examines the extent to which increased market access by western 
competitors affected East German and Hungarian companies. Table 4a indicates that 
in 1990 almost all of the East German companies, with the exception of the 
pharmaceuticals company, were local monopolists. On average their products 
covered 89% of the local market. By 1996 each company’s market share has 
dramatically dropped by 74% on average to only 15%. High market shares in 1990 are 
associated with a greater decrease by 1996 [-0.75, 1%]. This suggests that the more 
monopolised a sector was, the more competition and entry (in the form of ‘imports’) 
it has attracted upon reunification.
Companies which had a strong export orientation (to Eastern Europe) before and after 
1990 have tended to experience the smallest decreases by 1996 [0.65, 5%], mainly 
because they had smaller domestic market shares to start off with [-0.64, 5%]. These 
trends especially hold for manufacturing companies. One possible reason is that 
(West German) entrants might well have faced smaller entry costs into the 
construction sector54, which has seen an almost immediate transfer of the West 3*
33 In the East German data I again consider East Germany, rather than re-unified Germany, to be
‘domestic’ in order to be able to compare data for 1990 with that for 1996. All the companies
interviewed clearly distinguished between West- and East German sales and market shares.
If we assume that many West German manufacturing companies had excess capacity in 1990, then
they could simply transport their finished products to the East German market, so that the capital costs
of entry are not necessarily higher in manufacturing, although manufacturing is more capital intensive.
However to realise sales in the construction sector one merely has to win contracts and one does not
require a network of, for example, local sales outlets and distributors. In the construction sector one
also has to convince only one customer (usually the local or state government) rather than the general
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German market structure to the East German market. Any East German companies 
which survive in the construction sector do so as the subsidiaries of a Western firm, 
that is because in this instance entry was via acquisition, rather than by driving the 
local competitor out of the market.55 Furthermore, when giving construction contacts 
a company’s solvency and hence ability to finished the project is an important 
consideration, a factor which will have operated against East German companies 
without financial backing from the West.
The smallest drops in market share were suffered by the pharmaceuticals company D5 
(who had a small market share to start off with and is somewhat protected by a low 
demand elasticity for its products) and the turbine manufacturer D8 who has found a 
niche in servicing old turbines which have it has built in the past. D9 has seen its 
entire market collapse together with the East German car industry and D l, D2, D7 are 
left with very small residual markets after a large number of financially solvent West 
German competitors have entered the East German construction sector. D6, who also 
suffered a fall in market share of over 90 percentage points, is plagued not only by a 
large number of financially strong competitors as the other construction companies as 
well, but in addition by the fact that these competitors are operating a tacit cartel in a 
saturated market.
public to buy one’s end-product. Entry into the manufacturing sector consequently tends to necessitate 
advertising outlays, which add to the net costs of entry.
I encountered abundant anecdotal evidence of the latter strategy. Interview partners also repeatedly 
claimed that some of the former East German companies had been merely acquired to be ruined, i.e. 
that acquisition is frequently just another version of a strategy to drive out the local competitor.
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Given these considerations it is not surprising that almost all companies claim to face 
a large number of competitors. The exception is D9 whose parent is part of a West 
German duopoly. All companies claim that their main competitors are larger and 
solvent companies. In addition 4 out of 9 companies also face important small 
competitors.
The geographical location of the companies’ main competitors reflects their sales 
orientation. Eight out of nine companies claim that important competitors are located 
in West Germany. The only exception is D3, who is a member of a West German 
cartel and is hence only concerned about non-German competitors. The five 
companies which claim that they also face important East German competitors are 
usually quick to add that these East German companies are subsidiaries of West 
German parents. Three companies face important competitors who are located in 
Eastern (or rather Central) Europe and only one company (D6) is touched by 
competition originating from the rest of the world.
Table 5 a suggests that companies which in 1996 are more likely than others to be 
concerned about East German competitors sell a high proportion of their output in 
East Germany [0.60, 5%] and a smaller than average proportion in West Germany [- 
0.75, 1%]. All the companies which are concerned about East European competition 
have experienced above average falls in the sales they realised in Eastern Europe [- 
0.76, 1%]. This indicates that overall the East German companies in the data set are 
not very successfully defending their traditional export markets in Eastern Europe.
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Table 4a indicates that in 1990 the average company in the Hungarian data set had a 
60% market share.56 57*By 1996 the average market share has fallen to 56%, that is by 4 
percentage points only. Several companies (H3, H7, H8) have even experienced 
increases in their market share. Transportation or physical input cost 
considerations play an important import deterring role in almost all these cases. In 
addition interview partners in all the Hungarian companies indicated that they enjoy a 
net labour cost advantage, even after differences in their relative productivity have 
been taken account of. These differential cost conditions faced by domestic firms and 
importers means that in many sectors entry using a strategy of cost leadership is not a 
feasible strategy. The alternative is for a potential importer to offer a higher quality 
product at a price differential which covers his higher production and transportation 
costs. The Hungarian companies which have increased their market share have all 
drastically improved the quality of their products, making this second entry strategy 
unattractive as well.59
56 This is not significantly different from the ‘average’ market share prevalent in the East German data 
for 1990.
57 H3 now focuses on chocolate bars which are smaller (and cheaper) than Western ones. Like this 
people can still treat themselves and their children without having to spend much money, a fact which 
makes these bars especially popular with lower income groups and with children spending their pocket 
money. H8 has increased the quality and range of its products to an extent which makes importing more 
packaging materials unattractive.
These factors are especially important for H5, HI 1 and HI.
Table 5b suggests that Companies which have a high domestic market share in 1996 rank the 
importance of the quality of their products very highly [-0.43,10%]. In addition companies which have 
been increasing their domestic sales have been emphasising quality [-0.48,10%] rather than price [- 
0.56,10%].These observations are consistent with the assumption that increasing product and service 
quality is an important way of inhibiting entry from abroad in sectors where entry with a strategy of 
cost leadership is not feasible.
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The largest fall in market share was suffered by H4 who, like all its Hungarian 
competitors, has been suffering from the effects of entry by multinationals into the 
pharmaceuticals market. The fall in HlO’s and in HI l ’s market share are also a direct 
consequence of entry form abroad. Only H2 claims that newly established (smaller) 
Hungarian entrants into the “small sweets” (that is candies, small chocolate bars etc.) 
market have been affecting its sales.
Even though companies have generally maintained their market shares [0.89,1%] this 
by no means entails an absence of competitive pressure with 58% of the companies 
interviewed claiming that they face small competitors as well as large ones and only 
one company, HI, claiming that it does not face any large competitors at all.60 
Although companies with a high market share in 1996 tend to have fewer than 
average number of competitors [-0.53, 5%]61 and are less likely to face domestic 
competitors [-0.59, 5%], they are also concerned about the price [-0.42, 10%] and 
quality [-0.43, 10%] of their products. In conjunction with the good export 
performance of these companies62, this suggests that in a small and reasonably open 
economy a high domestic market share does not entail a lack of international 
competition.
60 Only three companies (HI, H5, H7) claim that they face few or no competitors. In all three cases this 
constitutes a continuation of a pre-existing monopoly situation in a market where the capital 
requirements for domestic entrants are prohibitive and where foreign entrants are deterred for the 
reasons discussed above.
61 Table 5b suggests that companies which in 1996 claim to be facing a large number of competitors 
tended to be strongly focused on the Hungarian market [0.52, 10%], to be exporting less to the 
European Union [-0.60, 5%] and world-wide [-0.45, 10%].
Table 5b also suggests that both in 1990 and 1996 companies which had a large market share in 1990 
tend to sell a below average proportion of their overall output in Hungary [-0.49, 10%] and have high
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Since the Hungarian companies have been increasing their exports to the EU and 
most foreign entrants into the Hungarian markets tend to originate from the EU as 
well it is not surprising that we find in Table 4b that nine out of the 11 companies 
interviewed state that they have important competitors who originate from the EU. 
The second most frequently cited geographical origin of competitors is Hungary (cited 
six times). Especially companies from the food processing industry tend to claim that 
their main competitors are Hungarian subsidiaries of western companies [0.56, 5%]. 
Four out of 11 companies indicate that they face important competitors originating 
from outside Europe and only H8 locates important competitors in Eastern Europe.
The observation that Hungarian companies with a high market share in 1990/6 are 
more likely to be profitable is only weakly significant [0.49/ 0.48, 10%]. That this 
association is not stronger is likely to be due to fact that it is the companies which are 
large domestically which are also tend to have a good export performance. 
Consequently they frequently face competition in their foreign markets, even if they 
have some monopoly power domestically. Consistently with this interpretation I find 
that in general companies which face a large number of competitors are less likely to 
be profitable [-0.56, 5%]. Similarly in 1997 an East German companies’ profitability 
is adversely affected by Eastern European [-0.76, 5%], EU [-0.76, 5%] and world­
wide competitors [-0.66,10%].
export levels [0.49, 10%]. Due to the fact that Hungary is a small market being big in terms of output
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The next section is going to explore the finer details of the East German and 
Hungarian companies’ competitive situation. By examining the main dimensions of 
competition and importance of different regional factors I am trying to find indicators 
of the companies’ implicit comparative advantage.
5. What are the main dimensions of competition? Are companies specialising in 
low-tech cheap products? How important are different regional characteristics 
for the companies’ competitive success? For example, how important is the 
availability of a cheap workforce?
Interviews in which East German managers were asked to describe their company’s 
main competitive advantages and challenges generally suggested that the companies 
focus on providing high (but not usually cutting edge) quality at lower prices than 
their main competitors.63 Consistently they are very concerned about achieving further 
product and service quality improvements64 and cost reductions65. Price wars and the 
acceptance or lack of it by West German cartels are also recurring themes66. In stark 
contrast the Hungarian case studies many East German interview partners also 
complained about the negative image of East German products and a lack of brand 
loyalty in domestic consumers.67
frequently entailed not just a large domestic market share but also a significant export orientation.
6 Explicitly mentioned by interview partners in Dl, D2, D3, D6, D7, D8. There is almost universal 
agreement that punctuality is secondary and design relatively unimportant. See also Table 4a. The 
variables capturing the importance of different dimensions of competition yield means which are not 
significantly different for the two country data sets.
64 D3, D4, D5.
65 D7, D8, D9
These comments are especially prevalent in the building (Dl, D2, D6, D7) and steel processing 
sectors (D3).
One East German interview partner expressed this sentiment by stating that “In the beginning you 
could not even sell milk from East German cows to East German consumers.” (Interview with the 
personnel manager in D4). On the other hand especially interview partners in the Hungarian food
236
Table 5a supports the importance of price factors in the East German companies’ 
competitive success by indicating that obtaining lower wage costs are especially 
important to companies which ascribe a high importance to price competition [0.50, 
10%] and in 1996 export a high proportion of their output to the EU [0.63, 5%] and 
world-wide [0.50,10%].
Companies which had a high export orientation in 1990 are less worried about 
quality, punctuality and design (all significant at a 10% level), suggesting that a high 
export orientation forced these companies to approach international standards with 
respect to these dimensions of competition. Nevertheless, companies which export a 
high proportion of their output in 1996 are very quality conscious [-0.55, 10%]. A 
focus on product quality tends to be associated with a focus on punctuality, which 
reflects the quality of the services provided by the company [0.67, 5%].
Companies which have been increasing their exports generally [0.72, 5%] and 
especially their sales in the European Union [0.72, 5%] and world-wide [0.86, 1%] 
tend to view high design standards as less important determinants of their success. 
This suggests the possibility that companies have been finding it easiest to increase 
their exports if they are producing products which are of a homogenous design
processing industry regularly recounted stories in which investors were forced to re-introduce domestic 
brands after hastily discontinuing them in favour of their own Western ones. Strong brand loyalty and 
an intimate knowledge of an idiosyncratic market were explicit mentioned as a competitive advantage 
in HI, H2, H4.
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internationally, which means that once the international standard (in processed steel, 
turbines or gears) is reached, the company does not has to compete along this 
dimension.
Common themes also emerged form interviews in which Hungarian interviewees 
were asked to describe their company’s main competitive advantage and challenges: 
again successful Hungarian companies tend to focus on providing Western level 
quality and service at lower prices than multinational companies.68 Further cost 
reductions69 and quality improvements70 71are the main internal changes with which the 
companies are hoping to improve their competitiveness.
The main message is that the Hungarian companies tend to mention western standard 
quality at lower prices as the main determinant of their success, rather than any of 
these factors individually. Three companies (H5, H8, H10) even rank quality above 
prices, something only the duopolist D9 did in the German data. Punctuality again 
figures a lot lower than either price or quality. Nevertheless when exporting to the EU 
[-0.54, 5%] and world-wide [-0.50, 10%] Hungarian companies are primarily
68 This strategy is explicitly referred to by HI, H3, H4, H5, H8, HI 1.
69 H3, H5, H6, H10, HI 1
70 H7, H9
71 Some companies (HI, H4) wish to expand their product range and to improve their marketing 
approach (H2). The companies tend to suffer from transition specific external problems: The lack of 
stability in the economy and society are a recurring theme, with companies complaining about legal 
uncertainty, uncertainty in Hungary’s economic policies regarding taxation, exchange and interest rates. 
Worries about future political stability and GDP growth are also common. Only two companies 
complain about industry specific external problems: Cartels (H10) and lack of payment discipline (H8).
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competing on price, without experiencing too many problems in their product 
quality72.
Punctuality is considered less important by companies with high export growth to 
Eastern Europe [0.68, 5%], while companies increasing their exports world-wide rank 
punctuality highly [-0.57, 5%]. Assuming that punctuality is of the same importance 
to customers all over the world this indicates that Hungarian companies can still “get 
away with” being less punctual in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless companies increasing 
their sales in Eastern Europe have been generally aiming to provide good product 
quality [0.45,10%].
The interviews showed that all the Hungarian companies (H9, H10, H5, H8) which 
assign a relatively low importance to price competition tend to have a degree of 
monopoly power, either by dominating the domestic market (H5, H8), being a 
member in a cartel (H10) or by operating in a small niche with few direct competitors 
(H9). The effect of a company facing small as well as large competitors is that it ranks 
price competition more highly than average [-0.83, 1%], indicating that in these 
industries the small entrants serve to drive prices down. Additional competition from 
small companies also enhances a company’s incentives for punctual delivery [0.83, 
1%].
72 Two types of companies tended to assign a high importance to competition in terms of quality: those 
who excel in this dimension and those which still face problems in this area.
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I also enquired about the importance of various regional characteristics for the 
economic success of the company interviewed.73 The means of the relevant variables 
(Tables 4a & b) indicate that for East German interview partners the availability of a 
highly qualified workforce is a very important factor for all companies, while the 
availability of a cheap workforce is attributed a medium importance by three 
companies only. Similarly in the Hungarian data the difference between the mean of 
the variable capturing the importance of a highly trained workforce and the mean 
score for a cheap workforce is significant at the 1% level74, indicating that there too 
the availability of a cheap workforce is clearly a secondary factor when compared 
with the importance of well trained employees. This result provides a 
counterargument to the popular claim that cheap labour is what is making Eastern 
Europe attractive to investors.75 What makes Eastern Europe and especially Hungary 
attractive to investors is not cheap labour, but rather the combination of a cheaper and 
very highly trained workforce. It is of essential importance for the future economic 
success and recovery of the region to maintain its currently high levels of human 
capital, that is the good provision of technical and non-technical training and of 
general schooling.
73 The interviewees were asked to ascribe strengths to their preferences and to order factors according 
to their importance. The first two questions relate to characteristics of the workforce, the next three to 
proximity of relevant input and output markets and the last three deal with public good provision, for 
example the quality of the local infrastructure.
I obtain a test statistic of 3.57, while the critical value for 1% significance is 2.52 for a t-distribution 
with 20 degrees of freedom. IN comparison to the East German companies the Hungarian companies 
ascribe a significantly (at the 5% level) higher overall importance to the fact that their workforce is 
relatively cheap. This is not a reflection of the fact that the East German companies would not like to 
have a relatively cheap workforce, rather they have few labour cost advantages over West German and 
EU companies because of the fast rise in East German wages to levels which are very close to West 
German ones.
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Confirming market access considerations the East German companies also emphasise 
the importance of having a well developed infrastructure in the region.75 6 *Similarly in 
the Hungarian data the considerations which closely follow a well-trained workforce 
all relate to the proximity of the companies’ markets and the state of the infrastructure 
the companies have to rely upon in order to obtain access to different geographical 
markets. The Hungarian companies place, however, a much higher valuation on being 
close to their most important customers and input providers (both significant at the 
1% level). East German companies would probably not be indifferent about having 
more customers and suppliers in close proximity, enabling them to have, for example, 
transportation cost savings. Whether East German manufacturing companies would 
like to have customers and suppliers in close proximity is not, however, really the 
relevant question. More to the point, they cannot have them because they usually do 
not exist. On the other hand the Hungarian companies predominantly have domestic 
customers and suppliers who, all the better, tend to be in close proximity. Since 
services are usually not tradable, it is no contradiction to find that the East German
75 In the Hungarian data companies with FDI especially value the availability of a highly trained 
workforce [0.62, 5%] rather than a cheap one. In addition companies which ascribe a high importance 
to having a cheap workforce also tend to appreciate high standards of training [0.54, 5%].
East German companies which value having a good infrastructure tend to sell a relatively small 
proportion of their output in East Germany [-0.64, 5%] and a high proportion in West Germany [0.61, 
5%] and the EU [0.53, 10%] in 1996. Due to their high export levels westwards they also assign a high 
importance to both price [-0.65,5%] and quality [-0.62,5%] competition.
East German companies which value proximity to their customers as well as input providers [0.65, 
10%] tend to be construction companies [-0.82, 1%] who are strongly localised in their operations 
[0.83,1%]. Competition in product quality and punctuality is relatively unimportant to these companies 
[0.72,5% and 0.78, 1% for example in the cost of companies valuing proximity to their suppliers] 
probably because once a contract has been won predominantly based on price considerations, the 
customer experiences significant transaction specific sunk costs for any given building project. There is 
no evidence for any such trends in the Hungarian data, were proximity to their input and output markets 
is more uniformly considered to be important.
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companies value proximity to their service providers just as highly as the Hungarian
___ „ 78ones.
Although the Hungarian and German companies do not significantly differ in their 
assessment of the absolute importance of the three public goods the Hungarian 
companies’ give a very low relative ranking two public goods, namely the proximity 
to research institutions and a competent local government.78 9 At times (especially in 
the case of HI) proximity of research institutions is judged to be unimportant because 
the company has its own internal R&D department, while in the East German data 
there is a general lack of R&D. The Hungarian data provides some evidence that 
companies purchasing R&D from surrounding institutions have an above average 
export performance to the EU [0.52, 10%] and world-wide [0.51, 10%], especially in 
terms of export growth between 1990 and 1996 [0.71, 1% and 0.45, 10% 
respectively]. Even though these companies are exporting products with a high R&D 
content, price competition remains their dominant consideration [-0.64, 5%].
7 8  • » •Since proximity to service providers greatly enhances a companies’ flexibility it should come as no 
surprise that in both data sets companies which value proximity to their service providers are export 
orientated, experiencing especially rapid export growth westwards between 1990 and 1996 [in the East 
German data: 0.53, 10% for export growth to the EU, 0.48, 10% for export growth world-wide; in the 
Hungarian data: 0.61, 5% for total export growth, 0.53, 5% for export growth to the EU. These 
Hungarian companies also ascribe a very high importance to price competition: -0.81,1%].
Hungarian companies which assign a high importance to one of these factors tend to also do so for 
the other [0.81, 1%], suggestion that these are companies who are generally more tightly integrated into 
the institutional structures surrounding them. Similarly East German companies ascribing a high 
importance to their local government are more localised than average in their operations and have low 
exports to the EU [-0.54,10%]. East German companies tend to praise their local government while in 
Hungary the tenor tends to be, especially when foreign managers are being interviewed: “If a 
competent local government was of any importance to us, we would not be here.” (Interview with the 
MD of Douwe-Egberts.)
242
Tables 4a & b also make some interesting suggesting concerning a companies’ 
relative probability of being profitable. For example with respect to different regional 
characteristics I find that companies which assign a high importance to the 
importance of a competent local government are more likely to be profitable both in 
1995 [0.65,10%] and 1997 [0.68, 5%]. The interviews showed that companies which 
assign a high importance to a competent local government do so because they feel that 
their local government is of great value to the company in dealing with the social 
dimensions of its restructuring process or, in the construction sector, in securing 
contracts for the company.
In 1995 there was a strong negative association between East German companies 
which ascribe a high importance to a well-developed regional infrastructure [-0.91, 
1%] and those which are profitable. Since East Germany suffered from some 
backwardness (relative to West Germany) in, for example, its telecommunications 
and road networks it should not come as a surprise that companies which have an 
above average dependency on this relatively backwards infrastructure suffered a 
competitive disadvantage. By 1997 this association is insignificant which suggests 
that the large investments into infrastructure projects which took place in East 
Germany since 1990 seem to be succeeding in alleviating the infrastructure related 
problems especially manufacturing companies tended to face.80
° The Hungarian data merely indicates that in 1996 companies which value proximity to their 
customers are more likely to be profitable than average [0.56, 5%], while those valuing proximity to 
their input suppliers are less likely to be profitable [-0.48, 10%].
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6. Conclusions
My qualitative and quantitative data suggests that both East German and Hungarian 
suppliers experienced similar initial problems, especially with the quality of their 
products. They also suffered from a generally weak financial position and from 
transition specific problems such as a lack of punctuality and reliability. The response 
of East German and Hungarian customers to the problems faced by their domestic 
suppliers has been very different. Faced with very low trade costs East German 
customers generally abandoned their domestic suppliers because they had easy access 
to pre-existing supply networks in the West. Hungarian suppliers on the other hand 
benefited from the protection offered to them by Hungary’s own currency and 
generally higher transportation costs to Hungary. These factors, however, merely gave 
them some breathing space. The threat of competition from the EU remains very real, 
especially in sectors in which quality is very important. There is evidence that 
Hungarian suppliers are responding by rapidly increasing their product quality and by 
being highly accommodating to their customers.
The diverging geographical shifts which have taken place in terms of input markets 
are mirrored in the companies’ output markets. Although Hungarian companies had 
higher exports world-wide and to the EU in 1990,1 find that by 1996 the East German 
companies have experienced far larger increases in their exports, especially to West 
Germany, and decreases in their domestic sales. The overall shifts are in accordance 
with the literature surveyed: Trade liberalisation has resulted in increased exports to 
the EU from companies in both countries. The increase in exports has been especially
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large in the case where trade barriers have been entirely abolished, namely from East 
German companies to West Germany. The interviews indicated that market size 
consideration were instrumental in re-focusing East German companies to the West 
German market: not only did the West German market present many new 
opportunities, but many East German customers vanished. Domestic companies 
interviewees supplied with inputs ceased, greatly changed or reduced their operations. 
In some sectors, such as steel, tyres, gears and turbines interview partners indicated 
that the East German market of industrial customers had all but ceased to exist, 
suggesting a process of disaglomeration. In addition East German final consumers 
showed a strong lack of brand loyalty, while Hungarian consumers were more prone 
to be sceptical about Western brands. Consistently with market access and 
transportation cost considerations interviews with Hungarian companies provided 
some evidence for an increasingly regional focus on Central Europe defined as a 1000 
km radius both east- and westwards.
The persistence of historical trends in both data sets suggests that a pre-existing 
exporting capability is a pre-condition for being able to provide a flexible supply 
response to the opportunities presented by trade liberalisation. Since few East German 
companies had a pre-existing exporting capability and even fewer any direct 
experiences with Western customers the hypothesis presents itself that the extremely 
rapid trade liberalisation which took place not only enabled the survivors to re­
orientated themselves westwards, but also forced them to do so by ‘eliminating an
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inordinate share of domestic production’ [van Brabant (1994, p. 167)] and hence 
demand.
The devastation suffered by East German industry is also reflected in the companies’ 
market shares. From similar starting points, between 1990 and 1996 the average 
Hungarian manufacturing company has only experienced a 3 percentage point fall in 
its market share, while the fall experienced by East German companies tended to be 
closer to 74 percentage points (significant at the 1% level), resulting in the typical 
East German company having a significantly (at the 1% level) lower overall market 
share in 1996. The combination of the vanishing industrial and frequently also 
consumer demand for traditional East German products and of the unfettered market 
access enjoyed by Western companies has resulted in a situation where locally East 
German companies are not only frequently facing a smaller pie but are also obtaining 
a much smaller slice of what is left. This is a recipe for eliminating companies rather 
than for restructuring them.
The protection afforded to the Hungarian companies in the form of higher 
transportation costs to Hungary and their labour cost advantage are crucial in giving 
them a chance in competing with western multinationals. Reductions in market share 
which occurred nevertheless have generally been the result of entry by multinationals, 
rather than the consequence of indigenously grown new Hungarian competitors.
I find no evidence that in manufacturing the rapid expansion of the small and 
medium-sized firm sector has occurred which was hoped to “ensure output growth,
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generate new employment, provide a tax base and generally augment the flexibility 
and dynamism of these economies” [Svejnar (1991, p. 133)]. This observation makes 
the successful restructuring of the existing manufacturing base all the more 
imperative.
It is clear from the interviews that their continuing cost advantages are not, however, 
making the Hungarian companies complacent. They respond to the threat of 
competition by improving the quality of their products while maintaining relatively 
low prices. Since Hungary is a small economy, it is also important to bear in mind 
that being large in terms of domestic market share by no means entails being 
inappropriately big from the point of view of international scale economies and 
competitiveness. I find that it is exactly the companies which have a large domestic 
market share which are also strong exporters. A policy of domestic demonopolisation 
might well have adversely affected this exporting capability without providing 
incentives for restructuring which are not obtainable from continuing and gradual 
trade liberalisation with the aim of eventual EU membership.
With respect to the role of regional characteristics and of different dimensions of 
competition the case studies confirm the important role played by net labour cost 
advantages in maintaining the attractiveness of Central Europe as a manufacturing 
location. In this context the rapid wage assimilation between West and East Germany 
posed a particular problem to East German companies. Since it is net labour costs 
which count in this context, it is not enough for a workforce to be cheap, but it also
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has to be well-trained and sufficiently productive to constitute a competitive 
advantage. It is this combination which allows both East German and Hungarian 
companies to strive for niches in which they provide products of Western quality at 
lower prices.
There is some evidence, however, that the (indigenous) R&D content of the East 
German products is lower, making East German companies mainly successful in 
exporting product of a relatively homogenous design to western markets. Hungarian 
companies not only have a greater wage cost advantages, but have also maintained a 
greater R&D capacity. Although in their case as well price remains the primary 
competitive focus, there is some evidence that this greater R&D content allows for 
high export growth to EU and world-wide markets.
The very high importance ascribed in both data sets to a well-developed infrastructure 
underlines the role played by market access and transportation costs in influencing the 
companies’ ability to compete internationally. In this context it is notable, however, 
that Hungarian companies have a significantly (at the 1% level) higher valuation of 
being in proximity to their most important customers and input providers. This 
suggests that local agglomeration forces and the logic of cumulative causation are 
working in favour of manufacturing in Hungary.
The question arises whether the extensive destruction of the East German 
manufacturing base has resulted in dis-agglomeration, that is a situation where in
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most industrial sectors (with the clear exception of construction) the critical mass of 
domestic industry has been lost. In conjunction with the rapid wage assimilation 
between East and West Germany this results in a situation where the general lack of 
centrifugal and centripetal forces favouring East Germany as a production site makes 
East German re-industrialisation an unlikely prospect even in the longer term. 
Hungary on the other hand provides an example of how gradual but fully credible 
trade liberalisation with the aim of future integration with the EU provide 
restructuring incentives without destroying a country’s manufacturing base.
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Data Appendix
Table 1: Data on changes in the geographical structure of supply relationships1
HI H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10 H ll mean significant differences 
between East German and 
Hungarian data?"
H90%Hung 100 0 20 40 80 75 50 30 80 100 25 54.5 complete data set: YES 
manufacturing only: NO
H90%EEur 0 0 0 15 0 20 0 0 10 0 75 10.9 complete data set: NO manufacturing only: NO
H90%EU 0 15 60 40
20 5 40 70 10 0 0 23.6 complete data set: YES 
manufacturing only: NO
H90%WW 0 85 20 5 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 10.9 complete data set: NO manufacturing only NO
H96%Hung 98 30 35 30 80 70 60 10 20 100 20 50.2 complete data set: NO manufacturing only: YES
H96%EEur 2 5 0 10 0 10 0 0 60 0 78 15 complete data set: NO manufacturing only: NO
H96%EU 0 10 45 30 20 20 30 90 20 0 0 24.1 complete data set: YES manufacturing only: YES
H96%WW 0 55 20 30 0 0 10 0 0 0 2 10.6 complete data set: NO manufacturing only: NO
HAHung -2 30 15 -10 0 -5 10 -20 -60 0 -5 -4.2 complete data set: YES manufacturing only:YES
HAEEur 2 5 0 -5 0 -10 0 0 50 0 3 4.1 complete data set: NO manufacturing only: NO
HAEU 0 -5 -15 -15 0 15 -10 20 10 0 0 0 complete data set: YES manufacturing only: YES
HAWW 0 -30 0 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 -0.3 complete data set: NO manufacturing only: NO
ll%oldsup 100 95 25 25 95 80 76 70 20 60 80 66 complete data set: NO manufacturing only: NO
D l ,
c
D 2 ,
c
D3 D4 D5 D 6 ,
c
D 7 ,
c
D8 D9 mean,
complete
data
mean, manufacturing data 
only (excluding companies 
marked with c)
D90%EGer 1 0 0 1 0 0 95 70 0 8 0 1 0 0 96 70 79 66
D90%WGer 0 0 0 20 50 0 0 4 5 8.7 16
D90%EEur 0 0 5 0 50 2 0 0 0 25 11.1 16
D90%EU 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 1.1 2
D96%EGer s o 5 0 0 30 0 8 0 1 0 0 30 5 38.3 13
D96%WGer 5 0 5 0 15 28 50 2 0 0 40 60 34.7 39
D96%EEur 0 0 85 0 5 0 0 0 0 10, (0.5 
excl. D3)
18 (1 excl. D3)
D96%EU 0 0 0 40 40 0 0 20 20 13.3 24
D96%WW 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 10 15 3.5 6
DAEGer - 5 0 - 5 0 -95 -40 0 0 0 -66 -65 -41 -52
DAWGer 5 0 5 0 15 8 0 2 0 0 36 55 26 23
DAEEur 0 0 80 0 -45 - 2 0 0 0 -25 - 1.1, (-10 excl. 
D3)
2 (-14 excl. D3)
DAEU 0 0 0 30 40 0 0 20 20 12.2 22
DAWW 0 0 0 2 5 0 0 10 15 3.5 6
D%oldsup 8 5 0 70 35 80 17 35 2 23 28
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Definition of the variables used:
D90%EGer/
H90%Hung
percentage of total inputs (physical and support services) procured in East Germany/Hungary in 1990
D90%WGer percentage of total inputs (physical and support services) procured in West Germany in 1990
D (H) 90%EEur percentage of total inputs (physical and support services) procured in Eastern Europe in 1990
D90%EU percentage of total inputs (physical and support services) procured in the European Union in 1990, 
excluding West Germany
H90%EU percentage of total inputs (physical and support services) procured in the European Union in 1990, 
including West Germany
H90%WW percentage of total inputs (physical and support services) procured world-wide in 1990, zero for all East 
German companies in 1990
D96%EGer/
H96%Huns
percentage of total inputs (physical and support services) procured in East Germany/ Hungary in 1996
D96%WGer percentage of total inputs (physical and support services) procured in West Germany in 1996
D (H) 96%EEur percentage of total inputs (physical and support services) procured in Eastern Europe in 1996
D96%EU percentage of total inputs (physical and support services) procured in the European Union in 1996, 
excluding West Germany
H96%EU percentage of total inputs (physical and support services) procured in the European Union in 1996, 
including West Germany
D96%WW percentage of total inputs (physical and support services) procured world-wide Union in 1996
DAEGer D96%EGer minus D90%EGer: the in - (or decrease in the percentage of total inputs which are procured 
in East Germany
HAHung H96%Hung minus H90%Hung: the in - (or decrease in the percentage of total inputs which are procured 
in Hungary
DAWGer D96%WGer minus D90%WGer: the in - (or de)crease in the percentage of total inputs which are procured 
in West Germany
D (H) AEEur D (H) 96%EEur minus D (H) 90%EEur: the in - (or de)crease in the percentage of total inputs which are 
procured in Eastern Europe
DAEU D96%EU minus D90%EU: the in - (or de)crease in the percentage of total inputs which are procured in 
the European Union, excluding West Germany
HAEU H96%EU minus H90%EU: the in - (or de)crease in the percentage of total inputs which are procured in 
the European Union, including West Germany
D (H) AWW D (H) 96%WW minus D (H) 90%WW: the in - (or decrease in the percentage of total inputs which are 
procured world-wide, since D90%WW is 0 for all companies DAWW equals D96%WW
D(H)%oldsup percentage of current suppliers which pre-date 1990
The critical values relevant to the complete pooled data set are: tm oo"/.) = 1.33, tig (5%) = 1.73, tu (i%> = 2.55.
The critical values relevant to the pooled data set containing the Hungarian and German manufacturing companies only are: 
ti3 (10%) ~ 1.35, ti3 (5%) = 1.77, ti3 (!•/„> =2.65.
Variables t-statistic obtained for complete data 
set, reject or accept null of homogeneity 
between country data sets?
t-statistic obtained for 
manufacturing data set, reject or 
accept null?
90%Hung/90%EGer -1.63, reject at 10% level -0.85 , accept
90%EEur -0.02, accept -0.31, accept
90%EU / (90%EU + 90%WGer) 1.37, reject at 10% 0.62, accept
90%WW 1.28 accept 0.99, accept
96%Hung 0.78, accept 2.25, reject at 5%
96%EEur 0.40, accept -0.08, accept
96%EU/ (96%EU + 96%WGer) -1.89, reject at 5% -2.43, reject at 5%
96%WW 1.14, accept 0.61, accept
Allung, A EGer 2.85, reject at 1% 3.16, reject at 1%
AEEur 0.44, accept 0.15, accept
AEU/ AEU + AWGer -4 82, reject at 1% -5.13, reject at 1%
AWW -0.85, accept -1.07, accept
% o ld su p 2.84, reject at 1% 2.28, reject at 1%
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T able  3: L ist o f variab les  re la ting  to p ro d u c t m arkets
D(H)hqual 1 if the availability of a highly qualified workforce is of high importance to the company’s competitive 
success, 0.5 if this factor is of medium importance and 0 otherwise
D(H)cheap 1 if the availability of a cheap workforce is of high importance to the company’s competitive success, 0.5 
if this factor is of medium importance and 0 otherwise
D(H)custprox 1 if proximity to the company’s most important customers is of high importance to the company’s 
competitive success, 0.5 if this factor is of medium importance and 0 otherwise
D(H)inprox 1 if proximity to the company’s most important input suppliers is of high importance to the company’s 
competitive success, 0.5 if this factor is of medium importance and 0 otherwise
D(H)servprox 1 if proximity to the company’s most important service suppliers is of high importance to the company’s 
competitive success, 0.5 if this factor is of medium importance and 0 otherwise
D(ll)randdprox 1 if proximity to local research institutions is of high importance to the company’s competitive success, 
0.5 if this factor is of medium importance and 0 otherwise
D(H)localgov 1 if a competent local government is of high importance to the company’s competitive success, 0.5 if this 
factor is of medium importance and 0 otherwise
D(H)infrastr 1 if a well developed infrastructure is of high importance to the company’s competitive success, 0.5 if this 
factor is of medium importance and 0 otherwise
D%out 90 EGer/ 
I1%out90llung
percentage of the company’s total output which was sold in East Germany/ Hungary in 1990
D(H)%out90EEur percentage of the company’s total output which was sold in Eastern Europe in 1990
D%out 90WGer percentage of the company’s total output which was sold in West Germany in 1990
D (II) %out 90EU percentage of the company’s total output which was sold in the European Union (excluding West 
Germany for East German data including West Germany for Hungarian data) in 1990
D(ll)%out 90 WW percentage of the company’s total output which was sold world-wide (that is outside Europe) in 1990
D(ll)Total Exp 90 sum of total sales realised outside East Germany/ Hungary in 1990
D%out 96 EGer/ 
H%out96Hung
percentage of the company’s total output which was sold in East Germany/ Hungary in 1996
0(11) %out96 
EF.ur
percentage of the company’s total output which was sold in Eastern Europe in 1996
D%out 96WG er percentage of the company’s total output which was sold in West Germany in 1996
0(11) %out 96EU percentage of the company’s total output which was sold in the European Union (excluding West 
Germany for Fast German data, including West Germany for Hungarian data) in 1996
0(H) %out 96 
WW
percentage of the company’s total output which was sold world-wide (that is outside Europe) in 1996
0(11) Total Exp 96 sum of total sales realised outside East Germany/ Hungary in 1996
OA Total Exp O'Total Export 96 minus DTotal Export 90: the in - (or decrease in the company’s export orientation since 
1990
DA out Eger/ HA 
out Hung
D%out 96EGer minus D%out 90EGer: the in - (or de)crease in the percentage of total output which is sold 
in Fast Germany/ Hungary
OA out WGer I)%out 96WGer minus D%out 90WGer: the in - (or decrease in the percentage of total output which is 
sold in West Germany
0(11) A out EEur ->%out 96EEur minus D%out 90EEur: the in - (or decrease in the percentage of total output which is sold 
n Eastern Europe
DA out Ell i%out 96EU minus D%out 90Eur U: the in - (or decrease in the percentage of total output which is sold 
n the European Union
0(11) A out WW )%out 96WorldW minus D%out 90WorldW: the in - (or de)crease in the percentage of total output which 
s sold world-wide
D(II) MS 90 market share of the company in 1990, 100%= the East German (Hungarian) market, except in the cases 
>f D1, D2 and D7 where the relevant market is greater Berlin or, in the case of D2, only one quarter of 
lerlin
D(H) MS 96 market share of the company in 1996, the same areas are taken as 100% as for Market Share 90
D(II)AMS L)(I1)MS 96 minus D(H)MS 90
D (H) numcomp if the company faces a large number of competitors, 0 otherwise. In the East German data this variable 
s 0 for Company D9 only.
D (II) jmall comp 1 if the company mainly faces small competitors, 0 otherwise.
D(H) big comp 1 if the company mainly faces large competitors, 0 otherwise. This variable is 1 for all the East German 
companies. If a company faces both large and small competitors, then both big comp and small comp 
equal 1.
0 ( 11)  c  Eger 
(Hung)
if important competitors are located in East Germany / Hungary in 1996, 0 otherwise,
DComp 96 WGer if important competitors are located in West Germany in 1996,0 otherwise.
D(H) C EEur 1 if important competitors are located in Eastern Europe in 1996, 0 otherwise.
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Table 3 (continued):
D(ll) C Eli 1 if important competitors are located in the European Union in 1996, 0 otherwise.
D(H) C 96 WW 1 if important competitors are located in countries outside Europe in 1996, 0 otherwise.
D(H) DiC price Captures the extent to which price is an important dimension of competition in the company’s main 
product markets. Interview partners ranked the importance of this factor on a sale of 1 (very important) to 
6 (unimportant). Consequently the lower the numeric value for this entry, the more important a 
determinant of the company’s competitive success price is.
D(H) DiC quality Captures the extent to which quality is an important dimension of competition in the company’s main 
product markets. Interview partners ranked the importance of this factor on a sale of 1 (very important) to 
6 (unimportant).
D(H) DiC punct Captures the extent to which punctual delivery is an important dimension of competition in the company’s 
main product markets. Interview partners ranked the importance of this factor on a sale of 1 (very 
important) to 6 (unimportant).
D(H) DiC design Captures the extent to which design (including packaging and technical design) is an important dimension 
of competition in the company’s main product markets. Interview partners ranked the importance of this 
factor on a sale of 1 (very important) to 6 (unimportant).
Dpr 95 1 if the company was profitable in 1995,0 otherwise.
Hpr 96 1 if the company was profitable in 1996,0 otherwise.
D pr97 1 if the company was profitable in 1997,0 otherwise.
D manufacturing/ 
H food
1 if the company belongs to the manufacturing/ food sector, 0 if it belongs to the construction sector.
D(H) IMPPR 1 if the investor was the main force determining the restructuring of the product range, 0 otherwise.
D(H) EDI 1 if the company has EDI, 0 otherwise.
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Table 4 a: Summary of the data on the East German companies’
product markets
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 mean
Dhqual 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Dcheap O' 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.33
Dcustprox 1 1 0.5 0 0 0.5" 1 0.5 0 0.5
Dinprox 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.27
Dservprox 1 0 1 0 0.5“' 0 0.5 1 0.5 0.5
Dranddprox 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.1
Dlocalgov r 0.5 0 1 r 0 r 0.5 0 0.55
Dinfrastr 0 0.5 1 1 0.5 1 0.5 1 1 0.72
D%out 90EGer 100 100 75 80 60 70 100 85 100 85.55
D%out 90EEur 0 0 15 0 40 5 0 15 0 8.33
D%out 90WGer 0 0 10 6.6 0 0 0 0 0 1.84
D%out 90EU 0 0 0 6.6 0 0 0 0 0 0.73
DV.out 90 WW 0 0 0 6.6 0 25 0 0 0 3.51
DTotal Exp90 0 0 25 20 40 30 0 15 0 14.44
D%out 96EGer 100 100 20 25 50 90 100 65 5 61.66
D%out96 EEur 0 0 5 0 35 3 0 5 0 5.33
D%out 96WGer 0 0 60 75 10 7 0 5 65 24.66
D%out 96EU 0 0 15 0 5V" 0 0 25 30 8.33
D%out 96 WW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 1.11
DTotal Exp 96 0 0 80 75 50 10 0 35 95 38.33
DA total Export 0 0 55 50 10 -20 0 20 95 23.33
DA out ECer 0 0 -55 -55 -10 20 0 -20 -95 -23.8
DA out WGer 0 0 50 68.4 10 7 0 5 65 8.59
DA out EEur 0 0 -10 0 -5 -2 0 -10 0 -3
DA out EU 0 0 15 -6.6 5 0 0 25 30 7.6
DA out WW 0 0 0 -6.6 0 -25 0 0 10 -2.4
DMV,“S90 100 100 95 100 10 100 100 100 100 89.44
DM S 96 3IX 10 20 20 2.6 7.5 4 72.5X 0X1 15.5
DAMS -97 -90 -75x" -80 -7.4 -92.5 -96 -27.5 -100 -73.9
Dnumcomp 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0.88
Dbigcomp 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Dsmall comp 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.44
DC EGer j X l l l 0 XIV0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.55
DC WGer 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.88
DC EEur 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.33
DC EU 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.33
DC WW 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.11
DDiC price 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1.11
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Table 4a (continued):
Dl D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 m e a n
DDiC quality 2.5 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1.61
DDiC punct 4 3 1.5 2 1 1 1 1 2 1.83
DDiC design 3XV 3 5 2 3 1 3 3 6 3
Dpr95 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0.44
Dpr97 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.77
Dmanufact 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.55
DIMPPR 0 0 0 1 0.5 0 0 0.5 1 0.33
DFD1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.77
1 The personnel managers of companies D1& D3 see stable and high wages as an important incentive increasing 
productivity. Hence he does not think that paying the lowest wages possible is desirable. Company D2 has made 
bad experience with cheap labour.
"“Contacts are more important than geographical proximity..”
Here the manager in charge o f procurement mentioned the proximity of service suppliers which had been 
separated out of the original Kombinat and are independent companies now.
IV “This would be highly desirable...but there is no solidarity with East German products. The West German 
lobbies have more power in East German local government, than the lobbies representing local industry have....” 
The in company D2 has a similar opinion when he states that in practice the company receives no support from the 
local government.
vCompany D5 describes its relationship with the local government as good since it is one of the biggest employers 
in that quarter of Berlin and are thus in regular contact with the authorities
" The Senate is the main customer o f company D7, thus its competence is very important to this company. A 
manager in company D9 however stated: “If this was of any importance at all to our success, then we would have 
long left Brandenburg.”
v" D5 and D8 export to subsidiaries of the investor which are located in the European Union.
V"1 *IVXlFor both 1990 and 1996 the market share figures refer to the East German market or to relevant sub-segments
of it. The three building companies D l, D2 and D7 had markets which only extended to the greater Berlin area or,
in the case of D2, to a quarter o f Berlin only. However, within each of these sub-markets the company in question
still had a monopoly position.
“ Values for D l, D2 and D4 are estimates provided by interview partners when they were pushed to make a 
personal guess. In these companies the prevalent sentiment was that the relevant markets had changed so much 
beyond recognition that one could not really compare market shares. D2’s relatively large market share refers to 
its position within the quarter of Berlin it was originally operating in. By 1997 D2 has extended its operations to 
the entire Berlin area, for which market its market share is very close to zero.
* This summary statistic hides a share of the East German market of 60% for new turbines and 85% for servicing 
old ones. The company also has acquired a 30% market share in Eastern Europe for servicing turbines.
Xl Although the East German market for gears ceased to exist with the traditional East German car industry, D9 has 
managed to acquired a 1.5 market share of the West German market. From what I gather the West German 
market seems to be a duopoly, so that D9 faces only one, but much larger, competitor there.
It should be noted that we are dealing with a rapidly shrinking market here. Before 1990, D3 had a market share 
of 2% in West Germany. By 1996 this has increased in 10%.
x'“ D l’s main competitors are new subsidiaries of West German companies, there has been a 1 to 1 import o f the 
West German market structure.
m It is interesting in this context that D3 seems to be entirely unconcerned about competitors in West Germany, 
but very much about Scandinavian, Italian, Polish and Hungarian competitors. This probably indicates collusion 
in the (West) German steel processing sector.
xv Companies D l, D2 and D7 do not directly engage in design activities, but rather purchase these from architects, 
who work in separate companies. It is, however, o f importance that the company collaborates with good 
architects.
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T able 4b: Sum m ary  o f the  d a ta  on the  H u n g arian  com panies’ p ro d u c t m arkets
HI H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8 H9 H10 H ll mean
Hhqual 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.5 1 1 1 0.90
Hcheap 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.59
Hcustprox 1 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.63
Hinprox 1 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0 0.72
Hservprox 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 li 1 0.5 0.5 1 0.86
Hranddprox Oii 0.5 0.5 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.36
Hlocalgov 0 0.5 0 1 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 1 0.31
Hinfrastr 1 1 1 1 0 0.5 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.81
H%out90Hung 40 97 92 40 50 15 35 93 75 87 90 64.9
H% out 90EEur 36“' 3 l ,v 30 8V 80 10 4 20 10 3 18.6
H% out 90EU 0 0 4 10 30 0 30 3 0 0 7 7.6
H%90 out WW 24 0 3 20 12 5 25 0 5 3 0 8.8
H90Totol Exp 60 3 8 60 50 85 65 7 25 13 10 35
H% out 96Hung 40 97 65 35 50 10 10 84 OO 0 < 99 85 59.5
H% out 96EEur 60 3 25 27 8 70 3V" 10 20 1 0 20.6
H%96 out EU 0 0 10 15 30 5 45 6 0 0 15 11.5
H%96 out WW 0 0 0 23 12 15 42 0 0 0 0 8.3
HTotalExp96 60 3 35 65 50 90 90 16™' 20 1 15 40.4
HA total Export 0 0 27 5 0 51X 25 9 -5 -12 5 5.4
HA Hung 0 0 -27 -5 0 -5 -25 -9 5 12 -5 -5.4
HAEEur 24 0 24 -3 0 -10 -7 6 0 -9 -3 2
HA EU 0 0 10 5 0 5 15 3 0 0 8 4.18
HA WW -24 0 -3 3 0 10 17 0 -5 -3 0 -0.45
HMS90 100 90x 5XI 75 78x" 98 78 45 5 25x,li 100 63.5
HMS96 100 80 10 25 78 90
xiv
85 60 3 5 85xv 56.5
HAMS 0 -10 5 -50 0 -8 7 15 -2 -20 -15 -7.00
Hnumcomp 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.72
Hsmallcom 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.54
Hbigcomp 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.90
IlCllung 1 1 |XV1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.54
lICEEur 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.09
HCEU 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.81
HCWW 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.36
HDiCprice 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1.36
IIDiCquality 1 2 3 1 1 1 1.5 1 2 1 1 1.41
IIDiC punct 4 3 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1.91
HDiCdesign 2 1 2 3 1 2 3 4XV11 2 2 4.5xvm 2.41
Ilpr96 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0.54
II food 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.27
llfdi 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0.63
llimppr 0.5 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0.41
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i H7 especially emphasises the importance of being close to the providers of ancillary services and of packaging 
materials as well as the importance of a well-developed regional infrastructure.
ii “We have our own internal R&D department.”
H i’s MD is keen to stress that these exports went and continue to go to Central (the Czech Republic, Austria, 
Switzerland and the Ukraine) rather than Eastern Europe. The company’s world wide exports went to Algeria and 
Egypt and although they have ceased to exist by 1996, the MD states that the company has no intention of 
rebuilding these exports.
IV H3 explains its low exports to Eastern Europe in 1990 by stating that it offers better quality at higher prices than 
local producers. The export growth experienced by 1996 in the Eastern European category has been mainly to 
Central Europe. Exports to the European Union are mainly via the investor.
v H5a exported to the USSR not directly but via western intermediaries (and continues to do so). Its exports to the 
rest of the world are mainly to the USA and Asia.
" By 2001 H9 is hoping to sell only 65% of its output in Hungary, 25% in Eastern Europe and regain the 5% 
world-wide sales it has lost.
v” The manager interviewed stated: “They (that is business partners from the former Soviet Union) cannot pay and 
they cannot offer us anything worth bartering for.”
This includes direct exports by H8 only. Indirectly H8 exports about 50% of its output because the products 
packaged in H8’s products are being exported.
“ H6’s proportion of sales exported to its target markets have not changed dramatically, but its overall output has 
shrunk dramatically. At the company’s low-point in 1996 output was at 500 buses, down from 12000 in the late 
1980s. By 1997 output recovered to 1500-2000 buses. Throughout this period domestic demand has been fairly 
stable at 300 buses per annum, with the largest falls in orders and payment ability originating from the area of the 
former Soviet Union.
x H2’s high market share refers to the market for instant drinks only, that is to the products of the factory visited.
" The factory which is the core of H3 was a relatively small player in the Hungarian sweets industry in 1990. 
Furthermore it has always produced a multitude of products, without having a dominant role in any product group 
except in edible Christmas decorations.
H5a’s market share depends on its product groups. In petrochemicals (that is input production) it has a 
monopoly and imports account for 10% of the market only, while in plastic processing it has a market share of 
67% only. 78% is the average of 90% and 67%.
HlO’s low market share in 1990 was due to the fact that the civil engineering sector had quite a few companies 
operating, typically on a regional basis, in it already. For the future the interview partner stated: “We haven’t got 
much of a chance in terms of market share really. We are big enough to be tolerated as a bystander by the cartel 
operated by Western firms’ subsidiaries, but small enough for them not to see us as a threat and to do us in. If we 
grew any bigger, they would cease to tolerate us.”
Xlv H6’s market share in the Eastern European market is still, depending on the country concerned, 50-100%. 
Consequently its large falls in total sales are due to large falls in demand, rather than the loss of market share to 
competitors.
”  In 1996/7 HI 1 still had a legal monopoly on the supply of gas. This is likely to change, but HI 1 seems overall 
unconcerned about the impending legal changes. In petrol its market share has fallen to 70% due to entry by 
multinationals who are building up petrol station networks. These multinationals have to frequently, however, buy 
petrol from HI 1 because of the high transportation costs and the import taxes they face. HI 1 has also invested into 
upgrading its own chain of petrol stations and is fairly confident that it will be, given favourable legislation, able 
to sustain its market share. The large number of competitors H ll faces refers to the petrol market. The small 
competitors originate from “the illegal (blending) activities of individuals”, which were especially rampant during 
the oil embargo during the Yugoslav war.
The Hungarian competitors are almost all subsidiaries of western companies. The same statement holds for 
HIO and for the Eastern European (especially Polish) competitors of H7. 
xvu Design is unimportant because it is usually supplied by the customer.
*™ 4.5 is the average of 6 for lubricants and 3 for petrol stations.
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T a b le  5 a :  C o rre la tion  m atrix  1: R egional charac teris tics '
Dcheap Dcustprox Dinprox Dservprox Dranddprox Dlocalgov Dinfrastr
Dcheap 1.00
Dcustprox 0.00 1.00
Dinprox -0.19 0.65*nc 1.00
Dservprox 0.29 0.17 0.16 1.00
Dranddprox -0.25 -0.43 -0.24 0.00 1.00
Dlocalgov -0.09 0.16 0.22 0.00 0.36 1.00
Dinfrastr 0.23 -0.60* nc -0.63* nc -0.20 -0.23 -0.64* nc 1.00
D%out 90EGer 0.46 0.57*t 0.53*t 0.09 -0.63**t 0.08 -0.36
0%out 90EEur -0.19 -0.43 -0.28 0.27 0.88***t 0.12 0.02
D%out 90WGer -0.37 -0.25 -0.35 0.13 -0.18 -0.19 0.42
D%out 90Eurl( -0.25 -0.43 -0.24 -0.43 -0.13 0.36 0.29
D%out 90 WW -0.32 -0.11 -0.30 -0.55*t -0.16 -0.35 0.36
DTotal Exp90 -0.46 -0.57*t -0.53*t -0.09 0.63**t -0.08 0.36
D%out 96EGer -0.10 0.83***t 0.58*t -0.11 -0.11 0.35 -0.64**t
D%out96 EEur -0.24 -0.45 -0.27 0.09 0.98***t 0.26 -0.13
D%out 96WGer -0.03 -0.68**t -0.53*t -0.08 -0.17 -0.30 0.61**t
D%out 96EurU 0.63**t -0.42 -0.20 0.48*t -0.10 -0.54*t 0.53*t
D%out 96 WW 0.50*t -0.43 -0.24 0.00 -0.13 -0.45 0.29
DTotal Exp 96 0.10 -0.83***t -0.58*t 0.11 0.11 -0.35 0.64**t
DA total Export 0.31 -0.62* *t -0.38 0.18 -0.14 -0.35 0.51*t
DA out EGer -0.29 0.63**t 0.38 -0.16 0.14 0.33 -0.5 l*t
DA out WGer 0.01 -0.71**t -0.53*t -0.10 -0.16 -0.30 0.61**t
DA out EEur -0.06 0.17 0.16 -0.60**t -0.17 0.31 -0.40
DA out ELI 0.63**t -0.32 -0.14 0.53*t -0.08 -0.57*t 0.45
DA out WW 0.45 -0.05 0.18 0.48*t 0.10 0.15 -0.22
DMS 90 0.27 0.44 0.25 -0.02 -1.00 -0.34 0.21
DM S 96 0.33 -0.04 0.13 0.37 -0.21 -0.08 0.42
DAMS -0.01 -0.41 -0.14 0.27 0.75***t 0.25 0.09
Dnumcomp -0.50 0.43 0.24 0.00 0.13 0.45 -0.29
Dsmall comp -0.16 -0.55 -0.33 -0.27 0.40 0.14 0.40
DC EGer 0.16 0.27 0.06 0.27 0.32 0.37 -0.40
DC WGer 0.25 0.00 0.24 -0.43 0.13 0.45 -0.29
DC EEur 0.00 0.00 -0.19 0.29 -0.25 -0.63**t 0.57*t
DC EU 0.00 0.00 -0.19 0.29 -0.25 -0.63**t 0.57*t
DC WW -0.25 0.00 -0.24 -0.43 -0.13 -0.45 0.29
DDiC price 0.50*t -0.43 -0.24 0.00 -0.13 -0.45 0.29
DDiC quality -0.27 0.83***t 0.72**t 0.09 -0.29 0.15 -0.65**t
DDiC punct -0.35 0.41 0.78* **t 0.07 -0.29 0.21 -0.62**t
DDiC design 0.57**t -0.22 0.00 0.33 0.00 -0.20 0.00
Dpr95 -0.16 0.55 0.48 0.00 0.40 0.65* nc -0.91***nc
Dpr97 0.38 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.19 0.68**nc -0.43
Dmanufacturin
g
0.16 -0.82***nc -0.48 0.27 0.32 -0.14 0.58
DFDI -0.19 -0.33 0.36 0.33 0.19 0.07 -0.04
DIMPPR 0.29 -0.83***nc -0.38 -0.17 0.14 0.05 0.46
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C orre la tion  m atrix  2: T he geographical d is tribu tion  o f  sales in 1990 and  1996
D%out
90EGer
D%out
90EEur
D%out
90WGer
D%out
90EurU
D%out 90 
WorldW
DTotal
Export
90
D%out
96EGer
D%out96
EEur
D%out
96WGer
D%out
96EurU
D%out
96
WorldW
D%out90EGer 1.00
D%out90EEur -0.77***t 1.00
D%out90WGer -0.31 0.03 1.00
D%out90EU -0.14 -0.23 0.47 1.00
D%out 90 WW -0.42 -0.15 -0.06 0.14 1.00
DTotal Exp90 -1.00***t 0.77***t 0.31 0.14 0.42 1.00
D%out96EGer 0.29 - 0.22 -0.57*t -0.36 0.18 -0.29 1.00
D%out96EEur -0.72***t 0.95***t - 0.11 -0.18 - 0.12 0.72**t -0.15 1.00
D%out96WGer - 0.12 -0.13 0.71**t 0.59**t -0.05 0.12 -0.91 ***t -0.17 1.00
D%out96EU 0.09 0.14 0.03 -0.26 -0.33 -0.09 -0.63**t - 0.02 0.38 1.00
D%out 96 WW 0.35 -0.23 -0.18 -0.13 -0.16 -0.35 -0.56*t -0.18 0.47 0.68* *t 1.00
DTotal Exp 96 -0.29 0.22 0.57*t 0.36 -0.18 0.29 -1.00***t 0.15 0.91***t 0.63**t 0.56*t
DA total Export 0.13 -0.08 0.45 0.28 -0.37 -0.13 -0.91***t -0.14 0.87***t 0.71**t 0.74**t
DA out EGer - 0.12 0.09 -0.47 -0.32 0.36 0.12 0.92***t 0.14 -0.89***t -0.69**t -0.72**t
DA out WGer -0.09 -0.14 0.65**t 0.58*t -0.05 0.09 -0.91***t -0.17 1.00***t 0.41 0.54*t
DA out EEur 0.5 l*t -0.62**t -0.39 0.26 0.16 -0.51*t 0.29 -0.35 -0.04 -0.48*t 0.26
DA out EU 0.11 0.17 -0.05 -0.42 -0.33 - 0.11 -0.53*t 0.01 0.26 0.99***t 0.66**t
DA out WW 0.49*t 0.05 - 0.01 -0.17 -0.94***t -0.49*t -0.36 0.05 0.21 0.53*t 0.49*t ~~
DIMS 90 0.64**t -0.90***t 0.14 0.13 0.17 -0.64**t 0.14 -0.99***t 0.15 0.09 0.13 ~
DIMS 96 -0.11 0.15 0.11 0.07 -0.11 0.11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 0.44 -0.26 ~~
DAMS -0.65**t 0.90***t -0.05 -0.07 -0.23 0.65**t -0.17 0.83***t -0.17 0.22 -0.29 ~~
Dnumcomp -0.35 0.23 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.35 0.56*t 0.18 -0.47 -0.68**t - i . oo***T
Dsmall comp -0.73***t 0.47 -0.05 0.40 0.50*t 0.73**t - 0.10 0.45 - 0.01 -0.07 -0.32 ^
DC EGer -0.20 0.32 -0.58*t -0.40 0.21 0.20 0.60**t 0.34 -0.75***t -0.23 -0.40
DC WGer 0.26 -0.19 -0.81***t 0.13 0.16 -0.26 0.41 0.01 -0.42 - 0.21 0.13 ~
DC EEur -0.44 0.19 0.30 -0.25 0.43 0.44 -0.07 -0.07 - 0.02 0.31 -0.25 ~~
DC EU -0.44 0.19 0.30 -0.25 0.43 0.44 -0.07 -0.07 - 0.02 0.31 -0.25
DC WW -0.38 -0.09 -0.18 -0.13 0.97***t 0.38 0.28 -0.08 - 0.21 -0.26 -0.13
DDiC price 0.35 -0.23 -0.18 -0.13 -0.16 -0.35 -0.56*t -0.18 0.47 0.68**t 1.00***t
DDiC quality 0.57*t -0.37 - 0.01 -0.29 -0.37 -0.57 *t 0.55*t -0.34 -0.38 -0.41 -0.29
DDiC punct 0.58*t -0.48*t -0.07 0.06 -0.28 -0.58*t 0.24 -0.39 -0.06 -0.25 0.06
DDiC design 0.49*t -0.07 -0.17 -0.28 -0.64**t -0.49*t -0.47 -0.05 0.31 0.71**t 0.85***r"
Dpr95 0.28 0.12 -0.47 -0.32 -0.40 -0.28 0.64**t 0.29 -0.66**t -0.56*t -0.32
Dpr97 0.48*t -0.07 -0.48*t 0.19 -0.61**t -0.48*t 0.10 0.07 -0.16 0.04 0.19 ~
Dmanufacturin
S
-0.43 0.50*t 0.47 0.32 -0.31 0.43 -0.89***t 0.38 0.68**t 0.66**t 0.32 "
DFDI 0.02 0.25 0.28 0.19 -0.61**t - 0.02 -0.50*t 0.19 0.38 0.39 0.19
DIMPPR -0.08 0.05 0.08 0.58*t -0.14 0.08 -0.74**t 0.10 0.66**t 0.48*t 0.58*t '
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iCorrelation matrix 3: Changes in the companies’ sales & export orientation and 
market share
DTotal 
Export 96
DA total 
Export
DA out 
EGer
DA out 
WGer
DA out 
EEur
DA out
EU
DA out 
WW
DMS 90 DMS96 DAMS Dnum
comp
DTotal Exp 96 1.00
DA total Export 0.91***t 1.00
DA out EGer -0.92***t -1.00***t 1.00
DA out WGer 0.91***t 0.89***t -0.91***t 1.00
DA out EEur -0.29 -0.10 0.09 0.00 1.00
DA out EU 0.S3*t 0.62* *t -0.59**t 0.29 -0.50*t 1.00
DA out WW 0.36 0.59**t -0.58*t 0.23 -0.05 0.53*t 1.00
DMS90 -0.14 0.12 -0.12 0.15 0.21 0.06 -0.10 1.00
DM S96 0.07 0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.69**t 0.41 0.01 0.21 1.00
DAMS 0.17 -0.09 0.09 -0.18 -0.65**t 0.22 0.10 -0.75***t 0.49*t 1.00
Dnumcomp -0.56*t -0.74* *t 0.72**t -0.54*t -0.26 -0.66**t -0.49*t -0.13 0.26 0.29 1.00
Dsmall comp 0.10 -0.22 0.20 -0.01 -0.28 -0.13 -0.55*t -0.38 0.43 0.63**t 0.32
DC EGer -0.60**t -0.70**t 0.71**t -0.74**t -0.11 -0.15 -0.33 -0.30 0.13 0.35 0.40
DC WGer -0.41 -0.33 0.32 -0.35 0.61 -0.22 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 0.01 -0.13
DC EEur 0.07 -0.10 0.11 -0.06 -0.76***t 0.34 -0.47 0.22 0.59**t 0.20 0.25
DC EU 0.07 -0.10 0.11 -0.06 -0.76***t 0.34 -0.47 0.22 0.59**t 0.20 0.25
DC WW -0.28 -0.45 0.45 -0.20 0.09 -0.22 -0.90***t 0.13 -0.13 -0.21 0.13
DDiC price 0.56**t 0.74**t -0.72**t 0.54*t 0.26 0.66**t 0.49*t 0.13 -0.26 -0.29 -1.00***t
DDiC quality -0.55*t -0.32 0.33 -0.41 0.24 -0.34 0.22 0.28 -0.26 -0.43 0.29
DDiC punct -0.24 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.48*t -0.24 0.27 0.30 -0.30 -0.47 -0.06
DDiC design 0.47 0.72**t -0.69**t 0.36 0.09 0.72**t 0.86***t 0.00 -0.15 -0.10 -0.85***t
Dpr95 -0.64**t -0.54*t 0.55*t -0.66**t 0.39 -0.47 0.24 -0.38 -0.45 0.04 0.32
Dpr97 -0.10 0.09 -0.10 -0.11 0.40 0.00 0.60 -0.15 0.04 0.17 -0.19
Dmanufacturin
8
0.89***t 0.74**t -0.74**t 0.68* *t -0.55*t 0.57**t 0.39 -0.34 0.39 0.57*t -0.32
DFDI 0.50*t 0.52*t -0.52*t 0.37 -0.26 0.34 0.60**t -0.20 0.25 0.34 -0.19
D1MPPR 0.74**t 0.72**t -0.73* *t 0.71**t 0.10 0.35 0.32 -0.13 0.14 0.21 -0.58*t
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T a b le  5 b :  C orre la tion  m atrix  1: R egional characteristics '
Hhqual Hcheap Hcustprox Hinprox Hservprox Hranddprox Hlocalgov Hinfrastr
Hhqual 1.00
Hcheap 0.54**nc 1.00
Hcustprox 0.29 0.29 1.00
Hinprox -0.03 0.42 -0.42 1.00
Hservprox -0.29 -0.29 0.38 -0.20 1.00
Hranddprox 0.40 -0.15 0.43 -0.58**nc 0.52*nc 1.00
Hlocalgov 0.39 -0.15 0.55**nc -0.57**nc 0.24 0.81***nc 1.00
Hinfrastr 0.10 -0.45 0.35 -0.25 0.61**nc 0.48 0.47 1.00
H%out90Hung 0.18 -0.43*t -0.18 -0.17 -0.13 0.00 0.10 0.35
H% out 90EEur -0.49*t 0.17 0.12 0.26 0.16 -0.28 -0.22 -0.26
H% out 90EU 0.26 0.31 -0.11 -0.14 -0.13 0.35 0.11 -0.38
H%90 out WW 0.32 0.51*t 0.38 0.04 0.14 0.25 0.08 0.02
H90Totol Exp -0.18 0.43*t 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.00 -0.10 -0.35
H% out 96Hung 0.19 -0.30 -0.12 -0.10 -0.33 -0.18 0.11 0.22
H% out 96EEUr -0.40 0.29 0.22 0.39 0.29 -0.36 -0.43*t -0.15
H%96 out EU 0.20 0.16 -0.06 -0.27 0.06 0.52*t 0.21 -0.20
H%96 out WW 0.03 0.05 -0.03 -0.16 0.20 0.51*t 0.26 -0.06
HTotalExp96 -0.19 0.30 0.12 0.10 0.33 0.18 -0.11 -0.22
HA total Export -0.07 -0.23 -0.11 -0.15 0.61 **t 0.51*t -0.05 0.27
HA Hung 0.07 0.23 0.11 0.15 -0.61**t -0.5 l*t 0.05 -0.27
HAEEur 0.17 0.25 0.22 0.27 0.27 -0.17 -0.44*t 0.23
HA EU 0.02 -0.26 0.02 -0.40 0.53**t 0.71***t 0.29 0.34
HA WW -0.27 -0.43*t -0.42*t -0.26 0.14 0.45*t 0.28 -0.10
HMS90 -0.11 0.35 0.49*t -0.09 0.48*t 0.28 0.33 -0.02
IIMS96 -0.24 0.30 0.23 -0.02 0.47*t 0.08 -0.02 -0.09
HA MS -0.30 -0.08 -0.54*t 0.15 0.01 -0.41 -0.73***t -0.16
Hnumcomp -0.29 -0.69**nc -0.08 -0.20 0.08 0.04 0.24 0.29
Hsmallcom 0.04 0.16 0.56*nc 0.08 0.67**nc 0.35 0.28 0.34
llbigcomp -0.15 -0.56**t -0.52 -0.26 -0.19 0.27 0.26 -0.18
HCIIung 0.52**t 0.16 0.15 0.35 -0.15 -0.08 0.04 0.34
HCEEur 0.15 -0.06 -0.19 -0.22 0.19 0.47*t 0.15 0.18
HCEU -0.22 -0.38 -0.24 -0.39 0.24 0.40 0.08 -0.27
IICWW -0.13 -0.13 0.39 -0.24 0.46*t 0.46*t 0.60**t 0.13
HDiCprice -0.13 -0.13 -0.46*t 0.05 -0.81***t -0.64* *t -0.38 -0.45*t
HDiCquality 0.30 -0.11 -0.40 0.21 0.07 0.12 -0.25 0.14
HDiC punct 0.19 0.37 0.47*t 0.34 0.56**t 0.08 -0.04 0.37
IlDiCdcsign -0.26 -0.57**t 0.44*t -0.85***t 0.43*t 0.47*t 0.46*t 0.48*t
Hpr96 0.04 0.16 0.56**nc -0.48*t 0.26 0.35 0.28 0.05
11 food 0.29 0.29 0.08 0.51*nc 0.38 -0.04 -0.24 0.35
Hfdi 0.62**t 0.13 0.04 0.24 -0.04 0.20 0.13 0.45*t
Ilimppr 0.41 0.03 -0.32 0.13 -0.34 -0.06 0.03 0.19
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C orre la tion  m atrix  2: T he geographical d is tribu tion  o f sales in 1990 and  1996
H%out
90Hung
H% out 
90EEur
H% out
90EU
H%90 out 
WW
H90Total
Exp
H%out
96Hung
H%out96
EEUr
H%96out
EU
H%96out
WW
HA total 
Export
H%out90Hung 1.00
H% out 90EEur -0.77***t 1.00
H% out 90EU -0.36 -0.25 1.00
H%90 out WW -0.72***t 0.23 0.51*t 1.00
H90Total Exp -1.00***t 0.77***t 0.36 0.72***t 1.00
H%out 96Hung 0.93***t -0.64**t -0.46*t -0.73***t -0.93***t 1.00
H%out96EEUr -0.65* *t 0.88***t -0.36 0.29 0.65* *t -0.59**t 1.00
H%96out EU -0.38 - 0.22 0.96***t 0.51*t 0.38 -0.54**t -0.33 1.00
H%96out WW - 0.68 0.21 0.72***t 0.68**t 0.68**t -0.78***t 0.00 0.81***t 1.00
HTotalExp96 -0.93 0.64**t 0.46*t 0.73***t 0.93***t -1.00***t 0.59**t 0.54**t 0.78***t 1.00
HA total Export - 0.10 -0.16 0.39 0.22 0.10 -0.44*t 0.00 0.56**t 0.46*t 0.44*t
HA Hung 0.10 0.16 -0.39 - 0.22 - 0.10 0.44*t 0.00 -0.56**t -0.46* t -0.44*t
HA EEur 0.21 - 0.20 -0.23 0.12 - 0.21 0.08 0.30 -0.25 -0.43 - 0.08
HA EU -0.18 -0.09 0.43 0.25 0.18 -0.47*t - 0.11 0.66**t 0.63**t 0.47*t
HA WW -0.23 0.07 0.49*t -0.04 0.23 -0.36 -0.28 0.61 0.70***t 0.36
HMS90 -0.49*t 0.37 0.22 0.34 0.49*t -0.42*t 0.26 0.24 0.31 0.42*t
HMS96 -0.41 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.41 -0.41 0.24 0.29 0.24 0.41
HA MS 0.16 - 0.21 0.13 -0.14 -0.16 0.01 - 0.02 0.13 -0.13 - 0.01
Hnumcomp 0.51*t 0.02 -0.69***t -0.76***t -0.51*t 0.52**t -0.08 -0.60**t -0.45*t -0.52*t
Hsmallcom - 0.10 0.34 -0.41 - 0.02 0.10 -0.15 0.49*t -0.31 -0.17 0.15
Hbigcomp 0.28 -0.25 0.22 -0.51*t -0.28 0.20 -0.54**t 0.26 0.20 - 0.20
HCHung 0.27 - 0.10 -0.53**t 0.04 -0.27 0.34 0.10 -0.58 -0.38 -0.34
IlCEEur -0.34 - 0.12 0.64**t 0.55**t 0.34 -0.50 -0.24 0.77 0.81***t 0.50*t
HCEU 0.02 -0.09 0.33 -0.24 - 0.02 -0.15 - 0.20 0.39 0.30 0.15
IICWW - 0.12 0.35 -0.23 - 0.21 0.12 -0.07 0.14 -0.15 0.07 0.07
HDiCprice 0.31 -0.28 0.04 -0.31 -0.31 0.45*t -0.36 -0.13 -0.31 -0.45*t
HDiCquality 0.42*t -0.35 -0.15 -0.25 -0.42*t 0.20 - 0.12 -0.09 -0.18 - 0.20
IIDiC punct - 0.02 0.17 -0.43 0.14 0.02 -0.06 0.5 l*t -0.39 -0.32 0.06
HDiCdesign 0.14 -0.15 - 0.01 -0.06 -0.14 0.03 - 0.20 0.17 0.10 -0.03
Hpr96 -0.27 -0.17 0.57**t 0.55**t 0.27 -0.31 -0.13 0.56**t 0.37 0.31
II food 0.25 -0.15 -0.35 0.01 -0.25 0.15 0.23 -0.36 -0.39 -0.15
lirdi 0.08 -0.17 -0.16 0.37 -0.08 0.06 -0.05 -0.14 0.09 -0.06
llimppr 0.15 - 0.20 -0.08 0.11 -0.15 0.24 -0.30 -0.09 0.06 -0.24
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Correlation matrix 3: Changes in the companies’ sales & export orientation 
and market share
HA total 
Export
HA Hung HA EEur HA EU HA WW H
MS90
H
MS96
HA MS Hnum
comp
HA total 
Export
1.00
HA Hung -1.00***t 1.00
HA EEur 0.32 -0.32 1.00
HA EU 0.87***t -0.87***t -0.05 1.00
HA WW 0.42*t -0.42*t -0.71***t 0.61**t 1.00
HMS90 -0.05 0.05 -0.20 0.05 0.09 1.00
HMS96 0.12 -0.12 -0.03 0.11 0.06 0.89***t 1.00
HAMS 0.37 -0.37 0.38 0.13 -0.05 -0.19 0.27 1.00
Hnumcomp -0.16 0.16 -0.20 -0.10 0.12 -0.38 -0.53**t -0.35 1.00
Hsmallcom 0.16 -0.16 0.32 0.11 -0.21 0.45*t 0.26 -0.39 0.26
Hbigcomp 0.15 -0.15 -0.62**t 0.27 0.78***t -0.33 -0.38 -0.13 0.52**t
HCHung -0.28 0.28 0.39 -0.38 -0.56**t -0.42*t -0.59**t -0.38 0.26
HCEEur 0.56**t -0.56* *t -0.25 0.71***t 0.57**t 0.13 0.25 0.27 -0.52**t
HCEU 0.48*t -0.48*t -0.23 0.41 0.64**t 0.01 0.05 0.08 0.24
HCWW -0.11 0.11 -0.40 0.05 0.29 0.58**t 0.28 -0.62**t 0.46*t
HDiCprice -0.50*t 0.50*t -0.18 -0.54**t -0.12 -0.54**t -0.42*t 0.24 0.04
HDiCquality 0.48*t -0.48*t 0.45*t 0.26 -0.01 -0.58* *t -0.43*t 0.29 0.23
HDiC punct 0.13 -0.13 0.68* *t -0.07 -0.57* *t 0.33 0.29 -0.07 -0.06
HDiCdesign 0.28 -0.28 -0.11 0.48*t 0.20 0.09 0.07 -0.04 0.24
Hpr96 0.19 -0.19 0.08 0.22 -0.02 0.49‘ t 0.48*t 0.00 -0.56**t
tifood 0.20 -0.20 0.76* **t -0.11 -0.54**t 0.03 0.12 0.20 -0.08
Hfdi 0.04 -0.04 0.25 0.03 -0.23 -0.36 -0.46*t -0.23 -0.04
Himppr -0.28 0.28 -0.22 -0.15 -0.02 -0.21 -0.17 0.08 -0.12
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Table 6 : Summary of the main statistical findings
Question East Germany Hungary
1. How and why has 
the geographical 
distribution of 
supply arrangements 
changed between 
1990 and 1996?
The mean values of the variables indicating the geographical distribution of 
supply arrangements suggest that from similar starting points by 1996 strongly 
diverging developments have taken place in the East German and Hungarian 
data set. Most importantly, the Hungarian companies continue to show a much 
stronger reliance on their local suppliers. At the same time the fact that East 
German companies have been predominantly switching to suppliers from West 
Germany and other countries in the EU, while Hungarian companies have been 
experiencing a much smaller increase in their reliance on these markets.
2. How has the 
geographical 
distribution of sales 
changed between 
1990 and 1996? In 
particular, have there 
been any noticeable 
changes in the 
companies’ export 
orientation?
The diverging geographical shifts which have taken place in terms of input 
markets are mirrored in the companies’ output markets. Although Hungarian 
companies had higher exports world-wide and to the EU in 1990,1 find that by 
1996 the East German companies have experienced far larger increases in their 
exports, especially to West Germany, and decreases in their domestic sales.
3. How has the 
company’s 
competitive situation 
and domestic market 
changed between 
1990 and 1996?
From similar starting points, between 1990 and 1996 the average Hungarian 
manufacturing company has only experienced a 3 percentage point fall in its 
market share, while the fall experienced by East German companies tended to 
be closer to 74 percentage points (significant at the 1% level), resulting in the 
typical East German company having a significantly (at the 1% level) lower 
overall market share in 1996.
4. What are the main 
dimensions of 
competition? Are 
companies 
specialising in low- 
tech cheap products? 
How important are 
different regional 
characteristics for 
the companies’ 
competitive success? 
For example, how 
important is the 
availability of a 
cheap workforce?
With respect to the role of regional characteristics and of different dimensions 
of competition the case studies confirm the important role played by net labour 
cost advantages in maintaining the attractiveness of Central Europe as a 
manufacturing location. In this context the rapid wage assimilation between 
West and East Germany posed a particular problem to East German companies. 
Since it is net labour costs which count in this context, it is not enough for a 
workforce to be cheap, but it also has to be well-trained and sufficiently 
productive to constitute a competitive advantage. It is this combination which 
allows both East German and Hungarian companies to strive for niches in 
which they provide products of Western quality at lower prices.
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Chapter 5 :
Conclusions
A noticeable pattern is that the academic literature and investors frequently endorsed 
restructuring measures which turned out to be ‘right’ for the East German companies 
and ‘wrong’ for the Hungarian ones. The second startling feature of my case studies 
is the evidence of total industrial devastation in East Germany. In this conclusion I 
argue that these observations are related to three recurring themes: local 
idiosyncrasies matter, the past matters and the future should not be rushed.
That local idiosyncrasies matter might seem banal, but it is not. My case studies 
show that academics, as well as foreign direct investors, frequently endorse catch-all 
restructuring measures. In doing so they implicitly assume that the wider social, legal, 
economic and cultural transition environment is already sufficiently similar to that of 
a developed and stable market economy for policies developed elsewhere to work 
well. Especially policy prescriptions assuming in any way that markets work well and 
information is abundant are not suited to address situations in which creating markets 
under a high degree of uncertainty is the problem to be addressed in the first place. 
The surprise many western managers expressed, for example, about unexpected 
responses by Hungarian consumers, suppliers, employees etc. shows not only a 
general lack of awareness of the fact that restructuring measures a constrained by and 
interact with their wider environment, but also of the critical dimensions of 
difference.
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To illustrate the problems associated with a blanket approach to restructuring imagine 
that there are two successful football managers from northern Italy, who both speak 
no English. One of them is asked to take over an ailing second division team in 
southern Italy and the other an English team. They arrive at their respective new jobs 
in the firm belief that their experiences gained and methods used in northern Italy will 
soon catapult their new teams into the first division. Whom would you expect to have 
a greater a priori change of succeeding?
A comparison between enterprise restructuring in East Germany and Hungary is 
especially well-suited to examine these issues. Not only does East Germany share 
strong language and cultural ties with West Germany, but through re-unification East 
Germany adopted West German laws, financial and political institutions and became 
part of the West German industry structure. Over night all the ‘right’ institutions and 
incentives were in place. In Hungary, however, local idiosyncrasies persist, which 
cannot simply be put down to widespread illegality and chaos. Hungary does not 
provide an illustration of how agents behave when the legal system is entirely 
ineffective, ethnic tension is high, corruption is rife and/ or the Mafia is the main rule- 
enforcement agency. Unlike less fortunate transition economies, Hungary is 
reasonably stable in all these main dimensions underpinning the transformation 
process and nevertheless it still yields different restructuring outcomes from those in 
East Germany.
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A clear illustration is provided in Chapter 1. The observation that under central 
planning companies were far more vertically integrated than is customary in market 
economies has resulted in the general assumption that vertical dis-integration is going 
to be performance enhancing. In my case studies Western managers, for example, 
showed a strong tendency to ‘slim’ their companies down by closing non-core units. 
On the other hand Hungarian managers, keen to reduce the unemployment impact of 
restructuring, tended to favour a policy of separating out non-core units, with the 
parent company frequently maintaining an ownership share in these newly founded 
subsidiaries. In the academic literature this ‘Hungarian-style’ restructuring of the 
boundaries of the firm has been generally interpreted as ‘ambiguous’ at best, with 
more sympathetic authors pointing to the risk spreading properties of cross-ownership 
and more critical ones suspecting that these measures merely create a cloud of 
confusion behind which non-restructuring or even criminal activities can take place.
Contrary to what might be expected my case studies clearly show that, in contrast to 
East Germany, vertical disintegration is not performance enhancing in the Hungarian 
companies examined. In retrospect the main reason seems rather obvious: For 
subcontracting to be viable a well-functioning supply market is necessary. Without 
the developed, competitive and stable West German background industry East 
German companies had direct access to, Hungarian companies benefit from remaining 
integrated or creating their own suppliers through ‘ambiguous’ restructuring 
measures.
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Chapter 2 makes a similar point, only this time with respect to the internal provision 
of social services. In most market economies the provision of social services such as 
crèches and doctor’s surgeries is not generally seen as the role of the enterprise sector. 
Consequently the suggestion is frequently made that the extent to which a company in 
a transition economy has shed the internal provision of such non-productive activities 
is one indicator of the extent of restructuring in that company. My East German data 
does indeed suggest that the internal provision of social services was almost without 
exception the first thing to go. In Hungary, however, the situation is different. Even 
companies with FDI show a strong persistence in social service provision. What is 
more, companies showing such persistence outperform others in terms of their profits, 
domestic market share and exports.
Maintaining the internal provision of social services has different efficiency 
implications in Hungary and East Germany. Employees in East German companies 
became integrated into the West German social security system and experienced rapid 
wage assimilation. For this reason abolishing the internal provision of social services 
caused little friction and enabled the companies’ to increase their per capita 
productivity. On the other hand, many Hungarian employees not only feel that social 
service provision is an intrinsic part of their company’s traditions, one of the few 
tangible benefits of decades of building socialism, but they also fear that there would 
be few alternative providers they could afford. A general tenor is ‘if you want to close 
these services pay us Western-level wages first.’ Even though happy employees are 
not necessarily productive ones, disgruntled employees can certainly cause a lot of
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conflict which hinders the restructuring process overall. My case studies show that 
generally in Hungary too foreign investors attempted to cut these services back. They 
soon relented, however, when such measures invariably caused severe friction with 
their workforce. On the other hand culturally sensitive and ‘humane’ managers were 
generally rewarded by a co-operative workforce willing to do its bit for the company’s 
long-term survival.
Chapter 3 most clearly illustrates the notion that local idiosyncrasies matter. The 
widespread assumption that companies with FDI will outperform their rivals because 
of knowledge transfer from their investor and his role in introducing new products 
and production methods is borne out in the East German data only. My Hungarian 
case studies provide many examples in which investors endorsed inappropriate 
restructuring measures by not realising, for example, the popularity of local brands or 
the analogy between socialist brigades and project groups. In this context successful 
companies give competent local managers a say in the restructuring process. They 
might need to be trained in areas such as marketing and finance, but at the same time 
they posses valuable historical and cultural knowledge. Transition is a two-way 
learning process: since enterprises have to restructure in a way which is appropriate to 
their local environment, investors frequently find that what works well in their head 
offices and domestic markets does not work well in their subsidiary. What might be 
optimal in one context is not necessarily so in another. Competent local managers 
can help investors understand why.
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The idea that local idiosyncrasies matter closely relates to a second underlying theme, 
namely that history matters, not only in the sense that it frequently gives rise to and 
explains local idiosyncrasies. Chapter 4 illustrates how historical factors also 
influence a company’s underlying restructuring capability. Flexible supply side 
responses to the challenges posed by transition are much more likely in companies 
which have a pre-existing export experience, that is they are used to producing 
internationally competitive products and have experience in international markets. 
There is no clean slate in enterprise restructuring, frequently the past provides the 
building blocks for the future.
Although there are situations in which transition would never get off the ground 
without revolutionary measures, my case studies nevertheless indicate that frequently 
the future should not be rushed. There is an underlying tension between 
experiencing too little pressure for change, resulting in insufficient restructuring, and 
too much pressure for change, resulting in destruction rather than restructuring. In 
other words, is evolution preferable to revolution? My case studies show that if the 
transition process overall is sufficiently credible, a lot can be said for a slower pace of 
change.
Chapter 4 illustrates this contention. Trade liberalisation is a fully credible policy goal 
in both Hungary and East Germany. Crucially, however, in the case of East Germany 
trade liberalisation occurred almost over night with reunification, while Hungary is
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more gradually preparing for EU membership. In addition Hungarian wage levels are 
approaching western-levels much more slowly than East German ones.
The result of early and radical trade liberalisation in East Germany has been the 
devastation of its manufacturing base. With the exception of the construction sector, 
East German companies have deserted their domestic suppliers in favour of stable 
West German and EU suppliers. At the same time in their domestic output markets 
the East German companies examined have experienced radical falls in their overall 
demand and market share as a consequence of the availability of attractive substitutes 
from the West and a near-total collapse in industrial demand. Breaking into a 
frequently hostile West German market became a matter of survival. The prospects 
for East German re-industrialisation in the foreseeable future are bleak: market 
access, agglomeration and wage cost considerations do not clearly favour East 
German production sites over West German ones, especially when many West 
German industrial sectors are characterised by overcapacity.
On the other hand cost advantages and demand idiosyncrasies have partially protected 
many Hungarian industrial sectors from unfettered competition by multinationals. 
This has enabled capable companies to genuinely restructure. Restructuring is a 
complex learning process which takes time to implement. The immediate and intense 
competition suffered by the East German companies left them with no time to learn. 
Excessively speedy trade liberalisation became a recipe for enterprise destruction 
rather than restructuring.
278
/
The notion that there is only that much simultaneous change an organisation or 
individual can cope with was also all-pervasive in the personal accounts given to me 
by interviewees. For example Hungarian subsidiaries of foreign companies were in 
one instance judged to be the worst possible suppliers because the multitude of their 
investors’ change initiatives left them in even more chaos than usual. Many trade 
union representatives gave illustrations of the apathy and feeling of powerlessness 
which yet another initiative to encourage ‘self-determination’, ‘responsibility’, 
‘efficient work practices’ etc. brought about in employees.
In a transition environment the pressures for change crush down on a company from 
all sides: customers are making new demands, suppliers are overburdened, new 
competitors and new opportunities arise, the rules of the game change. In this 
situation it is tempting to try and address all problems at once. There is a Hungarian 
saying, however, that people who grab much end up holding little. Sometimes there is 
no time for evolution. If there is, however, a company can benefit from carefully 
working out its most profound problem, which usually relates to its products and 
product markets, and then introduce change in that area. Afterwards it will become 
clear how the organisation as a whole is affected by this initiative and which follow- 
on changes are necessary. To maintain an organisation’s efficiency, change has to be 
genuine and targeted during radical restructuring processes.
I hope that this study will be conducive to future research. Should we accept the 
hypothesis that restructuring outcomes are highly dependent on the wider social,
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cultural and economic structures they are embedded in, then my findings suggest that 
there is a need to examine the precise nature of this dependency in future empirical 
and statistical work. Since my case studies illustrate the challenges of enterprise 
restructuring under extremely strong pressures for change, my results should also 
have a wider applicability for restructuring and change management processes in 
general. In this context it would be interesting to apply the same methodology to a set 
of restructuring companies in two different market economies. This would help to 
distinguish between factors which apply to restructuring enterprises in general and 
those which are unique to the transition environment. Similarly extending the study 
eastwards would help to examine the additional challenges posed by even higher 
levels of legal, political and economic uncertainty. The biggest problem faced by my 
study is, of course, the relatively small number of observations. The ideal solution 
would be to conduct a large sample survey for which the case studies can act as an 
interpretative framework. Follow-up visits to the participating companies could yield 
insights into the later stages of restructuring. In Central Europe the initial enterprise 
restructuring phase might be nearing its end, but many research challenges remain.
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Appendix 1:
English translation of the questionnaire used:
East German version1
Interviews were conducted  in E ast G erm any between A u gu st and D ecem ber 1996, in H ungary 
between M arch a n d  A u gu st 1997, fo llow -u p  p h o n e  calls were m ade in 1998
A. The situation in 1996.1997 
Interviewpartner
Name, Date, Company, Position in the company, Responsibilities
Name of the company 
Address 
Industrial sector 
Name of the investor
Number of employees in 1996, expectation for 2001 (2Pt = 1 Ft) 
Part-time 
Full-time 
Blue-collar 
White-collar
Sales volume after tax in Million DM 
Are you profitable? Yes/ No
B. The situation before 1990
Interviewpartner
Name, Date, Company, Position in the company, Responsibilities
1. To which conglomerate (Kombinat) did your company last belong?
2. Where was the head office of this conglomerate?
PRODUCT
3. Which were the most important products of your company before 1990?
4. Number of employees in 1990
Part-time
Full-time
Blue-collar
White-collar
KNOW-WHY
5. Did the company with this address have a particular responsibility in the conglomerate for
- certain commercial activities
- certain activities on the value added chain
- certain product groups
- certain markets
MARKETS
7. Which percentage of your final output did you sell before 1990
1 In designing this questionnaire I am deeply indebted to Professor Gemot Grabher and Professor 
Bruce Lyons.
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- within the Bezirk (corresponded to an administrative unit of about the size of a county) in 
which you are located
- within the former GDR
- within countries of the former Eastern Block?
- within West Germany
- to other companies in your Conglomerate?
- other
INTEGRATION
6. Which functions were catered for (1) directly in this company [separate internal division], (2) in 
other companies belonging to the same Conglomerate (3) bought from external sources?
- Bilanzierung (basically seeing whether production is following the plan given from above)
- investmentplanning
- personnel
- product development
- process development
- input procurement
- maintenance
- distribution
- transportation
7. Which social functions (e.g. summer camps, kindergartens...) were integrated into your company?
C. Changes since the acquisition by the investor 
Interviewpartner
Name, Date, Company, Position in the company, Responsibilities
1. When were you acquired? (All the companies in the sample have a 100% ownership by the investor)
2. How high is the size of the employment guarantees and the investment guarantees given by the 
innovator to the Treuhand? (guarantees given, until 1996 fulfilled, expected up to 2001)
3. Which sanctions were agreed upon in the acquisition deal?
PRODUCTION
3. Which are your most important products? (Since when in production, proportion of total sales before 
FDI, expectation until 2001)
4. For the products which you have kept on producing after FDI, to what extent has their value added 
changed?
5. For your new products: Would you say that they require, in comparison to your old products more, 
equal or less
- technological know-how
- modem production technology
- organisational knowledge
- qualified personnel ?
6. From where did the main impulses for the changes in your products come?
- Investor
- Treuhand
- management consultancies
- important customers
- industrial associations
- exhibitions, fairs
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- the “old” managers
- R&D
- other
7. Who controls how frequently and using which criteria whether the goals you are aiming for through 
these changes in your products are achieved?
INTEGRATION
8. Which activities are at the moment being a) internally supplied, b)supplied by the investor or are 
being c)bought from external sources?
-R&D
- Design
- Computing facilities
- Supply procurement
- quality control
- maintenance
- transportation 
-sales
- marketing
- customer services
- personnel
9. Which are in your opinion the main advantages and disadvantages of this division of labour?
10. How would you like to see this division of labour develop up to the year 2001?
11. According to which criteria have you changed your position on the value-added-chain?
- costs
- capacity
- know-how
- flexibility
MARKET
12. Which percentage of your total output do you sell in
- the Land in which you are located
- the New Länder
- the Old Länder
- the EU
- directly to your investor?
- other
13. How have your market shares changed? (1990, 1996, expected 2001)
- East Germany
- West Germany
- Eastern Europe 
-EU
- Overseas
14. How would you characterise the competition which you face? (before FDI, after FDI)
- mainly small companies
- mainly large companies
- a large number of competitors
- a small number of competitors
15. Where were your main competitors located before 1990?
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16. (agree do not agree 1 to 6) The main dimension of competition is nowadays....
- price
- quality
- punctuality in delivery
- design
- other
17. What is in your judgement the main reason why your business partners turn to you rather than your 
competitors?
18. Which changes would improve upon your competitive situation?
- internal (e.g. service, quality, organisation..)
- external (improvements in the infrastructure, policy changes...)
PRODUCTION METHODS
17. To what extent has the composition of overall production methods changed?
(before FDI, 1996,2001)
- production runs comprising individual units
- small series
- large series 
-mass production
18. Since the FDI, which were the three largest investments into the production process?
19. judging by sales volume, which were the three largest closures in production?
20. Which of the following technologies/ processes do you use in your company? (already before FDI, 
since FDI, expectation)
- computers in the commercial area
- computers in production planing
- computers in production co-ordination
- computers in R&D
- computers in the management of your stocks 
-CAD
-NC
- CNC
- Industrial robots
21. How old are (on average) the machines which are most important for your production?
22. How old is the average technical lifetime of your machines?
23. From were did the main impulses for the changes in production come?
External:
- investor
- Treuhand
- management consultancies
- important customers
- trade associations
- trade fairs
- other 
Internal:
- “old” management 
-R&D
- other
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24. Who controls using which criteria the attainment of the goals envisaged by the changes in 
production?
D. The relationship to your investor 
Interviewpartner
Name, Date, Company, Position in the company, Responsibilities
1.1 In case there is vertical integration between you and your investor: How high is the procentual 
proportion of your total output that you sell directly to your investor?
1.2 How high is the proportion of total output that you sell to your other main customer, who is not 
your investor?
2.1 How would you describe the price of “in-house-sales”?
- prices with profit margins which are typical of those obtained in this company
- prices with profit margins which are typical of our industrial sector
- prices with a narrow profit margin 
-just or hardly cost covering prices
2.2 How would you describe the prices which you obtain for “out-of house” sales?
- prices with profit margins which are typical of those obtained in this company
- prices with profit margins which are typical of our industrial sector
- prices with a narrow profit margin 
-just or hardly cost covering prices
3. For the proportion of your output that you sell out of house, how is the pricing decision made?
4. How biding are quality control requirements demanded a) by your investor b) by your other main 
customer?
- absolutely binding
- relatively binding
- have the proposal nature
5. What happens if the quality control procedures which have been suggested by a) your investor and b) 
by your other main customer are not implemented?
- the requested procedures are implemented
- nothing
- the dissolution of the business contact might be threatened
- we have to expect the loss of the contract
- other
6. How frequently are there control inspections by a) your investor and b) your other main customer?
7. To the extent that there have been in the past disagreements over issues such as the interpretation of 
a contract or quality control issues, how have these been resolved in your judgement?
- a fair compromise was found
- the supplier had to make the main concessions
- the customer had the mainly compromise
8. Are there any tasks that you solve together with a) your investor b) your other main customer?
- R&D
- common investment into tools/machines
- common management of the stocks
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other
9. Should serious problems develop in your supply relationship with a) your investor b) your other 
main customer, how are these resolved?
- there is close co-operation and common problem solving
- the parties are allocated separate problem areas but there is co-operation
- there is rather sporadic communication concerning the most important matters
- everybody solves there problems, to the extent that this is possible separately
10. How strongly does a) your investor b) your other main customer take into consideration 
(not at all: 1—>very strongly 6)
10.1 principles of fairness
10.2 ideas o f fair-reaching co-operation
10.3 your wishes and ideas
E. Changes in human resource management (2 times, one interview with the personnel manager 
and one with the trade union representative)
Interviewpartner
Name, Date, Company, Position in the company, Responsibilities
1. Number of employees in 1990, 1996, expectation for 2001 (2Pt= 1 Ft)
Part-time
Full-time
Blue-collar
White-collar
2. Which percentage of your employees is unionised? (Not applicable in German companies)
3. To which union do your employees belong?
4. Which are the main challenges which your company faces in its personnel policies?
5. How were the dismissals which became necessary in the context of restructuring handled?
6. In your opinion, do the new production methods which have been introduced since FD1 (or, were 
applicable after 1990) higher equally or less qualified personnel?
7.1 Which further training became necessary as a consequence of the changes in production?
7.2 Who has provided and financed this training?
7.3 Which importance does your company ascribe to further training?
- unimportant
- secondary, but not unimportant
- very important but time constraints ( )  or financial consideration ( ) hardly make it 
possible for us to provide our workforce with additional training
- very important, and even though we face the above problems, we make it possible for 
employees to occasionally visit courses etc.
- very important, and we make sure that each employees receives further training
7.4 How company specific are the skills acquired through this further training?
8.1 Have you introduced new forms of work organisation?
- quality control groups 
-job rotation
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-job enrichment
- flexible working hours
- project groups
- other
8.2 Why have you introduced the changes in 8.1
8.3 Are there any forms of work organisation which you have abandoned?
8.4 Why did you stop the forms in 8.3?
8.5 How has labour productivity developed?
9.1 Are there any (Ubertarifliche Sozialleistungen) social services which are provided by your company 
over and above those incorporated into the Tarifvertrag?
9.2 If yes, which are these?
9.3 Which social services have been stopped since FDI?
10.1 Are there demands on the side of the employees concerning:
- company social services
- personnel policies
- involvement in the introduction of new technologies/ production methods
- work load
- work organisation 
-other
10.2 In case there are demands, do you think that they are justified? (1 very justified— >6 unjustified)
10.3 If you think that the demands in 10.1 are rather unjustified, what do you think they are due to (1 
entirely, 2 partly)
- the interests of individual employees
- the policies of the trade union representative
- dissatisfaction with the work
- bad company climate
- good company climate
- political interests
- illusions
- other
11. Please try to characterise your company (1 agree— > 6 do not agree)
Our company
1.1 uses conservative and traditional management principles
1.2 uses modem organisational approaches
2. interprets itself as the social community of the workforce
3. sees employees mainly from the perspective of economically rational human capital usage
4.1 attempts to enhance the independence of employees
4.2 limits the independence of the employees in the interest of clearly defined areas of 
responsibly
In our company
5.1 conflicts are seen as avoidable
5.2 conflicts are seen as necessary for finding and implementing real solutions to problems
6.1 we view the Betriebrat as a legal requirement but a disturbance
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6.2 we view the trade union representative as an important Partner in decisions concerning 
our company
F. The regional effects of FDI: Structural changes 
Interviewpartner
1. How important are the following regional characteristics for the success of your company? (large, 
small, insignificant)
- availability of a highly qualified workforce
- availability of a cheap workforce
- proximity to the most important customers
- proximity to the most important input suppliers
- proximity the suppliers of services needed by the company
- proximity to research institutions
- a competent local government
- a relatively well developed infrastructure in the region
- other
2. How important were the following regional characteristics for the investment decision of your 
investor?
(large, small, insignificant)
- availability of a highly qualified workforce
- availability of a cheap workforce
- proximity to the most important customers
- proximity to the most important input suppliers
- proximity the suppliers of services needed by the company
- proximity to research institutions
- a competent local government
- a relatively well developed infrastructure in the region
- other
3. How has the geographical distribution of your input suppliers changed? (Please give approximate 
percentages, 1990, 1996, 2001)
- Berlin/ Brandenburg area
- East Germany
- West Germany
- Eastern Europe 
-EU
- other
4. How high is the proportion of standardised merchandise (Catalogue listed products) in your entire 
input demanded?
5. From where do you primarily procure such standardised products? (primary source/ secondary 
source)
- Berlin/ Brandenburg area
- East Germany
- West Germany
- Eastern Europe 
-EU
- other
6. According to which criteria have you changed (indicate nature of the change) your position of the 
vertical chain?
(primarily, secondarily, unimportant)
- costs
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- capacity utilisation
- know-how
- flexibility
7.1 How high is the proportion of “old” suppliers (those which whom you were in contact before your 
investor approached you) in relation to the total number of suppliers?
- standard products____ %
- customised products_______ %
7.2 How high is the proportion of suppliers which also belong to your investor?
- standard products____ %
- customised products_______ %
8. Which were the main reasons to maintain your contact with the “old” suppliers? (primarily, 
secondarily, unimportant)
- price
- quality
- proximity
- good experiences in the past
- willingness to cater for special requests
9. According to which criteria do you choose your new suppliers? (primarily, secondarily, unimportant)
- price
- quality
- existence of quality control processes
- punctuality
- belonging to the same conglomerate
- other
10. Which were the main reasons why you have stopped using certain old suppliers?
11. Do you think that there is a difference between suppliers located in the East Germany and those 
located in West Germany?
12. How think will your supply arrangements develop in the next 3 to 5 years?
G. The relationship the vour suppliers 
Interviewpartner
1.1 How frequently do you evaluate your suppliers according to a set routine?
1.2 Which factors do you consider in your evaluation?
- punctuality
- proportion of faulty supplies
- quality standard of the products supplied
- quality control procedures
- other
2.1 What kind of agreements do you have with your suppliers concerning quality purchased?
- a fixed number of units
- binding quantity agreements
- minimum number of units/ quantity
- other
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2.2 (1 agree---> 6 disagree) We take into consideration the need of our suppliers for stable and
continuous orders.
3. How long are your contracts with suppliers normally?
4. What are the main reasons for this time-frame?
5. Are there any tasks which you solve together with your suppliers? (frequently, seldom, never)
- R&D
- common investment into tools/ machinery
- common stock management
- other
6. With which arguments do you try to get your suppliers to make maximal concessions?
- buying at the competitors
- stopping the supply relationship
- situation in the final market
- other
7. To the extent that there have been disagreements between you and a supplier concerning the
interpretation of, for example, the supply contract or the implementation of quality control processes, 
how would you describe the resolution of these differences? (1: applies------ >6 does not apply)
- we have found a fair compromise
- the supplier had to make the largest concessions
- the customer (we) had to make the main concessions
9. Should serious problems develop in your supply relationship with one of your suppliers, how are 
these resolved?
- there is close co-operation and common problem solving
- the parties are allocated separate problem areas but there is co-operation
- there is rather sporadic communication concerning the most important matters
- everybody solves there problems, to the extent that this is possible separately
10. How strongly do your suppliers take into consideration 
(1 very strongly—> 6 not at all)
10.1 principles of fairness
10.2 ideas of fair-reaching co-operation
10.3 your wishes and ideas
10.4 I trust my suppliers not to take advantage of my company should the opportunity arise. (1 very 
strongly—> 6 not at all)
10.5 Our suppliers trust my company not to take advantage of them should the possibility arise (1 very 
strongly—> 6 not at all)
11. We keep to agreements with our agreements with our suppliers because (1 agree— > 6 do not at all 
agree)
11.1 We are contractually bound
11.2 We would like to maintain the business relationship with our suppliers in the future
11.3 We are concerned about our reputation with other companies
11.4 This is the common practice in our industrial sector
11.5 Personal friendship with the suppliers leads me to keep to agreements
11.6 Personal honour (I always keep my promises) motivates me to keep to agreements
12. Why do you think do your suppliers keep to agreements with you? (1 agree— > 6 do not at all 
agree)
12.1 They are contractually bound
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12.2 They would like to maintain the business relationship with us in the future
12.3 They are concerned about their reputation with other companies
12.4 This is the common practice in their industrial sector
12.5 Personal friendship with us leads them to keep to agreements
12.6 Personal honour (I always keep my promises) motivates them to keep to agreements
13. What characterises in your judgement a successful relationship with a supplier?
14. What determines the success of a business relationship with a supplier? (1 agree— > 6 do not at all 
agree)
- our willingness to cater for extra-contractual requests of our suppliers is important
- our supplier’s willingness to cater for our extra-contractual requests is important
- mutual co-operation is important
- mutual trust is important
- personal contact is important
- a prompt payment of the inputs bought by us is important
- mutual information concerning technological developments is important
- it is very important that our supplier informs us about reductions in his raw material costs
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Appendix 2:
The statistical questions involved2
Throughout I examine whether the variables collected in the case studies yield any 
statistically significant associations, that is whether I can detect ant statistical 
regularities in may data. I am fully aware that I have a rather small number of 
observations for such an enterprise. The first thing to stress is that throughout I do 
not generalise to entire populations. I do not, for example, claim that all Hungarian 
companies behave in a certain way. Rather on the basis of the statistical regularities 
which hold for my data set only I generalise to theoretical propositions. Nevertheless 
even the use of small-sample significance tests cannot fully eliminate the problems 
posed by the small number of observations. Consequently especially associations of a 
10% significance levels should be treated with some care and they should not serve as 
the basis for any strong conclusions. Rather they indicate fruitful avenues for future 
research benefiting form a larger data set.
What I am interested in my study is a) the existence of an association, b) its direction 
and c) its statistical significance, but not in assigning a precise numerical value to the 
association in order to give it an economic interpretation. All the correlations 
reported in the relevant tables were obtained using Excel.3 4
1. For testing the significance of an association between two dummy variables a
chi-square test of independence using contingency tables is used. Chi-square tests 
are non-parametric and require no assumption about the exact shape of the population 
distribution. The null hypothesis is that the two variables are independent, which is 
another way of saying that there is no association between them. The null hypothesis 
can be rejected if X2 (obtained/ corrected) > X2 (critical) and in this case the 
association between the two dummies is unlikely to have been generated by chance 
alone.
In the cases where the data set is large enough to generate expected frequencies of 
more than 5 in each cell in the relevant contingency table the following formula is 
used:
2 I would like to thank Dr. Dennis Leach for his help in statistical matters. This section is based on 
Statistics by Joseph F. Healy, 4th edition, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1996, Modern Elementary 
Statistics by John E. Freund,, 7th edition, Prentice-Hall, 1988 and Statistics for Business and 
Economics by Paul Newbold, 3rd edition, Prentice-Hall, 1991
3 The correlation coefficients are all based on Pearson’s r, which is essentially a measure of a linear 
association between two interval-ratio variables. However, my data also contains associations involving 
dummies (qualitative variables which are measured at the nominal level). I find that firstly, nominal 
based measures of association such as LAMBDA and PHI yield similar numerical values as those 
obtained from Excel. Secondly, even if I used nominal rather than the interval ratio based measures of 
association, the numerical values obtained could not be given a precise economic interpretation in my 
study. For the purposes of hypothesis testing I treat the discrete variables in my data set as continuous 
ones.
4 The same approach was used for testing the hypothesis that the observations for two country-specific 
dummies can be pooled, that is when examining whether there are significant country-specific 
differences in the data set.
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X2 (obtained) = £  (Jo - f t  )2 / /  e
>y
The degrees of freedom of this X test statistic is given by the formula: 
df = ( r - l ) . ( c - l ) ,
where (r-1) is the number of rows in the contingency table minus one and (c-1) is the 
number of columns minus one. For two-times-two tables where the expected 
frequency in at least one cell is less than five, the above formula is modified by 
applying Yate’s correction for continuity:
X2 (corrected) = £  ( |/0 - / e | - 0.5)2 / f e.
A two-times-two table always has one degree of freedom regardless of the number of 
cases in the sample.
2. When testing the significance of the correlation between a dummy and a 
continuous variable a t-test is used which tests whether the differences in the means 
of the two data sub-groups (of the continuous variable) generated by the dummy are 
significant or not. This test is appropriate for small sample sizes, especially when the 
population standard deviation is unknown. However, when using t-tests in general, 
one has to assume that one is dealing with independent random samples, the level of 
measurement is the interval ratio, the two samples have equal population variances 
and the sampling distribution is normal.5 6The null hypothesis is that the means of the 
two sub-samples are identical, that is pi - P2 = 0- If one can reject the null because 
t (obtained) > t (critical) we can conclude that the differences between the means of 
the two (continuous variable) sub-groups generated by the dummy are significant and 
that therefore the correlation between the dummy and the continuous variables is 
significant. The relevant test statistic for differences in means of small samples is:
/  = p i - p 2 - 8 / V [  {(nj - 1) si2 + (n2 - 1) S22 / ni + n2 - 2} • (1/ ni + 1/ 112)]. 6
This statistic has nj + n2 - 2 degrees of freedom.
3. When testing for the significance of the correlation between two continuous 
variables we again use a small sample t-test7. As before, this assumes random
5 It is worth noting that in this case these assumptions apply to the sample means which are the objects 
of our tests, not the series of dummies which have generated the means in the first place.
6 The most general formulation of the null hypothesis is that p, - p2 = 5. If we are, as in my case, 
testing the null that pi - p2 = 0, then 8 = 0 in the above formula, n! and n2 are the number of 
observations in sub-sample one and two respectively. This test (rather than the appropriate z test) is 
used when, as in my case, ni < 30 or n2 < 30. Si2 and s22 are the sample variance of sub-sample one and 
two respectively. They are in each case calculated using the formula: s 2 = £ (x - Pi )2 / fa  -1), where x 
is an individual observation in sample i, Pi is its mean and nj is the number of observations in i.
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sampling, that the level of measurement is the interval ratio and that both variables 
are normally distributed. In addition, this t-test also assumes that the relationship 
between the two variables is roughly linear in form and fulfils the assumption of 
homoscedasticity, that is that the errors, «, in a given bivariate regression (this is what 
correlations effectively are) have a common variance. Differently formulated, 
homoscedasticity requires that the variance of the scores for variable Y are uniform 
for all values of X. For our purposes the visual inspection of a scattergram should 
usually be sufficient to appraise the extent to which the relationship at hand conforms 
to the assumption of homoscedasticity. The null hypothesis tested is that p  = 0. If we 
can reject the null [t (obtained) > t (critical)], this indicates that the correlation 
between the two variables at hand is significant.
The formula for the relevant t-statistic is:
/ = [r • V (n - 2)] / V (1- r2) ,
where r is the correlation coefficient for the two variables at hand and n is the number 
of (pairs of) observations. This t-statistic has n-2 degrees of freedom. 7
7 This test was also used when I explored whether there are significant differences between the means 
of two country-specific continuous variables.
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